On Tue, May 20, 2014 at 10:38 AM, Randy Bush <ra...@psg.com> wrote: >> i didn't update the tracker... (i hadn't ever in the past). > > uh, that is between you and the datawhacker > >> Did we circle down on an answer for the leak/persay language that >> everyone's happy with? If so I'd like to push out a pub request today. > > as far as i am aware, there is no issue with leak language. we got past > folk looking up 'per se' in their dictionaries. the one open issue is > > >>>>> 3.14 While the trust level of a route should be determined by the > >>>>> BGPsec protocol, local routing preference and policy MUST > then > >>>>> be applied to best path and other routing decisions. Such > >>>>> mechanisms SHOULD conform with [I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt]. > >>>>> ... > >>>>> 3.17 If a BGPsec design makes use of a security infrastructure, > that > >>>>> infrastructure SHOULD enable each network operator to select > >>>>> the entities it will trust when authenticating data in the > >>>>> security infrastructure. See, for example, > >>>>> [I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt]. > >>> > >>> What about adding that "the connection to this security infrastructure > >>> MUST be through a secure channel"? > > > > it's done via rcynic and/or rpki-to-rtr, right? depending on where in > > the process you are... presuming the process looks like: > > publication-point - gatherer - cache - router > > (rcynic) (rcynic) (rpki-rtr) > > apologies to roque. some external data were indeed what was meant (an > rpki-like thing is an example), and was inteneded by "security > infrastructure." > > the authenticity of those data is an issue. we might say so in sec > cons. > > and i am waiting for wglc to close so i can make the hack once.
Roque, is the change/text ok? or ? _______________________________________________ sidr mailing list sidr@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
