On 02/07/2019 22:13, Larry Jordan via openssl-users wrote:
I want to build an openssl-fips canister to force IANA cipher suite
compliance.
With the help of an openssl-iana mapping
(https://testssl.sh/openssl-iana.mapping.html) I can identify the
corresponding OpenSSL cipher suites
I want to build an openssl-fips canister to force IANA cipher suite compliance.
With the help of an openssl-iana mapping
(https://testssl.sh/openssl-iana.mapping.html) I can identify the corresponding
OpenSSL cipher suites.
IANA
On 1/17/2019 5:33 PM, Jordan Brown wrote:
> Am I missing something?
Seems I was. Thanks, all.
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On Thu, Jan 17, 2019 at 5:40 PM Jordan Brown
wrote:
> On 1/14/2019 4:09 AM, Matt Caswell wrote:
>
> This works more "by accident". There is no ciphersuite alias called
> "TLSv1.3", so using it as above results in no ciphersuites matched. Since the
> TLSv1.3 ciphersuites are on by default anyway
On Friday, 18 January 2019 02:33:20 CET Jordan Brown wrote:
> On 1/14/2019 4:09 AM, Matt Caswell wrote:
> > This works more "by accident". There is no ciphersuite alias called
> > "TLSv1.3", so using it as above results in no ciphersuites matched.
> > Since the TLSv1.3 ciphersuites are on by
On Fri, Jan 18, 2019 at 01:33:20AM +, Jordan Brown wrote:
> On 1/14/2019 4:09 AM, Matt Caswell wrote:
> > This works more "by accident". There is no ciphersuite alias called
> > "TLSv1.3", so using it as above results in no ciphersuites matched.
> > Since the TLSv1.3 ciphersuites are on by
Hi,
V Fri, 18 Jan 2019 01:33:20 +
"Jordan Brown" napsáno:
> On 1/14/2019 4:09 AM, Matt Caswell wrote:
> > This works more "by accident". There is no ciphersuite alias called
> > "TLSv1.3", so using it as above results in no ciphersuites matched.
> > Since the TLSv1.3 ciphersuites are on by
On 1/14/2019 4:09 AM, Matt Caswell wrote:
> This works more "by accident". There is no ciphersuite alias called
> "TLSv1.3", so using it as above results in no ciphersuites matched.
> Since the TLSv1.3 ciphersuites are on by default anyway that's all
> that you get back.
>From what you say, and
On Mon, Jan 14, 2019 at 03:31:36PM -0500, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
> > to not depend on this "accident", right?
>
> The correct form would be:
>
> $ /usr/local/bin/openssl ciphers -s tls1_3 | tr ':' '\n'
> TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
> TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
>
On Mon, Jan 14, 2019 at 02:18:18PM +0100, Yann Ylavic wrote:
> I suppose one can always, e.g.:
>
> $ openssl ciphers -v |grep TLSv1.3 |awk '{print $1}' # or whatever filtering
>
> to not depend on this "accident", right?
The correct form would be:
$ /usr/local/bin/openssl ciphers -s
On Mon, Jan 14, 2019 at 5:18 AM Yann Ylavic wrote:
> I suppose one can always, e.g.:
>
> $ openssl ciphers -v |grep TLSv1.3 |awk '{print $1}' # or whatever filtering
>
> to not depend on this "accident", right?
No, `ciphers` gives you the TLS cipher suites that are enabled, it
doesn't give all.
On Mon, Jan 14, 2019 at 1:09 PM Matt Caswell wrote:
>
> This works more "by accident". There is no ciphersuite alias called "TLSv1.3",
> so using it as above results in no ciphersuites matched. Since the TLSv1.3
> ciphersuites are on by default anyway that's all that you get back.
OK, thanks for
On 13/01/2019 21:11, Yann Ylavic wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 8, 2019 at 11:24 PM Sam Roberts wrote:
>>
>> node.js has an API that lists all the cipher suite names that can be
>> validly passed to set_cipher_list(), but I don't see how to get them
>> for TLS1
On Tue, Jan 8, 2019 at 11:24 PM Sam Roberts wrote:
>
> node.js has an API that lists all the cipher suite names that can be
> validly passed to set_cipher_list(), but I don't see how to get them
> for TLS1.3 to list the valid inputs to set_cipher_suites().
FWIW, the below
On Wed 2019-01-09 04:16:05 +, Jordan Brown wrote:
> On 1/8/2019 7:44 PM, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
>> You could just provide a free-form emergency string parameter that
>> users are advised to not change unless some major advance makes it
>> necessary. At that time, advice can be published as to
On 1/8/2019 8:21 PM, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
> How do you plan to offer a built-in menu of algorithms that have not
> yet been added to OpenSSL?
I'm a bit confused as to why we would need to - if the underlying
OpenSSL doesn't support a particular algorithm, then there's no need to
disable it.
On 1/8/2019 7:44 PM, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
> So what you get is AESGCM with SHA2 or CHACHA20 with Poly1305.
> Breaks in either would be dramatic advances in cryptanalysis.
History shows that protocols, algorithms, and implementations all have
flaws. We assume that flaws will be discovered and
On Wed, Jan 09, 2019 at 04:16:05AM +, Jordan Brown wrote:
> > You could just provide a free-form emergency string parameter that
> > users are advised to not change unless some major advance makes it
> > necessary. At that time, advice can be published as to what the
> > override setting
On Tue, Jan 8, 2019 at 7:10 PM Viktor Dukhovni
wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 08, 2019 at 02:23:27PM -0800, Sam Roberts wrote:
> > node.js has an API that lists all the cipher suite names that can be
> > validly passed to set_cipher_list(), but I don't see how to get them
> > for TLS
On Wed, Jan 09, 2019 at 03:27:44AM +, Jordan Brown wrote:
> > Is there a good reason to want to change or freeze them at this time?
>
> Our products allow the user to enable and disable individual ciphers, to
> allow for both customer policy (e.g. a customer-specific approved-cipher
> list)
On 1/8/2019 7:10 PM, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
> The intent is that you SHOULD NOT generally customize the list. All
> the ciphers in question are quite safe, and if the default changes,
> you should probably go with that, rather than a frozen time-capsule
> version.
>
> Is there a good reason to
I would expect that smartphone clients might want to prioritize CHACHA over
AES, but I don't think Node cares about that environment.
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On Tue, Jan 08, 2019 at 02:23:27PM -0800, Sam Roberts wrote:
> node.js has an API that lists all the cipher suite names that can be
> validly passed to set_cipher_list(), but I don't see how to get them
> for TLS1.3 to list the valid inputs to set_cipher_suites().
The intent is that y
node.js has an API that lists all the cipher suite names that can be
validly passed to set_cipher_list(), but I don't see how to get them
for TLS1.3 to list the valid inputs to set_cipher_suites().
The openssl ciphers CLI doesn't seem able to do this either.
https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1
-requ...@openssl.org You can reach the person managing the list at
openssl-users-ow...@openssl.org When replying, please edit your Subject line so
it is more specific than "Re: Contents of openssl-users digest..." Today's
Topics: 1. Re: Integrating New Cipher Suite (Jakob Bohm) 2. Re: F
On 02/10/2017 00:47, Dr. Stephen Henson wrote:
On Sun, Oct 01, 2017, Wallboy wrote:
Hi,
...
Bonus Question: Is it possible to remove the SCSV cipher in the ClientHello?
You can't remove it without making source changes. Again it's in the
ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes() function.
Have you tried
On Sun, Oct 01, 2017, Wallboy wrote:
> Hi,
>
> I'm also interested in adding a few "pseudo" ciphersuites to OpenSSL.
> Notably the 16 GREASE ones Chrome currently uses (0x0A0A, 0x1A1A...0xFAFA).
>
> I made similar changes to the files listed in this thread and compiled
> successfully (based on
Hi,
I'm also interested in adding a few "pseudo" ciphersuites to OpenSSL.
Notably the 16 GREASE ones Chrome currently uses (0x0A0A, 0x1A1A...0xFAFA).
I made similar changes to the files listed in this thread and compiled
successfully (based on 1.1.0f). I see the new cipher when doing "openssl
On Fri, Apr 14, 2017, Schmicker, Robert wrote:
>
>
> After some debugging (exactly as mentioned above) it appears that the cipher
> suite does not show up in the ClientHello using the s_client/s_server. I
> modified the cipher for testing to use 512 bits instead of 64 so that
race and then try
>the -trace command ot s_client/s_server and see if the new ciphersuites is
>sent in ClientHello
>
>Steve.
>--
>Dr Stephen N. Henson. OpenSSL project core developer.
>Commercial tech support now available see: http://www.openssl.org
After some debugging (exa
Thank you for the quick replies!
@Matt Caswell
I have attempted to integrate the cipher suite into the source code and here is
what I have done so far…
Please keep in mind this was a previous attempt that mimicked a different
cipher suite.
Added defines in include/openssl/tls1.h:
# define
On Sat, Apr 08, 2017, Schmicker, Robert wrote:
> Hello,
>
> I'm attempting to integrate a customized cipher suite for TLS 1.2,
> however no matter what I try I always seem to end up with this error
> (client side):
>
> SSL routines:ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes:no ciphers
&
On 08/04/17 18:56, Schmicker, Robert wrote:
> Hello,
>
> I'm attempting to integrate a customized cipher suite for TLS 1.2,
> however no matter what I try I always seem to end up with this error
> (client side):
>
> SSL routines:ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes:no ciphers
&
Hello,
I'm attempting to integrate a customized cipher suite for TLS 1.2,
however no matter what I try I always seem to end up with this error
(client side):
SSL routines:ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes:no ciphers
available:ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c:3567
Can anyone give some further explanation
Does the -V flag not do what you want?
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On 14/12/16 08:09, Ajay Garg wrote:
> Hi All.
>
> I am using the following script at myu laptop, to test for the available
> cipher-suites :
>
>
> #!/usr/bin/env bash
>
> # OpenSSL requires the port number.
> SERVER=server.ip.com:12345
Hi All.
I am using the following script at myu laptop, to test for the available
cipher-suites :
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# OpenSSL requires the port number.
SERVER=server.ip.com:12345
DELAY=1
ciphers=$(openssl ciphers 'ALL:eNULL' | sed -e 's/:/
Thanks Michael.
From: openssl-users [mailto:openssl-users-boun...@openssl.org] On Behalf Of
Michael Wojcik
Sent: September-28-16 2:58 PM
To: openssl-users@openssl.org
Subject: [Newsletter] Re: [openssl-users] cipher suite list
Ivan Ristic's free OpenSSL Cookbook has a long section on cipher
> As for the silly disclaimer I have no control over adding it or not. My
> company must append it to the email when it sends it. ?
Please tell the folks at your company it is annoying. And consider posting
from a non-company address, then.
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Subject: [Newsletter] Re: [openssl-users] cipher suite list
Some places to look include:
https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS
https://bettercrypto.org/static/applied-crypto-hardening.pdf
ssllabs.com
observatory.mozilla.org
Ivan Ristic's free OpenSSL Cookbook has a long section on cipher suite
selection. It's available on
feistyduck<https://www.feistyduck.com/books/openssl-cookbook/>.
Michael Wojcik
Distinguished Engineer, Micro Focus
From: openssl-users [mailto:openssl-users-boun...@openssl.org] On
Some places to look include:
https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS
https://bettercrypto.org/static/applied-crypto-hardening.pdf
ssllabs.com
observatory.mozilla.org
And, by the way, the silly huge email disclaimer is obnoxious.
--
Senior
Hi, being somewhat of a newb to the security I thought I would ask the security
community about the current best practices/guidelines for configuring the list
of cipher suites that I should use in my client app. It seems like some cipher
suites fall out of favour over time and I would like to
> On Sep 24, 2016, at 7:16 PM, Salz, Rich wrote:
>
>>
>> Mr. Neugroschl's quest for a simple solution does bring up -- in my
>> user-oriented opinion -- a very good follow-on question: "Why cannot a
>> config file be utilized by openssl to simply give access based on an
>>
scot...@xypro.com
<mailto:scot...@xypro.com>> wrote:
Hi,
I’m afraid the man page on the conf file is not particularly clear. I’m
looking at mitigating CVE-2016-2183 (SWEET32), and am not sure how to
disable the DES and 3DES suites in the conf file.
Can someone give
Hi,
I'm afraid the man page on the conf file is not particularly clear. I'm
looking at mitigating CVE-2016-2183 (SWEET32), and am not sure how to disable
the DES and 3DES suites in the conf file.
Can someone give me a hand?
---
Scott Neugroschl | XYPRO Technology Corporation
4100 Guardian
I would like to use openssl as a basic DTLS server from the command line
using: openssl s_server -dtls1_2
The catch is I want to require the TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8
cipher suite. It appears OpenSSL currently doesn’t support this cipher
suite, even though it supports the both
On 03/09/15 07:22, Bryce Kahle wrote:
> I would like to use openssl as a basic DTLS server from the command line
> using: openssl s_server -dtls1_2
>
> The catch is I want to require the TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8
> cipher suite. It appears OpenSSL currently doesn’t supp
Good Morning,
I am trying to set up a TLS connection between an embedded processor and
remote server using the TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 cipher suite. This
cipher suite is supported on the device side and I can find aes-128-ccm as
a possibility on the fresh git clone of openssl. (using
On Wed, Aug 05, 2015, Colin Foe-Parker wrote:
Good Morning,
I am trying to set up a TLS connection between an embedded processor and
remote server using the TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 cipher suite. This
cipher suite is supported on the device side and I can find aes-128-ccm
according https://www.openssl.org/docs/apps/ciphers.html
the name of TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA is DHE-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA
but I found it's not working, and finally success with EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA
I think it's typo on document, where can I report this?
On 19/05/15 12:54, Weichen Lin wrote:
according https://www.openssl.org/docs/apps/ciphers.html
the name of TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA is DHE-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA
but I found it's not working, and finally success with EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA
I think it's typo on document, where can I report
Thank you, its very clearly
2015年5月19日 下午8:13於 Matt Caswell m...@openssl.org寫道:
On 19/05/15 12:54, Weichen Lin wrote:
according https://www.openssl.org/docs/apps/ciphers.html
the name of TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA is DHE-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA
but I found it's not working, and finally
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
Hi Rich,
Am 09.09.2014 00:42, schrieb Salz, Rich:
We are considering removing weak cryptography from the value of
DEFAULT. That is, append :!LOW:!EXPORT
It is currently defined as this in include/openssl/ssl.h: #define
Please consider also adding !SSLv3 and !RC4 to this list.
My plan is to move RC4 and MD5 to LOW; see RT3518. As for SSLv3, the issue is
that you really mean the protocol, not the ciphers (there's overlap with SSL
and TLS), which is configured separately, and only via code. So I think I have
On Tue, Sep 09, 2014 at 11:02:45AM +0200, Benny Baumann wrote:
Please consider also adding !SSLv3 and !RC4 to this list.
No. That would be unwise at this time.
--
Viktor.
__
OpenSSL Project
Moving RC4 to LOW is also premature. It is already at the bottom of the
medium cipherlist, that should be enough.
I am planning on doing it for master, not 1.0.2 That means it won't be in an
official release until... what, at least six months.
On Tue, Sep 09, 2014 at 08:42:36AM -0400, Salz, Rich wrote:
Moving RC4 to LOW is also premature. It is already at the bottom of the
medium cipherlist, that should be enough.
I am planning on doing it for master, not 1.0.2 That means it
won't be in an official release until... what, at
Master has security levels, which still need some work, but are a less crude
mechanism for such tweaks. Disabling RC4 at security level 2 or some such, is
better than incompatibly reclassifying it as LOW. We can discuss the
details
later.
That should probably also be done. But things
From: owner-openssl-us...@openssl.org [mailto:owner-openssl-
us...@openssl.org] On Behalf Of Viktor Dukhovni
Sent: Tuesday, 09 September, 2014 09:01
To: openssl-users@openssl.org
Subject: Re: Value of DEFAULT cipher suite
On Tue, Sep 09, 2014 at 08:42:36AM -0400, Salz, Rich wrote
that it
is not the preferred cipher suite when better options are enabled.
To improve security, raise the ceiling. ChaCha, new EC curves,
extensions to negotiate DH parameters, ... Raising the floor can
do more harm than good.
--
Viktor
For what it's worth, I'm with Victor on this. RC4 as cipher of last resort in
the
default set is better than not having it there at all.
Take it up with the IETF which has two working groups advocating against it.
UTA (use of TLS in applications) and the TLS group itself:
Far more productive than disabling RC4 would be ensuring that it is not the
preferred cipher suite when better options are enabled.
I am not disabling RC4. I am saying that applications that want to use it
will, after the post-1.0.2 release is adopted, need to take pro-active action
We disagree. I've got two IETF WG's coming to the same conclusion so making
post-1.0.2 follow IETF practices seems pretty inarguable.
The IETF is sadly also prone to knee-jerk reactions.
True. Some would put perpass in that category.
--
Principal Security Engineer
Akamai Technologies,
Yes, I'm jumping the gun claiming that the I-D are standards. They're not.
They're just drafts.
I'm willing to wait and see what happens for a few months.
__
OpenSSL Project
I can see RC4 going in the list of low security ciphers within a couple of
years anyways, so we can better discourage the usage right now.
2014-09-09 18:14 GMT+02:00 Salz, Rich rs...@akamai.com:
We disagree. I've got two IETF WG's coming to the same conclusion so
making post-1.0.2 follow IETF
unwise.
We could introduce a new cipher suite class name BCP, to complement
DEFAULT. The latter is broadly interoperable with sensible
ordering but inclusive cipher choices, the former would be more
restrictive, offering only the BCP cipher suites, sensibly ordered.
Applications that want BCP, could
From: owner-openssl-us...@openssl.org [mailto:owner-openssl-
us...@openssl.org] On Behalf Of Salz, Rich
Sent: Tuesday, 09 September, 2014 11:35
To: openssl-users@openssl.org
Subject: RE: Value of DEFAULT cipher suite
Far more productive than disabling RC4 would be ensuring
Folks who want strong BCP crypto, can disable MEDIUM.
Folks who want weak non-BCP crypto can enable LOW.
I'm putting this on hold to see where we are 6-9 months from now.
--
Principal Security Engineer
Akamai Technologies, Cambridge MA
IM: rs...@jabber.me Twitter: RichSalz
On 09/09/2014 00:42, Salz, Rich wrote:
We are considering removing weak cryptography from the value of DEFAULT. That is, append
:!LOW:!EXPORT
It is currently defined as this in include/openssl/ssl.h:
#define SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST ALL:!aNULL:!eNULL:!SSLv2
Please let us know if
In addition to removing the very-weak (less than 70 bits security) ciphers
from the default list,this would be a good opportunity to reorder the default
I'd prefer to wait until TLS 1.3 is implemented, which has some definite (and
rather strong :) feelings on the subject. Doing things like
On Tue, Sep 09, 2014 at 07:04:36PM +0200, Jakob Bohm wrote:
In addition to removing the very-weak (less than 70 bits security)
ciphers from the default list,this would be a good opportunity to
reorder the default list (either via the define, or bettervia whatever
internal priorities guide the
On 09/09/2014 19:20, Salz, Rich wrote:
In addition to removing the very-weak (less than 70 bits security) ciphers
from the default list,this would be a good opportunity to reorder the default
I'd prefer to wait until TLS 1.3 is implemented, which has some definite (and
rather strong :)
You really should look at the extensive research done by SSL Labsbefore
blindly deprecating stuff.
Sorry you think I'm doing that. I'm raising an issue six months before it will
affect people.
--
Principal Security Engineer, Akamai Technologies
IM: rs...@jabber.me Twitter: RichSalz
We are considering removing weak cryptography from the value of DEFAULT. That
is, append :!LOW:!EXPORT
It is currently defined as this in include/openssl/ssl.h:
#define SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST ALL:!aNULL:!eNULL:!SSLv2
Please let us know if you have strong objections to this.
--
From: owner-openssl-users On Behalf Of Vladimir Belov
Sent: Monday, December 23, 2013 23:13
And just one question. Is there any possibility to set different
cipher suits for different versions of TLS?
Certainly not released.
For example, I want to exclude RC4 cipher suits wholly for TLS
of choice cipher
suite for connection by Server from client's list?
Is it simple so: server looks at its ciphers list from top to bottom and
the first corresponding cipher suite that will be in ClientHello's cipher
list will be chosen for connection. Or something else?
And the second question
2013/12/23 Sri Ramya ramya.1...@gmail.com
hi,
please go through the below link..
http://www.openssl.org/docs/apps/ciphers.html
There is no answer to the question What is the algorithm of choice
cipher suite for connection by Server?
About Сipher suits for different TLS versions i started
of choice cipher suite for
connection by Server?
Hi,
On Server we have an ordered list of cipher suits. Server gets a cipher suits
of client in ClientHello. What is the algorithm of choice cipher suite for
connection by Server from client's list?
Is it simple so: server looks at its ciphers list
Thank you very much, Dave, for the answer and detailed explanation.
And just one question. Is there any possibility to set different
cipher suits for different versions of TLS?
For example, I want to exclude RC4 cipher suits wholly for TLS 1.2/1.1
and leave them only for =TLS 1.0 The reason is
Hi,
On Server we have an ordered list of cipher suits. Server gets a cipher
suits of client in ClientHello. What is the algorithm of choice cipher
suite for connection by Server from client's list?
Is it simple so: server looks at its ciphers list from top to bottom and
the first corresponding
() . Which files(s) need to
be addresses?
--
View this message in context:
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Sent from the OpenSSL - User mailing list archive at Nabble.com
Hi,
Could you help where do i need to change the method from
TLSv1_2_server_method() to SSLv23_server_method() . Which files(s) need to
be addresses?
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Sent
This problem is related to an issue I have been experiencing with a
piece of bespoke software I am writing that uses OpenSSL to terminate
SSL/TLS connections, using non-blocking I/O.
Observations:
- My server's TLS handshake for cipher ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 fails.
- If I use ALL for my
On Fri, Nov 09, 2012, Karel Sedl??ek wrote:
This problem is related to an issue I have been experiencing with a
piece of bespoke software I am writing that uses OpenSSL to terminate
SSL/TLS connections, using non-blocking I/O.
Observations:
- My server's TLS handshake for cipher
I have; following is the relevant snippet:
int nid = OBJ_sn2nid(ECDHE_CURVE);
if (NID_undef == nid)
goto err_obj_sn2nid;
EC_KEY *ecdh = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
if (NULL == ecdh)
goto err_ec_key_new;
SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(tls_ctx, ecdh);
On Fri, Nov 9, 2012 at 5:32 PM,
On Fri, Nov 09, 2012, Karel Sedl??ek wrote:
I have; following is the relevant snippet:
int nid = OBJ_sn2nid(ECDHE_CURVE);
if (NID_undef == nid)
goto err_obj_sn2nid;
EC_KEY *ecdh = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
if (NULL == ecdh)
goto err_ec_key_new;
I was using secp521r1, but secp384r1 has the same behavior. Here is
the output with -state:
CONNECTED(0003)
SSL_connect:before/connect initialization
write to 0x7fe008426dd0 [0x7fe008810800] (165 bytes = 165 (0xA5))
- 16 03 01 00 a0 01 00 00-9c 03 03 50 9d 3f 85 bf ...P.?..
On Fri, Nov 09, 2012, Karel Sedl??ek wrote:
I was using secp521r1, but secp384r1 has the same behavior. Here is
the output with -state:
SSL_connect:error in SSLv2/v3 read server hello A
140735101956572:error:14077410:SSL
routines:SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO:sslv3 alert handshake
Just discovered the culprit. I had configured the server using
TLSv1_server_method(), going from
http://www.openssl.org/docs/ssl/SSL_CTX_new.html and assuming TLSv1
encompasses v1.{1,2}. Stumbled on this by chance by experimenting with
forcing TLSv1.2 (of which the desired cipher suite is a part
7:12 PM
To: openssl-users@openssl.org
Subject: Re: Making AES-CCM available as a TLS-negotiated cipher suite
Hi Paul,
On Wed, Apr 18, 2012 at 2:01 PM, Muschick, Paul paul.musch...@itron.com wrote:
So, it’s ironic that only after I post to the mailing list, I solve my
first problem. For visitors
Hi Paul,
On Wed, Apr 18, 2012 at 2:01 PM, Muschick, Paul paul.musch...@itron.com wrote:
So, it’s ironic that only after I post to the mailing list, I solve my first
problem. For visitors from the future, to fully add a new cipher suite, you
can’t forget to add your cipher’s EVP_CIPHER
So, it's ironic that only after I post to the mailing list, I solve my first
problem. For visitors from the future, to fully add a new cipher suite, you
can't forget to add your cipher's EVP_CIPHER* accessor function (generated by
the BLOCK_CIPHER_custom macro) to SSL_library_init
On Wed, Apr 18, 2012, Muschick, Paul wrote:
So, it's ironic that only after I post to the mailing list, I solve my first
problem. For visitors from the future, to fully add a new cipher suite, you
can't forget to add your cipher's EVP_CIPHER* accessor function (generated
Hello all,
I've been working on getting AES-CCM available for negotiation over a TLS
connection. I know that AES-CCM is available via the EVP interface, but I need
it to be available as a TLS cipher suite so it can be negotiated with a client.
I started adding it as a new cipher suite
Hi,
I want to run a TLS Server with support of cipher suite
'ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256' (RFC 5289). Unfortunately I can't find these cipher
suite
within tls1.h. ECDSA is only available with SHA1.
Since openssl supports SHA256 I thought that ECDSA with SHA256 should be
available, or am I
Bonjour,
Hodie VIII Kal. Iun. MMXI, shoutee scripsit:
I want to run a TLS Server with support of cipher suite
'ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256' (RFC 5289). Unfortunately I can't find these
cipher suite
within tls1.h. ECDSA is only available with SHA1.
Since openssl supports SHA256 I thought
On Wed, May 25, 2011, Erwann ABALEA wrote:
Bonjour,
Hodie VIII Kal. Iun. MMXI, shoutee scripsit:
I want to run a TLS Server with support of cipher suite
'ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256' (RFC 5289). Unfortunately I can't find these
cipher suite
within tls1.h. ECDSA is only available
Bonjour,
Hodie VIII Kal. Iun. MMXI, Dr. Stephen Henson scripsit:
On Wed, May 25, 2011, Erwann ABALEA wrote:
Hodie VIII Kal. Iun. MMXI, shoutee scripsit:
I want to run a TLS Server with support of cipher suite
'ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256' (RFC 5289). Unfortunately I can't find
On Wed, 25 May 2011 12:21:04 +0200
Dr. Stephen Henson st...@openssl.org wrote:
On Wed, May 25, 2011, Erwann ABALEA wrote:
Bonjour,
Hodie VIII Kal. Iun. MMXI, shoutee scripsit:
I want to run a TLS Server with support of cipher suite
'ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256' (RFC 5289
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