Re: [Pharo-project] Trusting Trust

2012-02-08 Thread Philippe Marschall
On 02/07/2012 02:47 PM, Ben Coman wrote: This is slightly paranoid thinking, but considering the long evolution of Smalltalk live images (apparently all the way from the original Xerox PARC ST80 [1] ) in relation to Ken Thompson's Reflections on Trusting Trust [2] - are there any mechanisms to

Re: [Pharo-project] Trusting Trust

2012-02-08 Thread Stéphane Ducasse
On Feb 8, 2012, at 9:35 AM, Philippe Marschall wrote: On 02/07/2012 02:47 PM, Ben Coman wrote: This is slightly paranoid thinking, but considering the long evolution of Smalltalk live images (apparently all the way from the original Xerox PARC ST80 [1] ) in relation to Ken Thompson's

Re: [Pharo-project] Trusting Trust

2012-02-08 Thread Philippe Marschall
On 02/08/2012 10:33 AM, Stéphane Ducasse wrote: On Feb 8, 2012, at 9:35 AM, Philippe Marschall wrote: On 02/07/2012 02:47 PM, Ben Coman wrote: This is slightly paranoid thinking, but considering the long evolution of Smalltalk live images (apparently all the way from the original Xerox PARC

Re: [Pharo-project] Trusting Trust

2012-02-08 Thread Marcus Denker
On Feb 8, 2012, at 10:39 AM, Philippe Marschall wrote: well I do not think so since we can all read the code. No, read the argument again. If the compiler is compromised and the other tools in the image are compromised you can't read the code because the tools don't display you the

Re: [Pharo-project] Trusting Trust

2012-02-08 Thread Philippe Marschall
On 02/08/2012 10:43 AM, Marcus Denker wrote: On Feb 8, 2012, at 10:39 AM, Philippe Marschall wrote: well I do not think so since we can all read the code. No, read the argument again. If the compiler is compromised and the other tools in the image are compromised you can't read the code

Re: [Pharo-project] Trusting Trust

2012-02-08 Thread Norbert Hartl
Am 08.02.2012 um 11:12 schrieb Philippe Marschall: On 02/08/2012 10:43 AM, Marcus Denker wrote: On Feb 8, 2012, at 10:39 AM, Philippe Marschall wrote: well I do not think so since we can all read the code. No, read the argument again. If the compiler is compromised and the other

Re: [Pharo-project] Trusting Trust

2012-02-08 Thread Frank Shearar
On 8 February 2012 10:33, Norbert Hartl norb...@hartl.name wrote: Am 08.02.2012 um 11:12 schrieb Philippe Marschall: On 02/08/2012 10:43 AM, Marcus Denker wrote: On Feb 8, 2012, at 10:39 AM, Philippe Marschall wrote: well I do not think so since we can all read the code. No, read the

Re: [Pharo-project] Trusting Trust

2012-02-08 Thread Philippe Marschall
On 02/08/2012 11:33 AM, Norbert Hartl wrote: Am 08.02.2012 um 11:12 schrieb Philippe Marschall: On 02/08/2012 10:43 AM, Marcus Denker wrote: On Feb 8, 2012, at 10:39 AM, Philippe Marschall wrote: well I do not think so since we can all read the code. No, read the argument again. If the

Re: [Pharo-project] Trusting Trust

2012-02-08 Thread Norbert Hartl
Am 08.02.2012 um 12:04 schrieb Philippe Marschall: On 02/08/2012 11:33 AM, Norbert Hartl wrote: Am 08.02.2012 um 11:12 schrieb Philippe Marschall: On 02/08/2012 10:43 AM, Marcus Denker wrote: On Feb 8, 2012, at 10:39 AM, Philippe Marschall wrote: well I do not think so since we can

Re: [Pharo-project] Trusting Trust

2012-02-08 Thread drush66
Well, it's the turtles all the way down, and you always need a peace of trust to step on to keep the whole thing. So there is no absulute security, but I guess this is not a new concept. But IMHO, if someone would like to reduce (not eliminate) the risks, Smalltalk could make it less daunting.

Re: [Pharo-project] Trusting Trust

2012-02-08 Thread Ben Coman
Frank Shearar wrote: On 8 February 2012 10:33, Norbert Hartl norb...@hartl.name wrote: Am 08.02.2012 um 11:12 schrieb Philippe Marschall: On 02/08/2012 10:43 AM, Marcus Denker wrote: On Feb 8, 2012, at 10:39 AM, Philippe Marschall wrote: well I do not think so since

Re: [Pharo-project] Trusting Trust

2012-02-08 Thread Nicolas Cellier
Do you really think that the compiler is the real Achille heal in an image where everything work by message send? IMO, the compiler is much less central than in other languages. What I would do to fool users and tools would just be to hack a few methods like #methodDict (just like Stephane

Re: [Pharo-project] Trusting Trust

2012-02-08 Thread Ben Coman
You are right. The compiler binary described in the scenario corresponds to the whole of the Smalltalk binary image. Nicolas Cellier wrote: Do you really think that the compiler is the real Achille heal in an image where everything work by message send? IMO, the compiler is much less central

Re: [Pharo-project] Trusting Trust

2012-02-08 Thread Igor Stasenko
On 8 February 2012 12:33, Norbert Hartl norb...@hartl.name wrote: Am 08.02.2012 um 11:12 schrieb Philippe Marschall: On 02/08/2012 10:43 AM, Marcus Denker wrote: On Feb 8, 2012, at 10:39 AM, Philippe Marschall wrote: well I do not think so since we can all read the code. No, read the

Re: [Pharo-project] Trusting Trust

2012-02-08 Thread Nicolas Cellier
Yes, so duplicating the Compiler can't be a valid strategy. Every Inspector, every Debugger, every message send will modify the binary image... You could trace the image with another program - or another trusted image ;) - and validate some restrictive invariants, for example like: - all

[Pharo-project] Trusting Trust

2012-02-07 Thread Ben Coman
This is slightly paranoid thinking, but considering the long evolution of Smalltalk live images (apparently all the way from the original Xerox PARC ST80 [1] ) in relation to Ken Thompson's Reflections on Trusting Trust [2] - are there any mechanisms to prevent trojan code living undetected

Re: [Pharo-project] Trusting Trust

2012-02-07 Thread Igor Stasenko
On 7 February 2012 15:47, Ben Coman b...@openinworld.com wrote: This is slightly paranoid thinking, but considering the long evolution of Smalltalk live images (apparently all the way from the original Xerox PARC ST80 [1] ) in relation to Ken Thompson's Reflections on Trusting Trust [2] - are