Re: Arizona, Indiana . . . and now Georgia

This particular statute might have been politically unimaginable 25 years ago, I suppose (although states were already heading in that direction). But that is true of many, many laws that are enacted every day--perhaps the majority of them. What is not unimaginable at all is that Congress would

RE: Arizona, Indiana . . . and now Georgia

I also wonder how Marty thinks Smith itself should have been decided under pre-Smith law. Under that law, did the Native Americans have the right to engage in their religious ritual? Or perhaps Justice O'Connor was right that there was a compelling interest in preventing them from doing so? A

RE: Arizona, Indiana . . . and now Georgia

I think he means that 25 and more years ago (which just happens to be pre-Smith), it would have been politically unimaginable for government to require Catholic or Protestant religious institutions to do things that violate some of their core moral teachings. Those conflicts were just emerging;

Re: Arizona, Indiana . . . and now Georgia

"under pre-Smith jurisprudence, a federal mandate on the topic of contraception would not have been dreamed of either" I don't know what this means. What does Free Exercise jurisprudence have to do with whether Congress requires health insurance plans to include preventive services? On Mon, Mar

Re: Arizona, Indiana . . . and now Georgia

Marty makes a fair point. But under pre-Smith jurisprudence, a federal mandate on the topic of contraception would not have been dreamed of either. On Mon, Mar 28, 2016 at 6:51 PM, Marty Lederman wrote: > As reflected in my recent article and (with

Re: Arizona, Indiana . . . and now Georgia

As reflected in my recent article and (with Gordon/Greenawalt/Lupu/Tuttle) amicus brief, I have become convinced that where RFRA(s) went "wrong" is when advocates and judges started insisting--mistakenly, in the case of federal RFRA--that it is more demanding than the pre-*Smith* Free Exercise

RE: Arizona, Indiana . . . and now Georgia

Doug writes: "The cases of the sort Michael describes (and that Chris Lund has described in public work) are still out there; they still happen. And the cases Paul Finkelman imagines, in which state RFRAs justify all kinds of discrimination against gays, are not out there. They have not

RE: Arizona, Indiana . . . and now Georgia

The cases of the sort Michael describes (and that Chris Lund has described in public work) are still out there; they still happen. And the cases Paul Finkelman imagines, in which state RFRAs justify all kinds of discrimination against gays, are not out there. They have not happened. But gay

State RFRAs and Breyer's balancing test

Have any state RFRA sought to use a non-strict scrutiny balancing approach under which the weight of the interest of the religious exceptionalist, the state’s interest, and the employers/public accomodations/etc. interest are weighed to assess the proper outcome? -- Prof. Steven D. Jamar

Re: Arizona, Indiana . . . and now Georgia

Unfortunately, for many, the entire spectrum of "religious liberty" in the United States appears to revolve around LGBT rights. That may, in fact, be the case for religious "majorities" who are not otherwise adversely affected by facially neutral state laws that infringe upon their religious

Churches at public schools

While picking our daughter up from her public school today, my wife saw an enormous sign (my guess? 8 feet by 8 feet at least) that said "Easter at People Chicago. New Services 9:30 am and 11:15 am." It's on a super-prominent corner (like, 90 percent of kids going to school are going to pass

Re: Arizona, Indiana . . . and now Georgia

More than fair comments by Alan. On Mon, Mar 28, 2016 at 3:43 PM, Alan E Brownstein wrote: > My post was descriptive, not normative. In addition to the two cases, > Michael mentions there have been several state RFRA cases decided since > 2000. Several of Christopher

RE: Arizona, Indiana . . . and now Georgia

My post was descriptive, not normative. In addition to the two cases, Michael mentions there have been several state RFRA cases decided since 2000. Several of Christopher Lund’s articles describe these cases. I see no pattern that provides a narrative to explain those cases. Chris doesn’t

Re: Arizona, Indiana . . . and now Georgia

Well, we've had two major RFRA cases-- *O Centro* and *Hobby Lobby*-- since 2000; surely replicating those victories for state claimants does not reflect a focus on LGBT issues. likewise, pre-2000 RFRA cases at the state court level could likewise be used, even if it is true that no such cases

RE: Arizona, Indiana . . . and now Georgia

Based purely on anecdotal information, I think this issue is based more on timing than on legislative history. I worked on the attempt to get a state RFRA passed in California in 1998. The bill passed both houses of the legislature -- controlled by the Democrats -- only to be vetoed by the

Re: Arizona, Indiana . . . and now Georgia

Question for list members: What language and/or legislative history would you look for in a bill that has in order to consider it having the same intent as the original RFRA, and other state RFRAs that were passed absent the LGBT controversy now present? On Mon, Mar 28, 2016 at 1:18 PM, Marty

Arizona, Indiana . . . and now Georgia

https://gov.georgia.gov/press-releases/2016-03-28/transcript-deal-hb-757-remarks-0 The bill: http://www.legis.ga.gov/Legislation/20152016/161054.pdf ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or