I'm not certain on this question, but I have doubts about Eugene's argument
that this is simply religious speech or a religious ritual, analogous to a
ceremony marrying a nun to the Church. In the news reports I have read,
the prosecutors have conceded that they cannot prosecute clergy for
argument below falls closer to
the second and sometimes third categories, which are more problematic.
Paul Horwitz
Visiting Assistant Professor
University of San Diego School of Law
From: Berg, Thomas C. [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Reply-To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
[EMAIL PROTECTED
out there above it.
These steps would be far better in principle, in my view, than what Newdow's
side is asking for.
Tom Berg
***
Thomas C. Berg
University of St. Thomas School of Law
Mail # MSL 400
1000 La Salle Avenue
Minneapolis, MN 55403-2015
Phone: (651) 962-4918
Fax: (651
An interesting ministerial case (music minister) from Minnesota. Among
other things it dramatizes the proposition that the ministerial exemption
has nothing to do with the tenets of the defendant church. The defendant
Methodist congregation that was held exempt from sexual-orientation
As far as caselaw doctrine goes, isn't Eugene's question answered by the
Brennan plurality opinion in Texas Monthly (only a plurality, but also the
opinion in the case most restrictive of accommodations)? The Court struck
down the exemption from sales taxes for religious publications. The
purpose is not accommodating conscience.)
Tom Berg
***
Thomas C. Berg
University of St. Thomas School of Law
Mail # MSL 400
1000 La Salle Avenue
Minneapolis, MN 55403-2015
Phone: (651) 962-4918
Fax: (651) 962-4996
[EMAIL PROTECTED
to favor
Sundays is to encourage a single day of rest -- a sort of soft version of
the argument for blue laws that succeeded in McGowan. But in that case
its
purpose is not accommodating conscience.)
Tom Berg
***
Thomas C. Berg
University of St. Thomas School of Law
Mail
I'm not sure about the following argument, but what do you think of it? The
ban on lobbying can be circumvented by setting up a separate 501(c)(4)
organization, which the Court in Regan said was relevant (if not crucial) to
its constitutionality. Suppose that it doesn't cost much in terms of
be religious, wouldn't the better course be to
accommodate them under RFRA, and then fashion a similar accommodation for
the occasional secular group that might come along? (Analogous to Harlan's
expanding the draft exemption in Welsh.)
Tom Berg
***
Thomas C. Berg
University
I'm not sure that the doctors in Rust had the same kind of claim that they
needed to speak in their capacity in the funded program. The Court said
that the Title X programs did not purport to be giving general medical
advice -- while churches may and do propose to speak as a unitary matter on
all
I won't quarrel about Rust, which I'm not fond of as a constitutional
decision in the first place -- as Marty originally noted, it gives too
little consideration to the spillover cost involved in segregating
constitutionally protected activity into an entirely different entity or
facility from the
Eugene, I agree that very global quid pro quo theories -- like broad
Establishment Clause, broad Free Exercise Clause -- do not spread their
benefits to all religions equally. (For example, I think that broad
establishment clause, broad free exercise tends to protect or benefit
minority or
A pretty striking First Amendment violation rectified, below. Suppose the
uniqueness requirement applied to all student organizations? Not that any
state university would ever do that. But if it did, what rule for religious
organizations?
Tom Berg
_
Center for Law and
Steve Smith's article Barnette's Big Blunder (78 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 625
(2003)) directly addresses this question and argues pretty convincingly, as
I remember, that the passage quoted below is misguided if it is read
precisely as written. The government decide[s] what shall be orthodox in
I guess that Eugene has already offered my response to Professor Lipkin. It
seems to me that there are many instances in which the government or
government officials advocate political views with great force and suggest
that those who disagree are fundamentally misguided, or missing the basic
Right, my mistake -- the word in the first part of the Barnette sentence is
not declare, but prescribe, which can suggest the government forbidding
criticism of the view. More so when put together with orthodox in the
sentence, as Professor Lipkin argues; so I take his point on that score.
I do
I haven't read the Florida decision yet; but I've heard such reasoning
before. As Marty describes the reasoning, it is inconsistent with the
premises and result of Widmar, and indeed of a vast number of other
public-forum cases. In Widmar, the Missouri state constitutional principle
singling out
probably be support for Tom's theory.
- Original Message -
From: Berg, Thomas C. mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Saturday, November 13, 2004 11:03 AM
Subject: RE: Florida Voucher
The Christian Legal Society, joined by a
number of other Christian groups, evangelical and mainline, filed amicus briefs
at both the panel and the en banc stages. See http://www.clsnet.org/clrfPages/amicus/UDV.pdf.
The en banc opinion of Judge Seymour,
which in this part of the opinion
I thoroughly agree that the school should not stick the other students
(those not attending religious instruction) in a wasted time period or in
other ways structure the program so as to push students toward religious
instruction. Because of the difficulty of setting up a religion-only
I am not a supporter of 10 Commandments displays, and the following point,
in my view, does not fundamentally change the proper result in these cases.
But I don't agree with Steve Jamar's claim that it is really just one sect,
protestants, that push to establish state sponsorship or endorsement of
PM, Berg, Thomas C. wrote:
I am not a supporter of 10 Commandments displays, and the following point,
in my view, does not fundamentally change the proper result in these cases.
But I don't agree with Steve Jamar's claim that it is really just one sect,
protestants, that push to establish state
Marci Maybe I
should be proud to coin a term, although its likely too ugly to catch
on. I just meant to refer to the idea that when the Court bans or removes
government-sponsored religious symbols or ideas, while leaving secular symbols
and ideas intact, this makes government more
Marci writes: The right default position is the rule of law, but it is
good for everyone when accommodation can be provided and the public good is
not undermined.
First, I would have thought that this is the very goal of RFRA and RLUIPA,
the statutes that Marci so vigorously opposes: to
I dont get the argument
that individual victims of religious conduct or the public good are
rarely at the table in [religious freedom] litigation. Sometimes
they are directly at the table in that its a tort or other civil suit by
a plaintiff affected by religious conduct. Even if its a
But Eugene's position is also unattractive, I would suggest, because it
asserts that we should be free to practice our religion as long as it does
not harm others, and the government determines what is a harm to others,
without any constitutional review of that determination by the courts. I
don't think that
as to sacramental wines, Sherbert or Yoder would likely reach any different
results.
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Berg, Thomas C.
Sent: Tuesday, March 15, 2005 1:34 PM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject
] On Behalf Of Berg, Thomas C.
Sent: Tuesday, March 15, 2005 1:34 PM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Free Exercise, Free Speech, and harm to others
But Eugene's position is also unattractive, I would suggest, because it
asserts that we should be free to practice our
Would Marty (or anyone else) argue that a significant third-party harm is
sufficient in itself to invalidate a legislative accommodation of religion?
If so, why should it be sufficient, given that the government adjusts and
shifts burdens like this all the time to accommodate secular interests?
-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] ] On Behalf Of Berg, Thomas C.
Sent: Tuesday, March 15, 2005 4:14 PM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Free Exercise, Free Speech, and harm to others
I'd say that the problem of deciding
The Marsh opinion justified legislative prayer on the basis of a very crude
version of a historical argument -- the first Congress did this, and it's
been done consistently since -- not really on the basis of a coherent,
generalizable analytical principle such as it's just solemnization or
it's
It's also the case that after some hemming and hawing (along with others on
the Court), O'Connor came down firmly on the side of allowing religious
schools in school choice programs. She did still cast the key vote to limit
direct aid -- even when figured on a per-capita formula -- based on a
. But her reason for treating cases
differently across that admittedly clean line is still highly subjective
and, in my view, difficult to defend.
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Berg, Thomas C.
Sent: Saturday, July 02, 2005 3:22 PM
To follow up and agree with Eugene's argument, it seems to me that the text
of Title VII requires that the employment action, to give rise to
liability, must be based on the employee's religion rather than the
supervisor's religious motive: the text prohibits discrimination against
any
of mediating institutions in an economic regime where parents
work. (By the way, you failed to consider single-parent families.)
-Original Message-
From: Berg, Thomas C. [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] ]
Sent: Wednesday, August 24, 2005 12:32 PM
To: Law Religion issues
interlineated below.
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Berg, Thomas C.
Sent: Wednesday, August 24, 2005 3:18 PM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Hostility
Well, of course the pro-voucher side, correspondingly
This is an interesting and effective response to my challenge. But I
wonder:
1. Whether a golden age as short as the one to which Alan refers is really
enough to provide a stable model for the future.
2. Whether continuing to push everyone together in public schools (through
selective
It'll take me a while to respond to some of these points, but let me quickly
pick up on the last one. I do think that it is unfortunate that many people
-- even some judges -- tend to view Religion Clause positions as either
pro-religion or anti-religion, so that school prayer, school choice,
On the other hand, Earl Warren by all accounts was immediately successful as
a leader coming in from the outside (see, e.g., Brown v. Board of Ed). And
Harlan Fiske Stone, who'd been an associate justice for 15 years, was quite
unsuccessful as chief justice, letting conferences meander and
Let me join others, with a few additional facts.
From Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of
Religious Speech by Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 52-53 (1986)
(footnotes omitted):
The American Civil Liberties Union opposed early drafts of the Equal
Access
Mark and others --
Yoder's is a striking quote indeed, but I think that he and Carter are
saying different things that are ultimately in some tension. Yoder, I
think, would caution Christians not to focus on what the Supreme Court says
about abortion -- or what the legislature says -- and
We've had some discussions of this over at the Catholic lawprofs' weblog
http://www.mirrorofjustice.com http://www.mirrorofjustice.com , if anyone
is interested.
I would suggest that this development -- five conservative Catholics on the
Court, generally supported by evangelical Protestants --
I agree with Sandy thatissues
involving values that the Catholic Church supports arise often in statutory
contexts, which as I said perhaps should receive more attention than they do in
nomination debates. But constitutional issues get more attention, in part
because they're just better
important to be a [white] conservative? The
answer to this question is not apparent, although I think that Tom believes
that it is.
From:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Berg, Thomas C.
Sent: Wednesday, November 02, 2005
3:43 PM
To: Law Religion issues for
Law
I agree with Marty that the result in Santa Fe -- the case that Alito
allegedly discussed with Sen. Cornyn -- was to strike down speech that was
government preferred or sponsored, because of the majoritarian nature of the
election process and the school district's past practice. But some of the
Just to be clear: I dont
think that this disparate impact (Protestant student-led worship services
protected by the Act, Catholic masses not protected) warrants Catholics opposing
the EAA. For several reasons: (1) There are lots of other things
that Catholic student groups might do that
of a
Catholic student group? That argument is clearly out of
bounds. My objection has always been to EAA as it exists. Why the
resort to a straw man?
From: Berg,
Thomas C. [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Tuesday, November 08, 2005
4:44 PM
To: 'Law Religion issues for
Law Academics'
Subject: RE
at the Pole Case
And you still overreach with a straw man argument. I have taken no position
on the desirability of amending EAA. Why can't you understand that?
_
From: Berg, Thomas C. [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Tuesday, November 08, 2005 5:28 PM
To: 'Law Religion issues
In the amicus brief that Doug Laycock,
Greg Baylor, and I filed in Davey,
we argued that this kind of determination (whats objective
enough and whats too devotional) would entangle the state
in discretionary, theologically sensitive questions and constituted another
strike against the
A few reactions:
1. Would courts see this as a Braunfeld v. Brown case? I.e. one in which
the state's rule does not directly conflict with (i.e. visit some legal
consequence as a result of) the religious duty -- as the Sunday closing law
did not directly conflict with the Orthodox shopkeepers'
School address would be good.
_
From: Steven Jamar [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Wed 5/10/2006 5:53 PM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Re: Substantial burden on religious freedom and placing acopy of
the Koran in toilet
Let me get this straight. It is ok to
Direct aid to religious schools and institutions in general: there may be
five votes now for the Thomas plurality opinion in Mitchell v. Helms that
(at least) direct aid on an equal per-capita basis is permissible. The
direct-aid vs. private-choice distinction has been relevant in litigation
in
I've just resubscribed to the list, having been taken away for a while by
other commitments. I understand from the message below that Dr. Buck has
asked where a table of contents for the McConnell, Garvey, Berg casebook
Religion and the Constitution can be found. This link should work
(apologies
A non-numerical, ironic aspect of this: The breakaway congregations, now
and in the earlier rounds, have tended to be conservatives unhappy with
liberal denominational moves. If they succeed in court against the larger
organizations to whose decisions they object, they tend to make law such as
Atheism and agnosticism should be considered religions for free exercise
purposes because, as Doug has argued in print, we would regard them as
religions for establishment purpose -- if the government set up a Temple of
Atheism or schools taught officially that God does not exist. If one takes
I'm not sure what the denial of physics means. Doesn't one deny (or
affirm) a particular proposition or set of propositions about physics?
Similarly, it seems to me that there is a recognizable usage of religion
that includes varying positions on the ultimate questions such as the
existence of a
To the extent that he objects to paying the support even if the provision is
renumbered, because the requirement is of the antichrist and the 666 simply
evidences that, then I assume most courts would hold there's a burden but it's
overcome by a compelling interest. To the extent he says his
Eugene, I think one can cut the cases the way you did; but one can also cut
them the way I and Doug suggested. To satisfy the Roys' objection to providing
the social security number, the government would have had to let them do
something different (not provide the number). To satisfy
.
Alan Brownstein
UC Davis School of Law
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Berg, Thomas C. [EMAIL
PROTECTED]
Sent: Thursday, July 31, 2008 7:55 PM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Religious freedom and 42 USC 666
I agree that it is extremely unlikely that an objecting church or clergyperson
will be forced to host or perform a same-sex marriage. But I wouldn't rest
this on the argument that no couple would seek to be married by someone who
doesn't want to marry them. After all, it's a good question why
Adjunct faculty, University of Michigan Law School (Winter term 2010)
Email: steve...@umich.edu
Personal home page: www.stevesanders.net
-Original Message-
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of
Berg, Thomas C.
Sent
[religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu]
On Behalf Of Berg, Thomas C. [tcb...@stthomas.edu]
Sent: Monday, April 06, 2009 7:44 PM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Americans United: Iowa Supreme Court
RulingOnMarriageUpholdsReligious Liberty, Says Americans United
I agree
Churches can and do refuse to perform the marriages of those who the clergyman
thinks are not ready, or who don't have some connection to the church, or who
don't go through a religious counseling class, etc., although all those people
are entitled to civil marriage. So far as I can see,
I worked in the effort to get the exemption in the ENDA bill broadened in 2007
from a very narrow provision to one analogous to the Title VII religious-hiring
exemption. I agree that that's basically the right way to handle the bill. At
that time, part of the political dynamic was that the
Ted,
A group of religious liberty scholars (several of them on this list, including
me) filed an amicus brief supporting the cert petition arguing that the
standard the 9th Circuit used to dismiss this case (for lack of a substantial
burden under RFRA) could have far-reaching effects,
substantially affect religious exercise of the religious
community. Is this not a cognizable claim at all under RLUIPA under any
possible reading of the 9th circuit test?
Are there any others?
Steve
On Sat, Jun 13, 2009 at 6:05 PM, Berg, Thomas C.
tcb...@stthomas.edumailto:tcb...@stthomas.edu
The Becket Fund and Doug Laycock have filed a cert. petition in Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, raising the question [w]hether
the ministerial exception applies to a teacher at a religious elementary school
who teaches the full secular curriculum, but also teaches
which refuses to hire
African-Americans, women, and the disabled as teachers?
Alan
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu]
on behalf of Berg, Thomas C. [tcb...@stthomas.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, January 11, 2012 7:47 PM
Alan,
I agree that the majority leaves open the issue of lay teachers. But since
three justices take a broader approach to defining a minister, all you need for
a majority in a later case is two more votes, and Roberts and Scalia seem
reasonable prospects to me in a case that presents the
To the extent the mandate requires coverage of emergency contraceptives that
people at least plausibly believe cause early abortions in some cases (I will
not comment on the state of scientific debate here), does that put it in a
different category from ordinary contraception--even for
Marty,
The fact that services must be covered in the plan by virtue of legal mandate
(are required by law) can't be enough to counter the asserion of a burden,
can it--or even be a significant factor in countering it? That would do away
with virtually every free exercise claim (I'm only
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu]
on behalf of Berg, Thomas C.
Sent: Sunday, September 30, 2012 4:52 PM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Court Rejects Religious Liberty Challenges To ACA Mandate
Sandy, my particular objection
You might suggest Sarah Gerwig-Moore at Mercer. She has this piece: Sarah
Gerwig-Moore, (2012) Saving Their Own Souls: How RLUIPA Failed to Deliver on
its Promises, 4 LEGISLATION AND POLICY BRIEF Vol 4. Iss. 1, Article 4.
-
Thomas C. Berg
James L.
I hesitate a bit to pitch my piece here, since it could accelerate a trend that
we might not want if the list is otherwise active; but since it's not active
for now, I'll refer to my own new piece, which is likewise on (part of) the
mandate and the culture wars and aims to express a certain
Thanks, Nelson. This is an interesting piece, and I respect the arguments on
both sides. But I have a couple of critical reactions:
1. I wonder whether it's really helpful or effective to start by dismissing an
argument as something off the wall that somehow, inexplicably, has gone
In response to Chip,
As to the plaintiffs in Hobby Lobby and Conestoga, they object only to certain
medicines/methods that they believe cause abortions of fertilized embryos.
Unless opposition to abortion is a form of statutory sex discrimination, which
the Court rejected in Bray v.
If I understand the argument below made by Americans United, it seems to me a
non sequitur. Why can't it be that an activity (such as providing health
benefits) is secular and yet the persons or organizations engaged in it have
a religious-freedom interest in being able to pursue it in ways
Let me take up Chip's question.
I too accept Chip's point that the Establishment Clause encompasses certain
harms to the polity that occur when the government adopts a religious identity.
FWIW, on that basis among others, I joined a brief opposing the prayers in
Town of Greece, as well as
Mississippi does not have a law against sexual-orientation discrimination; if I
understand the Lupu et al. letter correctly, the local resolutions in Oxford,
Hattiesburg etc. are not laws. Therefore, whatever the motivations of the
proponents of the Mississippi state RFRA, it seems the statute
to wonder. How could we possibly know that to be the case?
On Tue, Mar 11, 2014 at 4:53 PM, Berg, Thomas C.
tcb...@stthomas.edumailto:tcb...@stthomas.edu wrote:
Mississippi does not have a law against sexual-orientation discrimination; if I
understand the Lupu et al. letter correctly, the local
Sandy (and Jon. etc.)--Why is an interpretation of RFRA for Hobby Lobby more
divisive than an interpretation against?
And would any ruling for Hobby Lobby automatically be wooden? Given Kennedy's
conflicting signals at oral argument, I suspect that if he has voted for Hobby
Lobby--which I
as
personally unattractive--I speak as someone who defended the right of the Ku
Klux Klan to march down Congress Avenue in Austin).
sandy
-Original Message-
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Berg, Thomas C.
Sent: Sunday
-Original Message-
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Berg, Thomas C.
Sent: Sunday, June 08, 2014 6:34 PM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Hobby Lobby/Ellen Katz
I get those arguments, but they don't
We've been over this before, of course, but as long as we're filling out the
facts ... they are required to pay a $2,000-per-employee assessment if they
drop health insurance, on top of being forced to choose an option that would
either cause them significant competitive disadvantage or
And in the standard complicity-with-evil analyses, including religious ones,
the degree of connection that's permissible is affected by the perceived
gravity of the harm, which as Marty notes is a religious determination.
Gravity of the harm, for example, is part of the material cooperation
Marty, on your two questions:
1. I don't think the Court said that pre-Smith doctrine is inapposite to
RFRA. Indeed, it looked at a lot of pre-Smith free exercise law; and on the
particular question whether a for-profit corporation has ability to assert free
exercise claims at the threshold,
Gallagher, hardly part of the canon!) still have generative
force for him . . . but not the long series of cases in which claims to
exemptions in the commercial sphere got almost no votes, for decades.
On Sun, Jul 6, 2014 at 6:27 PM, Berg, Thomas C.
tcb...@stthomas.edumailto:tcb...@stthomas.edu
The two proposals from HHS are out now:
http://www.ofr.gov/OFRUpload/OFRData/2014-20252_PI.pdf (interim final rules
allowing non-profits to notify HHS to claim the accommodation)
http://www.ofr.gov/OFRUpload/OFRData/2014-20254_PI.pdf (proposal to expand the
accommodation to closely held
The oral argument transcript is up,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/13-6827_8758.pdf.
I haven't read it yet, but from the SCOTUS Blog report, it looks like things
went poorly for the state.
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu]
on behalf of Berg, Thomas C.
Sent: Tuesday, October 07, 2014 2:59 PM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Holt v. Hobbs Oral Argument
Neal Devins's article in the George Washington Law Review (1992 I think)
documents this dynamic: home-schoolers losing in court after Yoder but then
prevailing in legislature and agencies.
-
Thomas C. Berg
James L. Oberstar Professor of Law and Public
And congratulations also to the Becket Fund lawyers on the case, especially
Eric Rassbach and Luke Goodrich, who participate on this list and who defend
free exercise of religion across a wide range of cases.
-
Thomas C. Berg
James L. Oberstar Professor
...@lists.ucla.edu]
On Behalf Of Berg, Thomas C.
Sent: Thursday, April 02, 2015 1:11 PM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Text of Indiana RFRA Fix; Video of Hearing
The fix preserves the ability of nonprofit religious institutions to have their
claims heard under the state
to me
that the race example can be a helpful tool for identifying the proper scope of
the public accommodations laws when libertarian arguments are made for limiting
their scope.
- Jim
On Thu, Apr 2, 2015 at 2:35 PM, Berg, Thomas C.
tcb...@stthomas.edumailto:tcb...@stthomas.edu wrote:
Well
The fix preserves the ability of nonprofit religious institutions to have their
claims heard under the state RFRA, which in my view is correct. Of course that
will not be a stable resolution in blue states now, and many on the list would
oppose allowing those claims to be raised.
In my view,
Marty refers to religious justifications upon which the civil state cannot
rely. I am OK with this language if it's understood narrowly, but it has the
potential to do mischief. It should mean that (1) religious justifications
cannot serve as the only basis for legislation (which I think
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court--hardly a reactionary body--made the
distinction between small vendor refusals that do and don't harm access
meaningfully, in Attorney General v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 240 (Mass.
1994), one of the cases Eugene referred to involving small landlords
Dear List Members,
After a decade or so, I am now doing a new edition (the 3rd) of The State and
Religion in a Nutshell for West. I would welcome comments from any list members
who have read the book or have received useful student comments on it, and have
been itching to tell me where I'm
Mary Ann, I don't know of any tabulation of all that information. You could get
some of it reasonably efficiently through the Becket Fund HHS information site,
http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral. The entries for individual
cases in the case database list the named plaintiffs,
aw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu>
on behalf of Berg, Thomas C. <tcb...@stthomas.edu>
Sent: Thursday, May 4, 2017 5:52:49 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Re: Johnson Amendment E.O.
I don't have a problem with that general idea, Alan. In some cases where
religious a
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