Re: Establisment clause and oppressive taxation
In a message dated 8/5/2005 12:19:48 AM Eastern Standard Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: What if the synagogue, temple, or mosque also distributes and sells religiously-prepared foods as does the local grocery stores, but some of the believers would rather purchase food with their stamps from those they trust to prepare the foods correctly, namely, those at their local house of worship. If the independence of synagogue, temple, mosque, on the one hand, and the government on the other is a sufficiently important constitutional value, I'm sure some members of these groups will beenterprising enoughto recognize the market for the relevant products and create trustworthy private producers and vendors. Bobby Robert Justin LipkinProfessor of LawWidener University School of LawDelaware ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Establisment clause and oppressive taxation
fwiw here is the South African Constitutional provisions on freedom of religion and freedom of _expression_:15. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion.(2) Religious observances may be conducted at state or state-aided institutions, provided that those observances follow rules made by the appropriate public authorities;they are conducted on an equitable basis; andattendance at them is free and voluntary.(3)This section does not prevent legislation recognising marriages concluded under any tradition, or a system of religious, personal or family law; orsystems of personal and family law under any tradition, or adhered to by persons professing a particular religion.Recognition in terms of paragraph (a) must be consistent with this section and the other provisions of the Constitution.Freedom of _expression_16. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of _expression_, which includes freedom of the press and other media;freedom to receive or impart information or ideas;freedom of artistic creativity; andacademic freedom and freedom of scientific research.(2) The right in subsection (1) does not extend to propaganda for war;incitement of imminent violence; oradvocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and that constitutes incitement to cause harm.On Aug 4, 2005, at 8:01 AM, Francis Beckwith wrote: Interesting suggestion. It would be a sort of anti-Blaine amendment. But that would imply that those that offered the Blaine amendment were suggesting what was unnecessary. However, if it was necessary, then the EC, and Paul’s Madisonian take on it, does not get us to a Blaine-meaning EC (so to speak). Frank On 8/4/05 6:53 AM, "[EMAIL PROTECTED]" [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: In a message dated 8/3/2005 11:47:28 PM Eastern Standard Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Given the regulatory state in which we live—one that requires that parents who send their children to religious private school must pay for both the school tuition as well as taxes to fund public schools--it seems to me that the principle from which Madison drew his conclusion is not so easily dispositive in resolving this dispute. On the assumption that Madison's view, stated by Paul in his earlier post, accurately represents the original meaning of the EC, then shouldn't those who contend it unfairly discriminates against religion regarding governmental benefits advocate amending the First Amendment to explicitly state the EC doesn't apply to these entitlements? Bobby -- Prof. Steven D. Jamar vox: 202-806-8017 Howard University School of Law fax: 202-806-8567 2900 Van Ness Street NW mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Washington, DC 20008 http://www.law.howard.edu/faculty/pages/jamar/ ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Establisment clause and oppressive taxation
Sorry -- I hit "send" before I had finished pasting all of the sections I intended to -- here is the more complete version -- you can see the whole bill of rights athttp://www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/constitution/saconst02.html?rebookmark=1#31On Aug 4, 2005, at 8:25 AM, Steven Jamar wrote:fwiw here are the South African Constitutional provisions relating to freedom of religion and freedom of _expression_:Equality9. (1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.(4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination.(5) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is fair.Freedom of religion, belief and opinion15. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion.(2) Religious observances may be conducted at state or state-aided institutions, provided that those observances follow rules made by the appropriate public authorities;they are conducted on an equitable basis; andattendance at them is free and voluntary.(3)This section does not prevent legislation recognising marriages concluded under any tradition, or a system of religious, personal or family law; orsystems of personal and family law under any tradition, or adhered to by persons professing a particular religion.Recognition in terms of paragraph (a) must be consistent with this section and the other provisions of the Constitution.Freedom of _expression_16. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of _expression_, which includes freedom of the press and other media;freedom to receive or impart information or ideas;freedom of artistic creativity; andacademic freedom and freedom of scientific research.(2) The right in subsection (1) does not extend to propaganda for war;incitement of imminent violence; oradvocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and that constitutes incitement to cause harm.Language and culture30. Everyone has the right to use the language and to participate in the cultural life of their choice, but no one exercising these rights may do so in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights.Cultural, religious and linguistic communities31. (1) Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be denied the right, with other members of that community to enjoy their culture, practise their religion and use their language; andto form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic associations and other organs of civil society.(2) The rights in subsection (1) may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights.Limitation of rights36. (1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including the nature of the right;the importance of the purpose of the limitation;the nature and extent of the limitation;the relation between the limitation and its purpose; andless restrictive means to achieve the purpose.(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, no law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights.On Aug 4, 2005, at 8:01 AM, Francis Beckwith wrote: Interesting suggestion. It would be a sort of anti-Blaine amendment. But that would imply that those that offered the Blaine amendment were suggesting what was unnecessary. However, if it was necessary, then the EC, and Paul’s Madisonian take on it, does not get us to a Blaine-meaning EC (so to speak). Frank On 8/4/05 6:53 AM, "[EMAIL PROTECTED]" [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: In a message dated 8/3/2005 11:47:28 PM Eastern Standard Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Given the regulatory state in which we live—one that requires that parents who send their children to religious private school must pay for both the school tuition as well as taxes to fund public schools--it seems to me that the principle from which Madison drew his conclusion is not so easily dispositive in resolving this dispute. On the assumption that
Re: Establisment clause and oppressive taxation
Francis Beckwith wrote: Re: Establisment clause and oppressive taxation Given the regulatory state in which we liveone that requires that parents who send their children to religious private school must pay for both the school tuition as well as taxes to fund public schools--it seems to me that the principle from which Madison drew his conclusion is not so easily dispositive in resolving this dispute. Suppose, for example, it were discovered that food stamp recipients were using some of them for the purchase of bread and grape juice for Catholic Masses conducted in their homes. Would that violate Madisons principle, since the purchase results from money acquired through taxing non-Catholics? Or would it be consistent with Madisons principle, since the purchase is the result of the free agency of the citizen who received the food stamps rather than a result of a government-directed order (as in the case of religious assessments in early America)? Suppose we change the food stamps to school vouchers and the bread and grape juice to Catholic school admission? I have to agree with Frank here, there has to be a distinction made between direct payments of tax money to churches and ministers (which is what Madison was opposing in Patrick Henry's bill when he wrote the Memorial and Remonstrance) and indirect use of money given for another purpose. Frank gives one example, but there are many others as well. We pay tax dollars to support police and the police protect churches too, so some portion of the taxes I paid might go to protect a church I disagree with, and so forth. Ed Brayton No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG Anti-Virus. Version: 7.0.338 / Virus Database: 267.10.0/63 - Release Date: 8/3/05 ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Establisment clause and oppressive taxation
Re Madison's view. Madison clearly expressed his position relating to civil rights and of opposition to use of tax (coerced) money for "teachers of the Christian religion" in his 1785 "Memorial and Remonstrance," which he distributed just prior to passage of the 1786 Virginia Statute of Religious Liberty, in which it is written: "to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which is disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical; ... our civil rights have no dependence on our religious opinions, any more than our opinions in physics or geometry; ... no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place or ministry whatsoever." The "Father of the Constitution" was also cochair of the joint Senate-House conference committee which in 1789 drafted the final version of the First Amendment's religion commandments. He is a primary source authority as to their meaning and application. The suggestion that Madison, related facts of history, and unanimous Court decisions (Reynolds and Davis) are irrelevant to an understanding of the wording of the First Amendment's religion commandments is particularly espoused by constitutional revisionists to whom such documentation is objectionable because it conflicts with their idea of religion accommodation. In America there have always been advocates of a connection between religion and government, but their position did not win in Virginia or, ultimately, in any of the colonies or original states, all of which significantly disestablished official religion by 1833. In his two 1811 veto messages of religion bills passed by Congress, President Madison's position remained the same. Feb. 21 veto: "Because the bill exceeds the rightful authority to which governments are limited by the essential distinction between civil and religious functions, and violates in particular the article of the Constitution of the United States which declares that 'Congress shall make no law respecting' Because the bill vests in the said incorporated church [Episcopal] an authority to provide for the support of the poor and the education of poor children of the same, an authority which, ... would be a precedent for giving to religious societies as such a legal agency in carrying into effect a public and civil duty." Feb. 28 veto: "Because the bill in reserving a certain parcel of land of the United States for the use of said Baptist Church comprises a principle and precedent for the appropriation of funds of the United States for the use and support of religious societies, contrary to the article of the Constitution which declares that "Congress shall make no law respecting." In his c.1817 "Detached Memoranda" Madison wrote "Strongly guarded as is the separation between Religion and Government in the Constitution of the United States, the danger of encroachments by Ecclesiastical Bodies may be illustrated by precedents already established in their short history," and he noted one after another example of a "palpable violation of ... constitutional principles." James Madison's "Detached Memoranda," became a part of legal record when cited in Everson v. Board of Education, footnotes 12 and 13. Just because a state, Congress, the Supreme Court, or some other government entity fails to accept and abide by the constitutional principle of "no religious test" and "no law respecting an establishment of religion" does not destroy the Constitution's religion commandments. Actions in violation of the Constitution should be stopped, and Court decisions in conflict with "the supreme law of the land" should be reversed. As one other participant to this list has already suggested, those who object to the wording of Article 6, Section 3., and the First Amendment should push for amendment. Indeed, I recall the day when a contracts professor made it clear "the Constitution means what the Court says it means." That may be sufficient for constitutional revisionists, but it is not the end of the legal argument for those of us who, in a nation composed from its beginning of citizens of many religions and of none, are "original intent," "strict constructionist" separationists and accept the simple wisdom of the Constitution's religion commandments, as written, lest Art. 6., Sec. 3., the Establishment Clause, and government (the essence of coercion) neutrality become a mockery. Gene Garman, M.Div. America's Real Religion www.americasrealreligion.org [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: In a message dated 8/3/2005 11:47:28 PM Eastern Standard Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Given the regulatory state in which we live—one that requiresthat parents who send their children to religious private school must pay forboth the school tuition as well as taxes to fund public schools--it seems tome that the principle from which Madison drew his conclusion is not so easilydispositive in resolving this
Re: Establisment clause and oppressive taxation
This is not the same as giving money to a synagogue or other religious institution; a Jew can use food stamps for kosher food; and Hindu for vegitarian food; a Moslem for Halal meat; but they should not be allowed to give the stamps to their synagogue, temples, etc. Rick Duncan wrote: Or better yet, change the food stamp hypo to Kosher food. Why should non-Jews be taxed to pay for Kosher observance? The answer, of course, is that they are not being taxed to pay for Kosher observance. They are being taxed to pay for food supplements for the poor, including food stamp recipients who choose to keep a Kosher kitchen. The same with education taxes supporting school choice. No one is being taxed to support religious instruction as such. Everyone is being taxed to pay for education, and everyone gets a free tax supported education up frontin return for paying a lifetime of educational taxes. Both Kosher education(in private religious schools)and non-Kosher education(in all other schools) are equally funded.There should be no strife at all, because everyone pays and everyone receives. Indeed, the battles over the public school curriculum we have been discussing would be less likely to occur (less strife) if dissenting families could exit the public schools without penalty. The real strifeis createdwhen Jews are denied Kosher food in the food stamp program and whenfamilies who choose private schools are denied their fair slice of the K-12 educational benefit pie. I deeply resent being forced to pay taxes to support a system which provides no benefits to my children. I feel like a second class citizen. And many millions more feel the same way. Rick Francis Beckwith [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Given the regulatory state in which we liveone that requires that parents who send their children to religious private school must pay for both the school tuition as well as taxes to fund public schools--it seems to me that the principle from which Madison drew his conclusion is not so easily dispositive in resolving this dispute. Suppose, for example, it were discovered that food stamp recipients were using some of them for the purchase of bread and grape juice for Catholic Masses conducted in their homes. Would that violate Madisons principle, since the purchase results from money acquired through taxing non-Catholics? Or would it be consistent with Madisons principle, since the purchase is the result of the free agency of the citizen who received the food stamps rather than a result of a government-directed order (as in the case of r! eligious assessments in early America)? Suppose we change the food stamps to school vouchers and the bread and grape juice to Catholic school admission? Im not sure Madison is helpful here. Frank On 8/3/05 11:27 PM, "Paul Finkelman" [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I would suggest you reread Madison's remonstrance on Religious freedom; one of the clear motivating factors for the establishment clause was to preclude the possibility that people would have to pay for other people's religion. That was what was going on in Va and that, quite frankly, is what the voucher system is all about; when tax money ends up in a religious school, it means that taxpayers of one faith are forced to support the religious schools of someone else. Madison understood how deeply wrong, dangerous, and offensive that was. I am surprised that you and Rick don't see this. Paul Finkelman Pybas, Kevin M wrote: All of the comments are helpful, but let me raise another question that is akin to the one Rick raised. He asked whether, why, and / or how these motivations, or the undesirability of such strife should be used to supply the Establishment Clause's enforceable content. WIth regard to neutral aid programs (as the Court characterizes them), is it really religious strife that worries us? In other words, in the context of the modern administrative state, are the conflicts over the funding of education, for example, whether it be vouchers or the type of aid at issue in Mitchell, really about religion, or religiously-motivated in any sense? In other words, how do we tell the difference between religously-motivated political strife and ordinary political disagreements (I understand that the word "ordinary" may not he all that helpful, but hopefully you see what I mean.) From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] on behalf of Paul Finkelman Sent: Wed 8/3/2005 5:08 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: religiously-motivated political strife ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw
Re: Establisment clause and oppressive taxation
Title: Re: Establisment clause and oppressive taxation What if the synagogue, temple, or mosque also distributes and sells religiously-prepared foods as does the local grocery stores, but some of the believers would rather purchase food with their stamps from those they trust to prepare the foods correctly, namely, those at their local house of worship. Frank On 8/4/05 11:04 PM, Paul Finkelman [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: This is not the same as giving money to a synagogue or other religious institution; a Jew can use food stamps for kosher food; and Hindu for vegitarian food; a Moslem for Halal meat; but they should not be allowed to give the stamps to their synagogue, temples, etc. Rick Duncan wrote: Or better yet, change the food stamp hypo to Kosher food. Why should non-Jews be taxed to pay for Kosher observance? The answer, of course, is that they are not being taxed to pay for Kosher observance. They are being taxed to pay for food supplements for the poor, including food stamp recipients who choose to keep a Kosher kitchen. The same with education taxes supporting school choice. No one is being taxed to support religious instruction as such. Everyone is being taxed to pay for education, and everyone gets a free tax supported education up front in return for paying a lifetime of educational taxes. Both Kosher education (in private religious schools) and non-Kosher education (in all other schools) are equally funded. There should be no strife at all, because everyone pays and everyone receives. Indeed, the battles over the public school curriculum we have been discussing would be less likely to occur (less strife) if dissenting families could exit the public schools without penalty. The real strife is created when Jews are denied Kosher food in the food stamp program and when families who choose private schools are denied their fair slice of the K-12 educational benefit pie. I deeply resent being forced to pay taxes to support a system which provides no benefits to my children. I feel like a second class citizen. And many millions more feel the same way. Rick Francis Beckwith [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Given the regulatory state in which we liveone that requires that parents who send their children to religious private school must pay for both the school tuition as well as taxes to fund public schools--it seems to me that the principle from which Madison drew his conclusion is not so easily dispositive in resolving this dispute. Suppose, for example, it were discovered that food stamp recipients were using some of them for the purchase of bread and grape juice for Catholic Masses conducted in their homes. Would that violate Madisons principle, since the purchase results from money acquired through taxing non-Catholics? Or would it be consistent with Madisons principle, since the purchase is the result of the free agency of the citizen who received the food stamps rather than a result of a government-directed order (as in the case of r! eligious assessments in early America)? Suppose we change the food stamps to school vouchers and the bread and grape juice to Catholic school admission? Im not sure Madison is helpful here. Frank On 8/3/05 11:27 PM, Paul Finkelman [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I would suggest you reread Madison's remonstrance on Religious freedom; one of the clear motivating factors for the establishment clause was to preclude the possibility that people would have to pay for other people's religion. That was what was going on in Va and that, quite frankly, is what the voucher system is all about; when tax money ends up in a religious school, it means that taxpayers of one faith are forced to support the religious schools of someone else. Madison understood how deeply wrong, dangerous, and offensive that was. I am surprised that you and Rick don't see this. Paul Finkelman Pybas, Kevin M wrote: All of the comments are helpful, but let me raise another question that is akin to the one Rick raised. He asked whether, why, and / or how these motivations, or the undesirability of such strife should be used to supply the Establishment Clause's enforceable content. WIth regard to neutral aid programs (as the Court characterizes them), is it really religious strife that worries us? In other words, in the context of the modern administrative state, are the conflicts over the funding of education, for example, whether it be vouchers or the type of aid at issue in Mitchell, really about religion, or religiously-motivated in any sense? In other words, how do we tell the difference between religously-motivated political strife and ordinary political disagreements (I understand that the word ordinary may not he all that helpful, but hopefully you see what I mean.) From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] on behalf of Paul Finkelman Sent: Wed 8/3/2005 5:08 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject
Re: Establisment clause and oppressive taxation
Title: Re: Establisment clause and oppressive taxation Given the regulatory state in which we liveone that requires that parents who send their children to religious private school must pay for both the school tuition as well as taxes to fund public schools--it seems to me that the principle from which Madison drew his conclusion is not so easily dispositive in resolving this dispute. Suppose, for example, it were discovered that food stamp recipients were using some of them for the purchase of bread and grape juice for Catholic Masses conducted in their homes. Would that violate Madisons principle, since the purchase results from money acquired through taxing non-Catholics? Or would it be consistent with Madisons principle, since the purchase is the result of the free agency of the citizen who received the food stamps rather than a result of a government-directed order (as in the case of religious assessments in early America)? Suppose we change the food stamps to school vouchers and the bread and grape juice to Catholic school admission? Im not sure Madison is helpful here. Frank On 8/3/05 11:27 PM, Paul Finkelman [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I would suggest you reread Madison's remonstrance on Religious freedom; one of the clear motivating factors for the establishment clause was to preclude the possibility that people would have to pay for other people's religion. That was what was going on in Va and that, quite frankly, is what the voucher system is all about; when tax money ends up in a religious school, it means that taxpayers of one faith are forced to support the religious schools of someone else. Madison understood how deeply wrong, dangerous, and offensive that was. I am surprised that you and Rick don't see this. Paul Finkelman Pybas, Kevin M wrote: All of the comments are helpful, but let me raise another question that is akin to the one Rick raised. He asked whether, why, and / or how these motivations, or the undesirability of such strife should be used to supply the Establishment Clause's enforceable content. WIth regard to neutral aid programs (as the Court characterizes them), is it really religious strife that worries us? In other words, in the context of the modern administrative state, are the conflicts over the funding of education, for example, whether it be vouchers or the type of aid at issue in Mitchell, really about religion, or religiously-motivated in any sense? In other words, how do we tell the difference between religously-motivated political strife and ordinary political disagreements (I understand that the word ordinary may not he all that helpful, but hopefully you see what I mean.) From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] on behalf of Paul Finkelman Sent: Wed 8/3/2005 5:08 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: religiously-motivated political strife ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Establisment clause and oppressive taxation
Or better yet, change the food stamp hypo to Kosher food. Why should non-Jews be taxed to pay for Kosher observance? The answer, of course, is that they are not being taxed to pay for Kosher observance. They are being taxed to pay for food supplements for the poor, including food stamp recipients who choose to keep a Kosher kitchen. The same with education taxes supporting school choice. No one is being taxed to support religious instruction as such. Everyone is being taxed to pay for education, and everyone gets a free tax supported education up frontin return for paying a lifetime of educational taxes. Both Kosher education(in private religious schools)and non-Kosher education(in all other schools) are equally funded.There should be no strife at all, because everyone pays and everyone receives. Indeed, the battles over the public school curriculum we have been discussing would be less likely to occur (less strife) if dissenting families could exit the public schools without penalty. The real strifeis createdwhen Jews are denied Kosher food in the food stamp program and whenfamilies who choose private schools are denied their fair slice of the K-12 educational benefit pie. I deeply resent being forced to pay taxes to support a system which provides no benefits to my children. I feel like a second class citizen. And many millions more feel the same way. RickFrancis Beckwith [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Given the regulatory state in which we liveone that requires that parents who send their children to religious private school must pay for both the school tuition as well as taxes to fund public schools--it seems to me that the principle from which Madison drew his conclusion is not so easily dispositive in resolving this dispute. Suppose, for example, it were discovered that food stamp recipients were using some of them for the purchase of bread and grape juice for Catholic Masses conducted in their homes. Would that violate Madisons principle, since the purchase results from money acquired through taxing non-Catholics? Or would it be consistent with Madisons principle, since the purchase is the result of the free agency of the citizen who received the food stamps rather than a result of a government-directed order (as in the case of r! eligious assessments in early America)? Suppose we change the food stamps to school vouchers and the bread and grape juice to Catholic school admission? Im not sure Madison is helpful here.FrankOn 8/3/05 11:27 PM, "Paul Finkelman" [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I would suggest you reread Madison's remonstrance on Religious freedom; one of the clear motivating factors for the establishment clause was to preclude the possibility that people would have to pay for other people's religion. That was what was going on in Va and that, quite frankly, is what the voucher system is all about; when tax money ends up in a religious school, it means that taxpayers of one faith are forced to support the religious schools of someone else. Madison understood how deeply wrong, dangerous, and offensive that was. I am surprised that you and Rick don't see this. Paul FinkelmanPybas, Kevin M wrote: All of the comments are helpful, but let me raise another question that is akin to the one Rick raised. He asked whether, why, and / or how these motivations, or theundesirability of such strife should be used to supply theEstablishment Clause's enforceable content.WIth regard to neutral aid programs (as the Court characterizes them), is it really religious strife that worries us? In other words, in the context of the modern administrative state, are the conflicts over the funding of education, for example, whether it be vouchers or the type of aid at issue in Mitchell, really about religion, or religiously-motivated in any sense? In other words, how do we tell the difference between religously-motivated political strife and ordinary political disagreements (I understand that the word "ordinary" may not he all that helpful, but hopefully you see what I mean.) From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] on behalf of Paul FinkelmanSent: Wed 8/3/2005 5:08 PMTo: Law Religion issues for Law AcademicsSubject: Re: religiously-motivated political strife ___To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.eduTo subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlawPlease note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.___To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.eduTo subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlawPlease note that messages sent to this large list
Re: Establisment clause and oppressive taxation
In a message dated 8/3/2005 11:28:30 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: I would suggest you reread Madison's remonstrance on Religious freedom; one of the clear motivating factors for the establishment clause was to preclude the possibility that people would have to pay for other people's religion. That was what was going on in Va and that, quite frankly, is what the voucher system is all about; when tax money ends up in a religious school, it means that taxpayers of one faith are forced to support the religious schools of someone else. Madison understood how deeply wrong, dangerous, and offensive that was. I am surprised that you and Rick don't see this. Of course you are right that the remonstrance addresses this issue. Perhaps the offense among folks whose religious faith prevents them from accessing government schools would be lessened if public funding was as faithful to Thomas Jefferson's vision as the Court has tried to make funding models be to Madison's worries. Jim Henderson Senior Counsel ACLJ ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
