So, Chip, for what it's worth, I read Snyder to reserve this question, not
to decide it. (The question being same facts -- IIEF claim where ultimate
thrust of speech is to the public on matters of public concern -- but
violation of content-neutral TPM restrictions.) Predictive answer? Not
sure.
While I am certainly not a fan of the secondary effects doctrine, it seems
one could make a good argument that IIED is content neutral under it. That
is, IIED is not trying to regulate the content per se, but instead is
regulating the effects of speech regardless of content.
One could also make
The Court has of course repeatedly confronted arguments that
speech could be regulated because the offensiveness of the speech creates
certain harmful effects - causes international tension, possibly leads to
fights when people see burning flags or offensive parades, and so on.
IIED liability is certainly content-based and that creates a presumption of
unconstitutionality that has to be overcome. (I think that is true of
telephone harassment laws as well.) So one question is whether protecting
mourners is a sufficiently important interest to outweigh this free
Seems to me to be entirely protected speech. And as to the
element of trying to get the professor fired, I'd say that NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware would be rather on point. Speech is constitutionally protected even
when it urges social ostracism - which would include dismissal
We're beginning to move fairly far away from law religion, but I wonder what
list members think of the tort of intentional interference with contractual
relations (IICR). A campaign to get a person fired could be seen as an
interference with contractual relations. Is the public concern point
Well, again, wouldn't NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware be pretty
squarely on point here? If one could campaign to get people to shun their
neighbors for simply shopping at white-owned stores, I would think that one
could campaign to get a professor fired for a wide variety of
