Re: [sidr] Conflict between rtr-keying, bgpsec-pki-profile, and RFC 6487

2014-05-12 Thread Sean Turner
On Apr 04, 2014, at 15:47, Geoff Huston g...@apnic.net wrote: The authors of RFC 6487 can speak for themselves, but I think their intent was to avoid requests for vanity names (CN=Joe's Pizza instead of CN=4DF2D88957372FF9FDA05C70F2D9E8BA334CFF89), which could be construed as eroding claims

Re: [sidr] WGLC for draft-ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling-04

2014-05-12 Thread Christopher Morrow
On Mon, May 5, 2014 at 12:10 PM, Roque Gagliano (rogaglia) rogag...@cisco.com wrote: Sandra, I support this document moving forward to the IESG. I read the document as part of the WGLC process and I believe the text is ready for publication. My only question is a formality from Section 3

Re: [sidr] Conflict between rtr-keying, bgpsec-pki-profile, and RFC 6487

2014-05-12 Thread Randy Bush
Would it make sense to have the name that goes in the router certificate then be something like “ROUTER-#-32_bit_BGP_Identifier” where the # gets incremented everytime there’s a new key? For those that love hard coded lengths this might be an issue if the # grows, but is that the only

Re: [sidr] Conflict between rtr-keying, bgpsec-pki-profile, and RFC 6487

2014-05-12 Thread Sean Turner
On May 12, 2014, at 16:03, Randy Bush ra...@psg.com wrote: Would it make sense to have the name that goes in the router certificate then be something like “ROUTER-#-32_bit_BGP_Identifier” where the # gets incremented everytime there’s a new key? For those that love hard coded lengths this

Re: [sidr] I-D Action: draft-ietf-sidr-rtr-keying-05.txt

2014-05-12 Thread Sean Turner
Wes, Randy and I bashed some text around; would this work: When it is decided that an active router key is to be revoked, the process of requesting the CA to revoke, the process of the CA actually revoking the router’s certificate, and then the process of rekeying/renewing the router’s