Re: [SC-L] Provably correct microkernel (seL4)

2009-10-03 Thread Steven M. Christey
I wonder what would happen if somebody offered $1 to the first applied researcher to find a fault or security error. According to http://ertos.nicta.com.au/research/l4.verified/proof.pml, buffer overflows, memory leaks, and other issues are not present. Maybe people would give up if they

Re: [SC-L] Provably correct microkernel (seL4)

2009-10-03 Thread Bobby Miller
I might argue that it may fix problems that aren't fixable otherwise. My experience in this area is very old, but I found that the biggest benefit of formal methods was not so much the proof but the flaws discovered and fixed on the way to the proof. In conclusion, it seems an awful effort to

Re: [SC-L] Provably correct microkernel (seL4)

2009-10-03 Thread Wall, Kevin
Steve Christy wrote... I wonder what would happen if somebody offered $1 to the first applied researcher to find a fault or security error. According to http://ertos.nicta.com.au/research/l4.verified/proof.pml, buffer overflows, memory leaks, and other issues are not present. Maybe

Re: [SC-L] Provably correct microkernel (seL4)

2009-10-03 Thread Chris Wysopal
] On Behalf Of Gunnar Peterson Sent: Friday, October 02, 2009 3:21 PM To: Cassidy, Colin (GE Infra, Energy) Cc: Secure Code Mailing List Subject: Re: [SC-L] Provably correct microkernel (seL4) design flaws. So we have only removed 50% of the problem. for my part there have been many, many days when I

Re: [SC-L] Provably correct microkernel (seL4)

2009-10-03 Thread Johan Peeters
It is my understanding that only the micro-kernel runs in kernel mode, but not having read the nitty-gritty either, I'll stand to be corrected. kr, Yo On Fri, Oct 2, 2009 at 11:20 PM, Wall, Kevin kevin.w...@qwest.com wrote: Steve Christy wrote... I wonder what would happen if somebody

Re: [SC-L] Provably correct microkernel (seL4)

2009-10-02 Thread Cassidy, Colin (GE Infra, Energy)
I have a few concerns with formal proofs particularly applying them in a non-academic environment (some of which may be my own naïve lack of understanding and my feeble memory of my university years studying formal methods). Firstly whilst the code provably does what you said that it would do,

Re: [SC-L] Provably correct microkernel (seL4)

2009-10-02 Thread ljknews
At 4:33 PM -0500 10/1/09, Wall, Kevin wrote: Professor Gernot Heiser, the John Lions Chair in Computer Science in the School of Computer Science and Engineering and a senior principal researcher with NICTA, said for the first time a team had been able to prove with

Re: [SC-L] Provably correct microkernel (seL4)

2009-10-02 Thread Johan Peeters
My $.02... I don't think this approach is going to catch on anytime soon. Spending 30 or so staff years verifying a 7500 line C program is not going to be seen as cost effective by most real-world managers. But interesting research nonetheless. maybe not as crazy as it sounds: this is a micro

Re: [SC-L] Provably correct microkernel (seL4)

2009-10-02 Thread Dimitri DeFigueiredo
-Original Message- From: sc-l-boun...@securecoding.org [mailto:sc-l-boun...@securecoding.org] On Behalf Of Jeremy Epstein Sent: Friday, October 02, 2009 6:38 AM To: Wall, Kevin Cc: Secure Code Mailing List Subject: Re: [SC-L] Provably correct microkernel (seL4) This was discussed a few months

Re: [SC-L] Provably correct microkernel (seL4)

2009-10-02 Thread Jeremy Epstein
...@securecoding.org] On Behalf Of Jeremy Epstein Sent: Friday, October 02, 2009 6:38 AM To: Wall, Kevin Cc: Secure Code Mailing List Subject: Re: [SC-L] Provably correct microkernel (seL4) This was discussed a few months ago on several other lists I read. The consensus is that it's interesting

Re: [SC-L] Provably correct microkernel (seL4)

2009-10-02 Thread Gunnar Peterson
design flaws. So we have only removed 50% of the problem. for my part there have been many, many days when I would settle for solving 50% of a problem -gunnar ___ Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org List information,