I
haven't read the opinion yet, but it sounds like a tacit judgment on the
sincerity of the belief. Church of Body Modification,
please.
-Original Message-From:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]On Behalf Of Marc
SternSent: Monday, December 06, 2004 9:25 AMTo:
Could be, but the court specifically refused
to rule on that issue.
Marc
From:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Menard, Richard H.
Sent: Monday, December 06, 2004
9:30 AM
To: 'Law Religion issues for
Law Academics'
Subject: RE: Steven Williams Case
.:.
Believe it or not: http://www.churchofbodmod.com/
Rob Vischer
-Original Message-
From:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Menard, Richard H.
Sent: Monday, December 06, 2004
9:30 AM
To: 'Law Religion issues for
Law Academics'
Subject: RE: Steven
I've
seen that in RFRA and RLUIPA cases: an almost neurotic reluctance to call a
bogus "religion" a spade. Makes for messy jurisprudence, but by and large
the cases seem to come out right.
-Original Message-From:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]On Behalf Of Marc
On Dec 6, 2004, at 9:37 AM, Robert K. Vischer wrote:
Believe it or not: http://www.churchofbodmod.com/
cf. esp. http://encyc.bmezine.com/?CoBM
--
David F. Austin
http://www4.ncsu.edu/~n51ls801/homepage.html
Associate Professor of Philosophy
Department of Philosophy and Religion
Box 8103
North
Yeah,
I believe it. That website raises an interesting question (not a new
one). One of the "ministers" says the piercing of his flesh was a
spiritual experience . . . fine, whatever. I'd wager the Church of Jim
Beam has a vastly wider membership. Anyone can dress up a hobby in
religious
Actually, I see no reason at all to think that this
religion is in any way bogus -- any more than mainstream religions with which we
are much more familiar. More to the point, it need not be an actual
established "religion," as such, in order to be protected by title VII's
religious
Fair enough, but the court also said beards
would be subject tot eh same rule even though it is probably common knowledge
that some religions require males to wear beards or turbans or yarmulkes .In such
cases the line between customers discriminating and rejection of the practice-which
I
Not so
fast. I for one still don't have a satisfactory grasp on where the
threshold line is drawn. Yes, "sincerely held with the strength of
traditional religious views" is vague, and necessarily so, butI can't
believeit's meaningless. Surely more is required than a webpage and
some
Just an observation from a
practitioner.I looked at Cloutier just a few weeks ago in declining
to represent a retail clerk who clearly DID have sincerely held beliefs re
wearing jewelry symbolizing very conventional Christian beliefs. This case
and others like it give employers a lot of
What about the classic case of Theriault v. Silber, 453 F. Supp. 254 (W.D.
Tex., 1978)? The relevant portion of that case:
Several facts developed during the proceedings had at Atlanta in the case of
Theriault v. Carlson, 339 F. Supp. 375, and succinctly restated by the Fifth
Circuit in
In a message dated 12/6/2004 9:15:52 AM Eastern Standard Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
But frankly, I'm more interested in the legal arguments.Ed Brayton
Oh, I am too. I am sure you agree that knowing the facts of the matter may affect the analysis to be applied and therefore the likely
And I thought the religiously motivated sale of t-shirts bearing gospel messages on the National Mall in Washington DC was the most important RFRA case challenging federal law to date. Tea anyone?
Jim Henderson
Senior Counsel
ACLJ
___
To post, send
Jim-
I absolutely agree that knowing the facts of the matter affects the
analysis. I'm quite curious to know the specifics of what he passed out
and what was opposed and why. I'm going only on the media reports at
this point. But I wondered if there were any thoughts from those on the
list
The facts in the Steven Williams case, concededly relevant to the analysis to be applied and the likely outcome of that analysis, do not support the charge that the Alliance Defense Fund has made any misrepresentation of the facts whatever.
It appears that a single (meaning only one, not a
In very brief: Under the "government speech"
doctrine, a state may require its teachers, in their official
capacities (i.e., while teaching), to hue to the state's prescribed
curriculum. This is the majority view in the courts of appeals -- that
there is no Free Speech Clause right of
The Christian Legal Society, joined by a
number of other Christian groups, evangelical and mainline, filed amicus briefs
at both the panel and the en banc stages. See http://www.clsnet.org/clrfPages/amicus/UDV.pdf.
The en banc opinion of Judge Seymour,
which in this part of the opinion
I am wondering why the 11th Circuit issued its decision in Dec. without at
least mentioning that fact that the Court granted cert in the 6th Circuit
case -- Cutter v. Wilkinson in early November/late Oct. Is it a difft
issue somehow?
For bkg on cert in the Cutter case:
Interesting you should raise that distinction,
Alan. I think that there really is a due process issue in
discharging a teacher for classroom speech or conduct that the teacher had every
reason to think was acceptable at the time and that only became "unacceptable,"
and worthy of sanction,
As I read the complaint, Williams is
arguing that the references to God and to religion in some of his supplemental
handouts (in only 5% of them according to the complaint) are consistent with
both state and school district curriculum guidelines on teaching history. He
claims the principal
I tend to agree with Marty's take here -- I think this is basically
a due process issue -- but I'm not sure all courts agree. I think this
was the real issue in Cockrel (The teacher got sandbagged. When the
community got upset, the school punished her for doing something it had
given her
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