Well if that is true, and I think it is, the state's promise to treat their
grant applications in the future equally with all others is all they can get
(admittedly they'd rather have an injunction) but that seems a slender reed.
Best,
Eric
Sent from my iPhone
On Apr 18, 2017, at 5:22 PM,
Doh! Not sure why I forgot about Edelman; maybe because the focus there was on
the line between prospective and retrospective relief. But that is the
fundamental modern Eleventh Amendment case, and it squarely holds that § 1983
does not override sovereign immunity. Somewhat conclusory, but
I can't refrain from asking the snarky question as to whether anyone believes
that the decision of the Supreme Court to decide or to dump the case will
represent a "principled" elaboration of mootness doctrine, as against 1) a
desire by Gorsuch and the other four to announce their solicitude
I don't think there was a claim for damages (and it would be barred by 11th
Amendment anyway) so I agree with Marty that the plaintiff has received all the
relief it sought. The State is saying that from now on, the church's requests
for funding under the program will be treated like all other
Because the Court held that neither a state, nor a state official in his
official capacity, is a "person" within the meaning of § 1983. It is a slightly
round about way of saying that § 1983 does not override sovereign immunity.
Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police.
Douglas Laycock
Robert E.
Section 1983 is not abrogation of 11th Amendment Immunityas crazy as that
is.
Best,
Eric
Sent from my iPhone
On Apr 18, 2017, at 5:33 PM, Ashutosh A Bhagwat
> wrote:
I may be completely wrong here, but if this is a section 1983 case
That Will arose in state court is probably why the Court wrote it in terms of
who is a person. They had not yet held that the Eleventh Amendment applies in
state court (that’s Alden v Maine, in 1997 I think). So they said that § 1983
doesn’t create a cause of action. The metastasizing of
I am once again reminded why I refuse to teach the 11th Amendment :-). But of
course you are all correct, I had forgotten about that line of cases.
Ash
Ash Bhagwat
Martin Luther King, Jr. Professor of Law
UC Davis School of Law
(530) 752-8687
Find my papers at:
Doug, is the complaint seeking money as damages for wrongful denial? That seems
to run into the 11th. I assumed plaintiffs can only ask for prospective relief
in this case.
Best,
Eric
Sent from my iPhone
On Apr 18, 2017, at 5:04 PM, Laycock, H Douglas (hdl5c)
I may be completely wrong here, but if this is a section 1983 case enforcing
the Religion Clauses as incorporated through the 14th Amendment, does that
trump 11th Amendment immunity? What am I missing?
Ash Bhagwat
Martin Luther King, Jr. Professor of Law
UC Davis School of Law
(530) 752-8687
Answer: Probably, but it may depend upon some still-uncertain facts:
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2017/04/is-trinity-lutheran-church-case-moot.html
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I haven’t looked at the complaint, but that has to be right. Damages for delay
could not be recovered from the state, or from any state official in his
official capacity, because of sovereign immunity. And they could not be
recovered from any state official in his personal capacity, because of
Giving the church the tires or the money would moot the case. But so far, they
have only announced a policy change, and that does not moot the case—especially
where, as here, the other side has a plausible claim and could immediately sue
the state officials to prevent them from granting the
There's also language in other cases involving federal jurisdiction that
Congress didn't intend 1983 to abrogate immunity. Will is only a state court
case.
Best,
Eric
Sent from my iPhone
On Apr 18, 2017, at 5:40 PM, Laycock, H Douglas (hdl5c)
>
See, e.g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 340-41 (1979):
"Mr. Justice BRENNAN in his opinion concurring in the judgment argues that
our holding in *Edelman* that § 1983 does not abrogate the States' Eleventh
Amendment immunity is 'most likely incorrect.' To reach this conclusion he
relies on
I would just say Sandy, that when it comes to standing, ripeness and mootness,
the only way the Court could act in a principled manner would be to shelve all
prior cases and start over.
e
Sent from my iPhone
On Apr 18, 2017, at 6:45 PM, Levinson, Sanford V
But Doug, the relied requested was simply the ability to compete for the
grant without the church disqualification -- and they've now received
precisely that. It's also not simply a policy change -- it is, presumably,
a conclusion that they are *legally required *not to exclude the church.
Yes,
Have they given the dollars? Or just said they will?
The voluntary cessation doctrine is all about the just-said-they-will cases.
They might change their mind, and here there would seem to be a very live
threat that they will change their mind because they might be forced to.
Maybe there are
But the whole point of the voluntary cessation doctrine is that a promise to
comply in the future is not enough.
Douglas Laycock
Robert E. Scott Distinguished Professor of Law
University of Virginia Law School
580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
434-243-8546
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