For whatever it’s worth, I have argued recently that the substantial burden
inquiry should be governed by something like a requirement that the claimant
come forward with some evidence to explain how the religious exercise fits into
a “system” of religious belief and practice. That showing
Micah, nobody I know who is resisting the third party Establishment Clause
theory that you, Nelson, and others have created based on “the general form” of
a constitutional limit on religious accommodation. RFRA incorporates the
general form of such a limit.
Marc
From: Micah Schwartzman
It’s a quite minor and likely unimportant point in this particular exchange, I
admit (unfortunately these are my specialty), but I would like to second Mark’s
remark in the final paragraph of his comment below that animadversive analogy
to Lochner may perhaps be inapt in this context. I take it
With respect, I do not understand the comment below about the “complicity” of
legal academics in the legal wrongs perpetrated by religious institutions, or
any institutions, that they study and think about. I am assuming that the
institutions are engaged in legal wrongs in the cases we are now
I agree with these points. I would also add that there are many ambiguities and
uncertainties in a test like that announced in Employment Division v. Smith,
both because of the express carve-outs within Smith itself (whatever their
motivation) and because of implicit questions about legislative
I hope you will indulge a brief note about the recent publication of my book,
The Tragedy of Religious
Freedomhttp://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674072664content=book.
Please let me know if you have an interest in reviewing (or, for that matter,
just in reading) it, and I will do
Chip raises a problem I've been having a hard time understanding too. A
burden does seem to imply the willingness to suffer to some unspecified
degree (rising to the level of being substantial) on behalf of the claimed
belief. On the specific question of whether one should interpret the
I wonder what sort of evidence Marty is looking for. What arguments qualify as
serious arguments? And serious for whom? A serious argument is not
necessarily an argument that one finds persuasive, though that might be the
standard. It could instead be an argument that one disagrees with but
One conceivable difficulty is the entanglement problem. When a student
transfers in to public school from a religious school, there may be several
different sorts of courses that the student will have taken which may combine,
in various degrees, religious and secular components. I'm not sure
AM, Marc DeGirolami
marc.degirol...@stjohns.edumailto:marc.degirol...@stjohns.edu wrote:
One conceivable difficulty is the entanglement problem. When a student
transfers in to public school from a religious school, there may be several
different sorts of courses that the student will have taken
-boun...@lists.ucla.edumailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu]
On Behalf Of Marc DeGirolami
[marc.degirol...@stjohns.edumailto:marc.degirol...@stjohns.edu]
Sent: Saturday, June 30, 2012 10:13 AM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Providing public school credits for release
Dear listserv members,
I am pleased to announce the launch of CLR Forumhttp://clrforum.org/, the new
on-line resource of the Center for Law and
Religionhttp://www.stjohns.edu/academics/graduate/law/academics/centers/lawreligion
(CLR) at St. John’s University School of Law. CLR Forum is a
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