[peirce-l] Re: reduction of the manifold to unity
Hi Joe, It has been a very long time away from this list! I just happened to read your wonderful post to Jim on the nature and primacy of play/art/craft, all of which as you suggest seem to be cognitively far more complex, and yet precedes what one would think of as the logical sequence of cognitive development or our general ability to make sense of things around us. It is truly amazing, and never as much reflected on it, till I read your post! I just happened to recollect that Peirce had an unusual interest in the notion of play through his readings of FCS Schiller (Please, correct me if I'm wrong on this!). No wonder then that kids as they learn to make sense of things around them, get to be such good actors! Shekhar Veera The Woodlands, TX From: Joseph Ransdell [EMAIL PROTECTED] Reply-To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Subject: [peirce-l] Re: reduction of the manifold to unity Date: Tue, 12 Sep 2006 10:19:31 -0700 (PDT) Just now getting arond to addressing your question of several days ago, Jim: you formulate it towards the end of your message as follows: JP: I don't see how a sign can represent without there being an observor role which is functionally distinct from the role of mere participant. So anyway that's my question -- is Peirce's theory of representation and the sign meant to imply or address this issue of an observor or am I just misreading something into it that is not there. I will be greatly dissapointed if such a notion or something akin to it is not part of what is intended by the idea of a triadic relation as being above and beyond that of a mere dyadic relation. But then there are those Peirce comments about consciousness being a mere quality or firstness so I'm not so sure. OK -- I hope I have made clear the nature of my concern and look forward to any comments you might have. I realize I'm drifting a bit from the initial question that started this exchnage but I for me the questions are very much related. I'm trying to get at and understand the relation of the sign as carrier of meaning and as that which gives rise to the feeling we have of being not simply participants in a world (like colliding billiard balls) but of also being observors of this participation -- aware of our nakedness and so on. The notion that in the beginning (of awareness) was the word. REPLY: REPLY: I would say that his theory of representation has to be capable of articulating that distinction or there is something wrong with it, but I don't think that it is to be looked for merely in the distinction between the dyadic and the triadic but rather in something to do with the different functions being performed by icons, indices, and symbols, and that the distancing or detachment you are concerned with is to be understood especially in connection with the understanding of the symbol as involving an imputed quality. What this says is, I think, that we do not interpret a symbol as a symbol unless we are aware both that the replica we are interpreting is one thing and that what it means is something other than that, namely, the entity we imagine in virtue of its occurrence. Explicating that will in turn involve appeal to the functioning of a quality functioning as an icon of something the replica indexes. Of course we are not normally aware of all of that when we are actually undergoing the experience of understanding what someone says, for example, but something that is actually very complex really must be going on nonetheless, as seems clear from, say, what is happening when we are watching a drama on a stage in front of us and are capable of understanding what is being said and done in the play AS action in a play and are able to be engaged by the actor's actions as being at once the entity enacted and a mere enacting which is NOT what is enacted. What never ceases to amaze me is the way in which I find myself able to be responsive to the actors as if they are something which I know at the very moment to be quite different from what they actually are. How is that dual consciousness possible? What is all the more amazing to me is that the ability to interpret actions as mere representative acts rather than as the actual acts which they appear to be actually seems to be earlier in our development than our ability to interpret things for what they literally are. Why do I say this? Because I am thinking about the way in which young animals -- like dogs and cats, say -- spend their early lives merely pretending to be fighting with one another and only later put the skills acquired in play into action as serious or non-playful actions. They bite but from the very beginning do so in such a way as to make it only a pretense bite by stopping just before it gets serious. Of course they are not always successful at this. I have a cat who is extraordinarily
[peirce-l] Re: reduction of the manifold to unity
Joe, Jim What Joe has said in his response to Jim of Sept 12, seems to reflect something that may have arisen from Peirce's early exposure to philosophy: his reading of Schiller's _Aesthetic Letters_. In writing up a report on cultural impacts in occupational health and safety, I found myself reading Schiller in order to get a grasp on the origins of the modern concept of culture, and recalled that Peirce had written something on Schiller during his early Harvard days (or before: I don't have acces to the _Writings_ right now, but I recall seeing something in one of the early volumes, and at Arisbe). In any case: perhaps what Joe has said here has to do with the relationship between learning, play, and (maybe?) what Peirce called Musement? Schiller, J.C.F. Von (1794/1910). Letters Upon The Aesthetic Education of Man. In Literary and philosophical essays: French, German and Italian. With introductions and notes . New York , Collier [c1910] Series: The Harvard classics, 32. It's also available on the Web, with a few minor typos.Just flying a kite, folks ... Cheers Arnold Shepperson --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: reduction of the manifold to unity
REPLY: I would say that his theory of representation has to be capable of articulating that distinction or there is something wrong with it, but I don't think that it is to be looked for merely in the distinction between the dyadic and the triadic but rather in something to do with the different functions being performed by icons, indices, and symbols, and that the distancing or detachment you are concerned with is to be understood especially in connection with the understanding of the symbol as involving an "imputed" quality. What this says is, I think, that we do not interpret a symbol as a symbol unless we are aware both that the replica we are interpreting is one thing and that what it means is something other than that, namely, the entity we imagine in virtue of its occurrence. Explicating that will in turn involve appeal to the functioning of a quality functioning as an icon of something the replica indexes. Dear Joe, Thanks for the thoughtful and suggestive reply. I'm looking forward to thinking about it duringthe coming week. In the meantimehere are some initialimpressions just by way of saying thanks -- One, I very much like the idea of expanding the issue to include the icon. I think you are right that the phenomenon of observation (for the lack of a better word) is one of representation and involves all three categories. And yes as well to the suggestion of looking at the notion of imputation. I take "imputation" as another word for representation. To impute is to represent the sign forwhat it is -- the functional mode of being. Pretending, playing, taking an"as if" stance and the like -- all examples of the process of representation or seeing the world triadicly. I'm not looking to introduce something new. It's more like housekeeping -- trying to tidy up some notions, put all the same colorsocks together and separatethe things to do list from the things themselves. Also hope to pick up Black Elk's contemplative book from Amazon. Watching the news these days onehungers for just such an account.Current worldeventsareupsetting enough in their own right, but it's the hectoring account of them that is truly driving me crazy. Cherry picking the facts and premisesto fit a preconceived conclusion --on both sides of the political spectrum. More later after I've had more time to digest your post and the comments for Martin and Arnold. Thanks again, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: reduction of the manifold to unity
thematical entities and the entities which the hard sciences study. But we are only just now getting around to understanding something about representation in a theoretical way. Yet a reading of The Sacred Pipe, the text authored orally by the Sioux wise man Black Elk (written down by an anthropologist with the translational aid of Black Elk's son, as I recall), suggests that Black Elk actually had a clarity of understanding about the symbolic/iconic significance of the basic cultural practices of the Sioux, prior to the conquest, which is unparalleled by any other religious text that I have any acquaintance with. He goes through ritual activities in great detail, explaining every action taken in terms of its representative qualities AS representative qualities without showing even a trace of confusion between the literal and symbolic at any point. in other words, that book shows a genuinely semiotical level of understanding so sophisticated and dsciplined as to suggest that the coming of civilization, which means the destruction of tribal life, actually involved a regression in human intelligence in at least one fundamental respect that has yet to be recovered. The point is that this seems to exemplify in another way the same thing that is puzzling about the seeming priority of playfulness to seriousness. Well, anyway, the point I was intending to make initially was simply that what you are wanting to account for, which is the difference between participative and observational awareness, seems to me to hinge importantly on understanding the way symbolism in particular functions, which has to be explicated in terms of the cooperative functioning of icons and indices. This may tie in with what Martin was getting at, at least in part. Joe - Original Message From: Jim Piat [EMAIL PROTECTED]To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.eduSent: Saturday, September 9, 2006 1:44:02 PMSubject: [peirce-l] Re: "reduction of the manifold to unity" Dear Joe, Thanks for your informal and very helpful response. I think I was misunderstanding the introductory passage in the New List.So I have a few more questions.First some background. My understanding is that signs refer to and stand for the meaning of objects. In standing for objectssignscan beuseful tools for communicating about objects as well as for conducting thought experiments about objects. But it is their function of referring to objects that I want to focus upon and ask you about.It seems to methatin defining signs as referring to objects part of what this definition implies is thatthe sign user is in the position of standing outside (or perhaps above and beyond) the mere reactive world of the object being referred to and observed. IOWs the sign user has a POV with respect to the object that is beyonda mere indexical relationship. That being an "observor" or spectator requires a level or dimension of detachment that goes beyond the level or dimension of attachment that is involved in "participation with" or reacting to an object. And so I'm thinking that an indexical representation is more than just a tool for indexing an object or giving voice toone's sub or pre-representationalunderstanding of an object. I'm thinking that representation is also (and perhaps most importantly) the process by which one achieves the observational stance. Or, to put it another way, that the capacity to step back from the world of objects and observe them as existing is one and the same as the capacity to represent objects. That, in effect, the ability to represent isthefoundation of being an observor in a world of existing objects as opposed tobeing merely a reactive participant in existence.. Actually, as I think about this a bit more, maybe it is notsimply the sign's function of "referring" but also the signs function of"standing for" that creates, presumes or makes possible the "observor" POV. But however one cuts it I don't see how a sign can represent without there being an observor role which is functionally distinct fromthe role of mere participant. So anyway that's my question -- is Peirce's theory of representation and the sign meant to imply or address this issue of an observor or am I just misreading something into it that is not there. I will be greatly dissapointed if such a notion or something akin to it is not part of what is intended by the idea of a triadic relation as being above and beyond that of a mere dyadic relation. But then there are those Peirce comments about consciousness being a mere quality or firstness so I'm not so sure. OK -- I hope I have made clear the nature of my concern and look forward to any comments you might have. I realize I'm drifting a bit from the initial question that started this exchnage but Ifor me the questions are very much related. I'm trying to get at and understand the relation of the sign as carrier of meaning and as that which gives rise tothe feeli
[peirce-l] Re: reduction of the manifold to unity
Title: [peirce-l] Re: reduction of the manifold to unity Jim, At first glance, your comment gives me the impression that you are psychologizing semiosis by introducing the sign user (and his consciousness) into the equation. (Something Charles Morris will do). I don't have ready access to the CP right now, but I recall that Peirce later criticized the fact that NL can lead to a psychological understanding, though this was not his intent at the time. Considering that sign processes take place in nature (the Universe's growth being the unfolding of an Argument) we cannot reduce semiosis to psychology (though psychological facts are semeiotic) which concerns only the human mind, not Mind in general. What would it mean, therefore, to say that nature observes the object when it carries out qualities of feeling that have grown into laws (laws being habits that have lost practically all plasticity in becoming inaffected by chance), through the working of the law of mind. Having said this, it may be possible to distinguish aspects of the human use of signs, what some (like John Deely) call anthroposemiosis, from other manifestations of semiosis (say, in the world of animals, or that of plants -- recall Peirce's famous sunflower example). When we use signs, like language, we are aware (to some extent) of doing so, and therefore represent (to ourselves) the signs we use and their processes through other signs. When I speak I typically have an understanding of what it is I'm trying to say -- that is, of the aboutness of my speech (the object) -- and of some, if not all, of the consequences or outcomes (the interpretants) of my words as chosen to stand for the object in just the way that they do (unless, of course, I happen to be a Freudo-Lacanian psychoanalyst...). In an important piece written in 1906 (ms. 283, published in EPII) Peirce writes that A sign [...] just in so far as it fulfills the function of a sign, and none other, perfectly conforms to the definition of a medium of communication. It is determined by the object, but in no other respect than goes to enable it to act upon the interpreting quasi-mind; and the more perfectly it fulfills its function as a sign, the less effect it has upon that quasi-mind other than that of determining it as if the object itself had acted upon it. (emphasis mine). Symbols are signs that perfectly fulfill their function as signs in that they necessarily determine oher signs. Symbols, unlike icons and indices, are signs whose very being is to be interpreted (see New Elements, also in EP II). Of course, all signs, in order to act as signs must be interpreted -- but, symbols, unlike icons and indices, are nothing if there not interpretable. Whenever we set out to use signs whether we use them iconically, indexically or symbolically --, that is, when we are conscious of using something to stand for something else, we are (necessarily) aware of their interpretability: here, semiosis, the action of the sign, becomes itself an object of our thought. In this case our consciousness is merely a further interpretant of the initial sign and of its triadic relation to the object and the interpretant. Could it be, then, that this what you're after? Martin Lefebvre Dear Joe, Thanks for your informal and very helpful response. I think I was misunderstanding the introductory passage in the New List.So I have a few more questions.First some background. My understanding is that signs refer to and stand for the meaning of objects. In standing for objectssignscan beuseful tools for communicating about objects as well as for conducting thought experiments about objects. But it is their function of referring to objects that I want to focus upon and ask you about.It seems to methatin defining signs as referring to objects part of what this definition implies is thatthe sign user is in the position of standing outside (or perhaps above and beyond) the mere reactive world of the object being referred to and observed. IOWs the sign user has a POV with respect to the object that is beyonda mere indexical relationship. That being an observor or spectator requires a level or dimension of detachment that goes beyond the level or dimension of attachment that is involved in participation with or reacting to an object. And so I'm thinking that an indexical representation is more than just a tool for indexing an object or giving voice toone's sub or pre-representationalunderstanding of an object. I'm thinking that representation is also (and perhaps most importantly) the process by which one achieves the observational stance. Or, to put it another way, that the capacity to step back from the world of objects and observe them as existing is one and the same as the capacity to represent objects. That, in effect, the ability to represent isthefoundation of being an observor in a world of existing objects as opposed tobeing merely a reactive participant in existence.. Actually, as I think about
[peirce-l] Re: reduction of the manifold to unity
Title: [peirce-l] Re: "reduction of the manifold to unity" Dear Martin, Thanks for these comments. You may well be right that I am introducingan unnecessarypsychological overlay to my account of representation.What follows aresome of my initialthoughts as I beginthe process ofstudyingyour very interesting and helpful comments. Could it be that,although it is not necessary to be conscious in order to interpret a symbol,it is, nevertheless, the triadic nature of symbols (or thirdness in general) that makesobservation possible? I'm thinking about the distinction between reacting and interpreting. Reaction, it seems to me, affects both the acting and reacting participants in equal but opposite ways. OTOH interpretation is asymetrical in thatit affects the interpretant without any corresponding affect on the symbol or the object. Interpretation is more like what we call observation and reaction is more like what we call participation. I am not offering the notions ofparticipation and observation as psychological explanations or causesof dyadic and triadic relations but rather the opposite. I'm saying that a dyadic relation is at the root of what we call theeveryday experience of raw (ie un-observed) participation and that a triadic relation is atthe rootof of observation. So often theact of observation is mis-taken as something thatis independent ofthe objectand itssign (or measurement), but as quantum physics teaches they are an irreducible triad and can not be built from or reduced to any combination of participations in dyadic reactions. That said I'm still very unsure of myself on this and you may be right that I am mostly just putting unneccessary psychological clothes on the naked truth. (Not your words I know but I couldn't resist oncethey popped into my head). But still, there is something about a concern for modestythat physics and logic lack in a way that psychology as the study of humans' being can not. What I take Peirce (a notable psychologist in his own right) to have rejected about the some of the psychologizing of his day was the tendency of some to suppose thatlabelingapuzzling phenomenawith afamiliar psychological name somehow provided an adequate explanation. But I am not trying to give a psychological account of representation. On the contrary I am trying to give a semiotic account ofthe psychologicalexperience ofobservation. Ah, a quickaside on consciousness as awareness of interpretation. It seems to me that there is something fundamentally faulty about the sorts of explanations that attempt to account for consciousness by a series of reactions to reactions (responding to responding, knowledge of knowledge etc). Off hand I can't think of a term for this sort of analysis but it smacks of an infinite regress and I don't find it persausive as an argument either for or against some explanation. The point is a triadic relation is the basis for all these supposed infinite regressions and triads only go three levels deep before they cycle back and repeat the same process. Not as an infinite regression but as a cycle completed. I say three levels deep on a intuitive hunch. There are only three elements involved and the analysis can only take three POV. If a phenomenon is triadic that is enough said about its recursive nature. Talk of an infinite regression neither adds nor detracts from the analysis. Butthese comments arejust an speculative aside.Ha, who am I kidding, my whole post is just a speculative aside! In any case, Martin, thanks very much for your comments. I'm will continue toponderthem. And I look forward to Joe's take as well.I'm wondering in particular how this issue might relate to the distinction between the act of assertion andthat which is asserted.Seems to me a mere fact is dyadic whereas an asserted fact is triadic. The problem is we assume that what we observe are "mere"facts but we have no access to mere givens without representation/observation. We are trying to build the explanation of a phenomenausing building blocks that include the phenomena itself. Which is why I am so often talking in circles. On a good day. Best wishes, Jim Piat Jim, At first glance, your comment gives me the impression that you are "psychologizing" semiosis by introducing the sign user (and his consciousness) into the equation. (Something Charles Morris will do). I don't have ready access to the CP right now, but I recall that Peirce later criticized the fact that NL can lead to a psychological understanding, though this was not his intent at the time. Considering that sign processes take place in nature (the Universe's growth being the unfolding of an Argument) we cannot reduce semiosis to psychology (though psychological facts are semeiotic) which concerns only the human mind, not Mind in general. What would it mean, therefore, to say that nature "obser
[peirce-l] Re: reduction of the manifold to unity
Title: [peirce-l] Re: "reduction of the manifold to unity" Dear Folks --I apologizefor mistakenly including all those prior posts in my last post! Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: reduction of the manifold to unity
Title: [peirce-l] Re: reduction of the manifold to unity Dear Jim, I understand (or think I do) your qualm about the distinction between reacting and interpreting. But just as much as Peirce distinguished between conduct and though only in matters of degree (thought for him is a form of conduct -- this is clear, for instance, when he discusses the normative sciences), I think the same holds for what you call reacting and interpreting. Moreover, dynamical interpretants have a reactive element of Secondness in them... So I guess I'm not sure I see where you're aiming... I'll have to think about it some more and wait to see what others have to say... One last thing, though: it seems that putting the issue in terms of access to givens (at the end of your post you write: The problem is we assume that what we observe are merefacts but we have no access to mere givens without representation/observation) brings us back to the dreaded Kantian ding-an-sich... best, Martin Lefebvre Dear Martin, Thanks for these comments. You may well be right that I am introducingan unnecessarypsychological overlay to my account of representation.What follows aresome of my initialthoughts as I beginthe process ofstudyingyour very interesting and helpful comments. Could it be that,although it is not necessary to be conscious in order to interpret a symbol,it is, nevertheless, the triadic nature of symbols (or thirdness in general) that makesobservation possible? I'm thinking about the distinction between reacting and interpreting. Reaction, it seems to me, affects both the acting and reacting participants in equal but opposite ways. OTOH interpretation is asymetrical in thatit affects the interpretant without any corresponding affect on the symbol or the object. Interpretation is more like what we call observation and reaction is more like what we call participation. I am not offering the notions ofparticipation and observation as psychological explanations or causesof dyadic and triadic relations but rather the opposite. I'm saying that a dyadic relation is at the root of what we call theeveryday experience of raw (ie un-observed) participation and that a triadic relation is atthe rootof of observation. So often theact of observation is mis-taken as something thatis independent ofthe objectand itssign (or measurement), but as quantum physics teaches they are an irreducible triad and can not be built from or reduced to any combination of participations in dyadic reactions. That said I'm still very unsure of myself on this and you may be right that I am mostly just putting unneccessary psychological clothes on the naked truth. (Not your words I know but I couldn't resist oncethey popped into my head). But still, there is something about a concern for modestythat physics and logic lack in a way that psychology as the study of humans' being can not. What I take Peirce (a notable psychologist in his own right) to have rejected about the some of the psychologizing of his day was the tendency of some to suppose thatlabelingapuzzling phenomenawith afamiliar psychological name somehow provided an adequate explanation. But I am not trying to give a psychological account of representation. On the contrary I am trying to give a semiotic account ofthe psychologicalexperience ofobservation. Ah, a quickaside on consciousness as awareness of interpretation. It seems to me that there is something fundamentally faulty about the sorts of explanations that attempt to account for consciousness by a series of reactions to reactions (responding to responding, knowledge of knowledge etc). Off hand I can't think of a term for this sort of analysis but it smacks of an infinite regress and I don't find it persausive as an argument either for or against some explanation. The point is a triadic relation is the basis for all these supposed infinite regressions and triads only go three levels deep before they cycle back and repeat the same process. Not as an infinite regression but as a cycle completed. I say three levels deep on a intuitive hunch. There are only three elements involved and the analysis can only take three POV. If a phenomenon is triadic that is enough said about its recursive nature. Talk of an infinite regression neither adds nor detracts from the analysis. Butthese comments arejust an speculative aside.Ha, who am I kidding, my whole post is just a speculative aside! In any case, Martin, thanks very much for your comments. I'm will continue toponderthem. And I look forward to Joe's take as well.I'm wondering in particular how this issue might relate to the distinction between the act of assertion andthat which is asserted.Seems to me a mere fact is dyadic whereas an asserted fact is triadic. The problem is we assume that what we observe are merefacts but we have no access to mere givens without representation/observation. We are trying to build the explanation of a phenomenausing building blocks that include the phenomena itself
[peirce-l] Re: reduction of the manifold to unity
Dear Joe, Thanks for your informal and very helpful response. I think I was misunderstanding the introductory passage in the New List.So I have a few more questions.First some background. My understanding is that signs refer to and stand for the meaning of objects. In standing for objectssignscan beuseful tools for communicating about objects as well as for conducting thought experiments about objects. But it is their function of referring to objects that I want to focus upon and ask you about.It seems to methatin defining signs as referring to objects part of what this definition implies is thatthe sign user is in the position of standing outside (or perhaps above and beyond) the mere reactive world of the object being referred to and observed. IOWs the sign user has a POV with respect to the object that is beyonda mere indexical relationship. That being an "observor" or spectator requires a level or dimension of detachment that goes beyond the level or dimension of attachment that is involved in "participation with" or reacting to an object. And so I'm thinking that an indexical representation is more than just a tool for indexing an object or giving voice toone's sub or pre-representationalunderstanding of an object. I'm thinking that representation is also (and perhaps most importantly) the process by which one achieves the observational stance. Or, to put it another way, that the capacity to step back from the world of objects and observe them as existing is one and the same as the capacity to represent objects. That, in effect, the ability to represent isthefoundation of being an observor in a world of existing objects as opposed tobeing merely a reactive participant in existence.. Actually, as I think about this a bit more, maybe it is notsimply the sign's function of "referring" but also the signs function of"standing for" that creates, presumes or makes possible the "observor" POV. But however one cuts it I don't see how a sign can represent without there being an observor role which is functionally distinct fromthe role of mere participant. So anyway that's my question -- is Peirce's theory of representation and the sign meant to imply or address this issue of an observor or am I just misreading something into it that is not there. I will be greatly dissapointed if such a notion or something akin to it is not part of what is intended by the idea of a triadic relation as being above and beyond that of a mere dyadic relation. But then there are those Peirce comments about consciousness being a mere quality or firstness so I'm not so sure. OK -- I hope I have made clear the nature of my concern and look forward to any comments you might have. I realize I'm drifting a bit from the initial question that started this exchnage but Ifor me the questions are very much related. I'm trying to get at and understand the relation of the sign as carrier of meaning and as that which gives rise tothe feeling we have of being not simply participants in a world (like colliding billiard balls) but of also being observors of this participation -- aware of our nakedness and so on. The notion that in the beginning (of awareness) was the word. Thanks again -- I look forward to any comments, adviceand suggestions you or others might have. I am very eager to get clear on this point. So drop whatever you are doing ... Best wishes, Jim Piat - Original Message - From: Joseph Ransdell To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Saturday, September 09, 2006 12:23 AM Subject: [peirce-l] "reduction of the manifold to unity" Jim and list: This is just a repeat of my previous message,spell-checked and punctuated correctly, with a couple of interpolated clarifications, and minus the unphilosophical paragraphsat the beginning and end: (I will try to state it better in a later message.) As regards your question: I will try to respond to it, but I can only talk about it loosely and suggestively here, in order to say enough to convey anything at all that might be helpful, and you will have to tolerate a lot of vagueness as well as sloppiness in what I am saying. If I bear down on it enough to put it into decently rigorous form it will not get said at all [because of the length], I'm afraid. But then this is just a conversation, not a candidate for a published paper. Okay, that self-defense being given in advance, I will go on to say that I think that one of the things that is likely to be misleading about the New List is that it is easy to make the mistake of thinking of the Kantian phrase "reduction of the sensuous manifold to unity" which Peirce uses at the very beginning of the New List to be talking about a unification of sense-data in the technical sense of "sense-datum" developed by philosophers somewhere around the beginning of the 20th Century, stressed especially by
[peirce-l] Re: reduction of the manifold to unity
Great question, Jim!I can't even get started on an answer today, but I will be at work on it tomorrow and try to get at least a start at an anwer before the day is out. Joe Oh thanks Joe. I'm relieved to hear that! Reflecting a bit more I see that I should have focused primarily on the triadic (standing for to) aspect of the sign and not the dyadic indexical (referential) aspect. But I'm glad you found my question worth addressing and I'm looking forward to your comments. Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
