----- Original Message ----- From: Joveljic, Nebojsa N <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: 'Mrs. Jela Jovanovic' <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Monday, July 09, 2001 5:39 AM Subject: Ponocni dnevnici jednog pijanca > > Za one koji jos uvijek nisu sigurni zasto smo izgubili rat na Kosovu dobro ce biti da procitaju dio teksta iz > "> Ponocnih dnevnika> "> pijandure i zadriglog ruskog krmka Borisa Jeljcina, koji se odnosi na njegovo vidjenje uzroka krize na Kosovu i nacina na koji je razrijesena. > > Boris je napisao svoje memoare > "> Midnight Diaries> "> tacno prije godinu dana (1. juli 2000). Izgleda da knjiga nije naisla na neki veliki interes. Ovdje na Novom Zelandu se nekoliko mjeseci prodavala po NZ$39.90 da bi joj u zadnjih nekoliko dana cijena pala na manje od paklice cigara - NZ$9.90, u kom trenutku sam se i ja odlucio da je kupim, vrlo vjerovatno kao jedini kupac na Novom Zelandu i okolnim pacifickim ostrvima. > > Na osnovu mog dozivljavanja ove knjige siguran sam da ce mnogi citaoci dobiti dijareju od citanja ovih > "> Diaries> "> koji nepobitno potvrdjuju da smo silno srecni sto ovaj svijet vec davno nije odletio u zrak imajuci u vidu kakvi sve idioti sjede i izigravaju predjednike najmocnijih drzava na svijetu. > > Evo na primjer kako Boris Jeljcin, koji pojma nema jesul' kompjuteri nesto sto se jede, spasava svijet od Y2K katastrofe (i usput Bila Klintona od sramote) u svom "dobro pripremljenom" petominutnom govoru na sastanku G7 (+ osmi durak), negdje u Evropi: > > > > "> There are sometimes funny clashes during the global discussions. I remember during one of the summits I glanced over Clinton> '> s shoulder and saw that he was getting ready to make a presentation on the same theme I had chosen: the Y2K computer problem. We were going around the table speaking in turn, and as it happened I was to speak just before Clinton. What was I to do? When I began, Clinton went white. I decided to throw away my five-minute speech - I had done serious preparation on the subject - and start an impromptu discussion so that Clinton could join in. I don> '> t think he was offended.> "> > > > > Ili kako mu je njemacki kancelar Kol obecao, ako mu se omakne i izgubi izbore, da ce mu zasigurno srediti posao u Njemackoj: > > > > At one point a very long time ago, Kohl joked: > "> Don> '> t be afraid Boris. If you lose the election, I will find work for you in Germany. I know that you have a degree in construction.> "> > > > > Sa Borisovim znanjem struke i stranih jezika jedino blesavom Borisu nije bilo jasno da je obecani posao isti onaj koje vec na hiljade Rusa, Srba i stalih robovskih nacija rade po Njemackoj - kopanje hala i kanala. > > > > Zaprepascuje nivo servilnosti, snishodljivosti i divljenja sa kojim se Boris odnosio prema velikim svjetskim liderima, osobito Bilu Klintonu. Evo opisa zadnjeg susreta ova dve > "> velikana> "> u junu prosle godine, kada je Boris bio penzioner vec 6 mjeseci: > > > > I always liked Bill> '> s good-natured openness and his free and easy style of communicating. Once I sat next to him for a long time at a state function. He said to me, > "> We> '> re almost the same height, Boris.> "> I asked him, > "> Bill, what size shoes do you wear? Let> '> s compare.> "> He laughed, and I started taking off my shoes. It turned out that although we were the same height, his shoes were at least one size larger. > > > > (moj komentar: cudi me da su se zaustavili samo na poredjenju velicine stopala, muskarci ne rijetko pokazuju zanimanje i za poredjenje nekih drugih ekstremiteta - u njihovom slucaju vjerovatno ne narocito ekstremnih) > > > > Finally, I stood up in order to see the guests off. In parting, Bill looked at me and said, > "> You wanted to change your country, Boris, and you did.> "> > > "> And you changed your country too, Bill, > "> I replied. I don> '> t think these were just cliches. > > We walked out of the house. It was a wonderful summer day. Tanya and Naina had themselves photographed with the president of the United States. He waved and headed toward his car. The officer with the nuclear suitcase walked ahead of him. He was wearing gloves, even in the heat. > > When Bill left, I looked at the photograph he had given me. He and I were sitting in the famous wicker Roosevelt chairs. We were looking ahead into blue sky. Two presidents. Two ordinary men. It> '> s a great photograph. > > > > Boris se na kraju memoara osvrce i na sporni dekret Dume koji je na brzinu donosen kako bi se ovaj klovn od predsjednika napokon u dobro organiziranoj akciji "take that clown down" skinuo sa vlasti uz obecanje da nece zaglaviti tamnice gdje bi mu po svim mjerilima bilo mjesto: > > > > Now as for the decree itself, this is how the point about immunity reads: > "> The president of the Russian Federation, having completed his duties in office, shall enjoy immunity> ...> He is not subject to criminal or administrative procedure, detention, or arrest; he is not subject to search of his premises, interrogation, or search of his person.> "> This decree was written with only a single goal in mind: to prevent the spread of political accusations. The decree speaks about certain ordinary guarantees the state gives the president, which I would describe as related to past public office. These are the right to auto transportation and security protection; the right to use special reception; the right to use special reception halls at airports and train stations reserved for officials and delegations; and the right to make use of government telecommunications. There is a point in the decree regarding a state dacha provided to the president for lifetime use. There is another on medical care. In other words, it includes nothing sensational. > > > > "> Nothing sensational!> "> Mogu zamisliti kako bi se gorko nasmjesio Milosevic na ove njegove rijeci. > > > > A sad jedna Borisova > "> iskrena> "> izjava vezana za sporni dekret koju je poprilicno tesko progutat: > > > > But in the fact, at the end of December, I KNEW NOTHING ABOUT DECREE and was thinking about something else entirely. I was completely focused on what would happen after December 31. What kind of life would it be? > > > > Mozda je vrijedno, na kraju, citirati i srceparajuci govor Jeljcina na ceremoniji u crkvi svetog Petra i Pavla, u Sent Pitersburgu (nekad slavnom Lenjingradu) 17 jula 1998 kada su osveceni i sahranjeni ostaci davno umorenog ruskog cara Nikolaja II, clanova njegove porodice i carske posluge: > > > > For many long years, we remained silent about this monstrous crime, but we must speak them truth: The vengeance in Ekaterinburg was one of the most shameful pages of our history. In giving back to the earth the remains of these murdered innocents, we would like to expiate the sins of our ancestors. Those who committed this evil deed are guilty, as well as those who justified it for decades> ...> . I bow my head before the victims of this ruthless murder. Any attempts to change life through violence are doomed. > > > > Kako ironicno zvuce zadnje rijeci "any attempts to change life through violence are doomed" iz usta istog covjeka koji ih je vrlo uspjesno demantovao u praksi, dramaticno promijenivsi zivot Rusa 1993 kada je u hektolitrima krvi ugusio pobunu ruskih parlamentaraca ne oklijevajuci ni trenutka da punu vojnu silu primjeni na najsvetiju institucije demokratije - parlament, razrusivsi ga do daske granatama iz topovskih cijevi tenkova i bacivsi u tamnicu ono sto je preostalo od "honourable members of parliament". > > > > Nakon citanja teksta o Kosovu, koji slijedi, nadam se da cete se sloziti sa mnom da ne bi bilo nikakvo cudo da Carla Del Ponte pozove Jeljcina kao kljucnog svjedoka optuzbe protiv najcuvenijeg politickog zatvorenika danasnjice i > "> posljednjeg komunistickog diktatora> "> - Slobodana Milosevica. Jedini ce joj biti problem kako da Jeljcina dovede trijeznog u sudnicu al> '> i to se da srediti ako mu obeca da ce u publici biti njegov veliki prijatelj, konfidant i politicki idol Bill Clinton, pa da se jarani jos jednom sretnu, izljube u junacke obraze i izmjenjaju komplimente o tome koga ce od njih dvojice istorija postaviti blize ( a mozda i iznad) cuvenog americkog predsjednika Ruzvelta.> > > > > Ko zna, mozda Jelcinovo svjedocenje moze donijeti i neke koristi Milosevicu. Ako Jeljcin uspije ubijediti suce kako je Milosevic, u ulozi reinkarniranog cara Laz> ara, zaista preklinjao Chernomidina da mu po svaku cijenu izdejstvuje kopneni rat u kojem ce njegov vjerni junak Nebojsa Pavkovic (nesudjeni Milos Obilic kojem se jos uvijek noge tresu kad god prodje pored buldozera), jasuci na bijelom konju do nogu potuci Nato pakt i rastjerati turke na buljuke, onda Milosevic ima zaista dobre sanse da zaigra na kartu po kojoj bi se izvukao na racun mentalne neuracunljivosti. No, poznajuci Slobu, slabe su sanse za to. Kroz koji mjesec dopustit ce on da ga u dobro orkestriranoj reprizi Isusove tragedije (ili trijumfa?), sluge Nato pakta razapnu na kriz u sred Haga gdje ce ga ostaviti da godinama visi za pouku i primjer ostalim "zlim komunistickim diktatorima". > > > > Nebojsa Joveljic > > (Auckland) > > > > ==================================== > > > > MIDNIGHT DIARIES, Boris Yeltsin > > > > First published in Great Britain in 2000 by Wiedenfeld & Nicolson, London, > > ISBN 0 297 6467 8 > > 398 pages, price 20 pounds > > > > > > The Kosovo Crisis > > (page 255 - 266) > > > > > > Yeltsin is horrified by NATO's bombing of Serbia. He does not see the justification for killing thousands of innocent people. Although he holds no admiration for Milosevic, whom he blames for the Kosovo crisis, Yeltsin believes the solution lies in negotiation, not military retaliation. The war is also too close to home; it traumatizes the Russian public. Anti-Western sentiments flourish. With his country in such an unstable state, Yeltsin sees every rocket strike against Yugoslavia as an indirect strike against Russia. In the post-cold war world, will the United States override any and all checks on its powers? > > > > > > Soon, on top of the whole complex domestic political situation, another bomb went off. In late March 1999 a global crisis broke out in international politics: the war in Yugoslavia. > > > > What was the difference between Russia's approach and the approach of the countries of Western Europe to the Kosovo crisis? The West persistently believes that the war in Yugoslavia was a specific retaliation against Milosevic, a fight for national minorities and human rights. We, in contrast, think the Kosovo crisis is a global crisis. > > > > After the bombing of Belgrade, all the rules that had been established by the UN during the long postwar decades collapsed. Yes, the bombing stopped the conflict in Kosovo. But the problems within the territory weren't solved. No one knows what to do next. The war reinforced the Milosevic regime, at least in the short term. There is nothing more dangerous to humanity than the idea that international force should be used to retaliate against any one country, its residents, its economy, and its culture, industry, ancient cultural monuments, sacred places, and museums were destroyed in Yugoslavia. If we accept such rules of the game, we risk creating a global crisis of democratic values. Soon the force of only one country or one group of countries will decide everything in the world. Instead of the mentality of a world peacemaker, we are seeing the psychology of a world enforcer and a dictator country. > > > > I had understood all this for a long time, but the Yugoslav crisis forced me to make rapid decisions on all these issues. I was in constant telephone contact with the leaders of the major countries and all sides of the conflict. On March 24, on the eve of the NATO bombing, Bill Clinton called me to discuss the Kosovo situation. Milosevic was continuing his offensive, he said, bringing in additional troops, killing totally innocent people, and burning whole villages. I was aware of this. But I knew something else: We had to try to conduct political negotiations. Negotiating in any way, even unsuccessfully, is better than bombing and destroying everything in one fell swoop. By this time Prime Minister Primakov, who had been on his way to visit Clinton in the United States, had already turned his plane around over the Atlantic Ocean. I told Clinton that Primakov's reaction was only the first step. There would be many more.> > > > > Clinton kept pushing, saying that it depende> d on me whether we would let Milosevic destroy our relations and everything that we had worked so hard to create in the past six years. He said that for his part, he would not allow this to happen. He cited concrete statistics. There was bloodshed in Europe; 250,000 refugees had already left Kosovo. If we didn't stop this, he warned, there would be 2.5 million refugees. If we didn't take measures immediately, we'd wind up with a new Bosnia. Milosevic wanted to crush the Kosovar Albanians with the help of military might. > > > > But I was amazed by one other argument Clinton cited. Clinton said that it was too bad, of course, that Milosevic was a Serb. For the sake of common solidarity, it would have been better if he were Irish or of some other nationality. Did Clinton really think that the problem was our national sympathy for Serbs? Didn't he understand that we were talking about America's approach to the Kosovo problem, about the fate of all of Europe, about the fate of the whole world? This was not just a question of some special "Slavic kinship" attributed to Russian-Serbian relations. We would have reacted the same way if it were a question of any other country -Poland, Spain, or Turkey. The country or nationality was irrelevant. > > > > I told Bill: "I am confident that if we had continued to work together, we would have toppled Milosevic." > > > > Clinton cited another, very serious argument: Milosevic, he said, is the last Communist dictator, and he would like to destroy the union between Russia and Europe and move against the democratization of the continent. But I had my own arguments. "Our people will think very little of America and NATO if this bombing proceeds. I remember how hard it was to change the attitude of ordinary people and politicians here in Russia toward the U.S. and the West. It was very hard, and yet we managed to do it. And now we're going to lose all that?" > > > > Clinton kept citing the common opinion of the European leaders. The Europeans, Clinton said, were even more determined about what was happening in Kosovo. The first air strike had to be made, and Milosevic would immediately start negotiations. That was NATO's logic. > > > > I said to Clinton, 'We can't let hundreds or thousands of people die to control the words and actions of one man. We have to try to get other people around him, so that he can't behave the way he is behaving now. A lot can be done. We should use foreign intelligence. For the sake of our future relations and the future security of Europe, I ask you to cancel this bombing. We could meet and work out a tactic to battle Milosevic personally. We are more intelligent and bigger, and we could probably achieve this. In the grand scheme of things, we have to try this for the sake of our relations and for peace in Europe. We don't know who will come after us. We don't know who will work on reduction of strategic nuclear weapons. But it is clear what we ourselves must do to keep reducing these mountains of weapons. That's what we need to work on." > > > > I remember how I tried to emphasize every word during this conversation. I tried to have an emotional impact on the man at the other end of the line. > > > > In reply, Clinton said that he did not share my optimism regarding the methods that might influence Milosevic. That meant only one thing: war. > > > > I didn't have any personal complaints against Bill Clinton. I even heard some sympathy in his voice. But as the president of the United States, he was letting me know in no uncertain terms that negotiations with Milosevic were pointless. This was a mistake, a very big mistake. The bombing didn't stop Milosevic either in March or in April or in May. Only the joint diplomatic efforts of Russia, Finland, and the United States would eventually stop him. > > > > I recently saw the film Wag the Dog. It was a very interesting movie, made even before the Kosovo crisis. With incredible prescience, the directors predicted everything-the flashpoint where the trouble began (the Balkans), the domestic political background in the United > States, and the way wars break out to compensate for or distract from other problems that have nothing to do with human rights. > > > > But war isn't virtual. It is real, and it is bloody. It corrupts the people who wage it because it teaches them the diktat of force. It teaches them to ignore the real reasons behind the violence. > > > > And what was happening, in my view, was this: The Americans found it necessary to stimulate North Atlantic solidarity by any means. They also felt threatened by the crisis in postwar values. They were afraid of the growing strength of European independence - economic, political, and moral. For these reasons, they resorted to war. That's my personal version of events. I don't impose it on anybody. I just propose that some thought be given to this side of the Kosovo crisis. > > > > But I must return to the Kosovo events. As I said in a statement published on March 25, 1999, immediately after the bombing started: > "> This is essentially an attempt by NATO to enter the twenty-first century in the uniform of the world policeman. Russia will never agree to this." Of course I didn't limit myself to a political statement. I realized that this war could be stopped only if Russia pressured both fronts, NATO and Yugoslavia, simultaneously if' the war lasted more than a month or two, Russia would inevitably be drawn into the conflict. A new cold war would begin. > > > > Once the bombs started falling, the internal political stability in our country would depend on the situation in the Balkans. Already the Communists and the nationalists were trying to play the Balkans card in order to destroy the balance of political forces in our society "Now we know the real value of the West!" the hysterical voices cried. > "> We always told you so. We warned you about NATO and what these damned Americans could cook up! Today Yugoslavia, tomorrow Russia!" > > > > What would be next? What would happen if we could not stop this aggressive anti-Americanism and anti-Westernism? The crisis in Russia would be not only a government crisis but a crisis of faith in the leaders. It would further exacerbate the crisis in the world. I could not rule out mass disorder and unconstitutional actions. In the final analysis, wars have always provoked revolutions. That was what irritated me most. Did the NATO leaders really not understand? I had met with these leaders dozens of times! Some of them called me their friend. Wasn't it obvious to them that each missile strike against Yugoslavia was an indirect strike against Russia? > > > > We really had some alarming days in Moscow. A crowd staged demonstrations near the U.S. embassy People threw bottles and stones at the windows and wrote obscene graffiti on the walls. The embassy building on Sadovoye Ring Road is only a few steps from the street. The guard's zone is only a yard of asphalt. Any extremist act would lead to unpredictable consequences. At one point the police detained a group of extremists who had driven past the U.S. embassy with a grenade launcher ready to be fired. It's hard to imagine what could have happened. > > > > The Duma passed resolution after resolution. The Communists held active negotiations with Milosevic on creating a military-strategic union of our two states. Volunteers were recruited to fight on the side of the Serbs. Politicians of all stripes tried to win points with the Kosovo conflict. For example, Mayor Luzhkov openly supported the demonstrators in front of the U.S. embassy. The police were guarding the demonstrators more than the embassy. > > > > Although not everyone in the society shared the fierce anti-NATO position of the red deputies in the Duma, Russians were alarmed and tense. People took the Yugoslav tragedy to heart. They were worried about more than the fate of the Serbs in Serbia: In each Russian family there were people who had fought on the front and children of the war, that is, children who were left without fathers. World War II is still very fresh in our minds; we do not perceive it as ancient history. Therefore we sense any aggrava> tion in Europe as an alarming signal. NATO's aggression, no matter how noble its motivations, came as a real psychological shock for Russians. Our artists gave benefit performances in Belgrade, and our newspapers and magazines were filled with anti-American statements. > > > > In the years since 1991, our society had truly changed. New attitudes, new values - democratic and at times naively and irresponsibly Western-had crept unnoticed into the everyday life of every Russian. Not everyone accepted this right away. Not everyone was happy with the intermixing of cultures, ideologies, economies, and political and spiritual systems. But gradually, through great effort, our people had begun to value and understand this completely new and unfamiliar world. This was a change for the better. And now, with the Yugoslav war, all of this could be finally and irrevocably destroyed within a few weeks. I could not accept this. > > > > As I noted, I was operating in two directions, putting pressure on NATO and on Milosevic. We had to stop this war no matter what. Meanwhile, NATO's strategists and politicians had clearly miscalculated. The Yugoslav people united in the face of an external enemy. The Yugoslav army, without air cover but quite capable of ground fighting, was prepared for an invasion of ground forces and could put up a strong resistance on its own territory > > > > Russia actively sought a peaceful settlement to the crisis. On April 14, I appointed Viktor Chernomyrdin as my representative in Yugoslavia. He spent dozens of hours with Milosevic, both alone and together with Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari. I chose Chernomyrdin because the Foreign Ministry believed that a diplomat with experience and high rank, perhaps a deputy minister of foreign affairs, was necessary for these types of negotiations. Others said the opposite - that because of the bad state of relations with the West a highly respected politician should head the Russian mission to Yugoslavia. For example, I was actively advised to appoint Gaidar, a correspondent for Pravda, who had lived in Yugoslavia for many years with his father. After thinking about it for a long time, I settled on Chernomyrdin. > > > > I suppose I couldn't have trusted any other politician at that moment. Chernomyrdin had enormous weight and authority in Yugoslavia, in the West, and in the eyes of the American political elite. This unique combination allowed him to establish a negotiating line oriented toward a single goal: the rapid halt of military action. And it was here that Chernomyrdin displayed his best qualities, the qualities of an old political fighter - patience, flexibility, and a firm will for intelligent compromise. > > > > On April 22 British Prime Minister Tony Blair called me. It wasn't our first conversation about Kosovo; we had spoken three or four times since the onset of the crisis. But that conversation reflected the tension of those days, as excerpts from the phone transcript show: > > > > "I am convinced, Tony, that NATO is making a big mistake in continuing to bomb Yugoslav territories. The consequences were not properly calculated. Instead of pressuring Milosevic, you are strengthening his position. Instead of resolving the humanitarian problem, we are now dealing with a real humanitarian catastrophe. Instead of a negotiation process, which London helped quite a bit to put into motion, we are backsliding into military confrontation. We are alarmed at reports about the plan to conduct a ground operation by the alliance in Kosovo. I will tell you frankly, this is the path to the abyss.> "> > > > > "Tony," I urged. "Find the strength to stop this madness. This could lead to a European and perhaps a worldwide war. Milosevic will not capitulate. If the bombing stops, a path for the restoration of the negotiation process will open between the Serbs and the Albanians, Yugoslavia and NATO, the U.S. and Great Britain. Come to your se> nses now, because tomorrow will be too late. Whoever unleashed this war without the consent of the UN Security Council will be responsibl> e for everything that happens." > > > > I include this long quotation for a reason. After I had spoken with Clinton, the situation got much worse. It became clear that the bombs would result in nothing. But the NATO position didn't allow for any changes. Blair repeated everything that Clinton had said a month before, word for word: NATO had exerted the maximum effort at the negotiations in Rambouillet* in order to find a peaceful political resolution to this problem. But the alliance could not morally permit what Milosevic had done to the refugees nor the actions taken by the Serb military police with his knowledge. > > > > I asked: "But what about the bombing of the columns of refugees, in which there were both Albanians and Serbs? Was that morally justified?" > > > > Blair evaded my question. At the end of the conversation, he wished me success with the talks between Chernomyrdin and Milosevic. > > > > Meanwhile, the negotiations had bogged down. The bombing continued. Yugoslavia was gradually being turned into ruins, into a country without electrical power stations, bridges, industry, administrative buildings, roads, fuel, and food. Each day NATO pilots were making more than 1,000 overflights. They had one specific goal: to destroy the economy of a country. > > > > On May 13 French president Jacques Chirac made an emergency visit to Moscow to see me. > > > > I appealed to Chirac: "You're continuing the ruthless bombing of Yugoslavia, and you're handing Russia a role as NATO's special courier to Belgrade to impose your ultimatums. Can't you see that you are bombing more than Yugoslavia?" I said: "I want to tell you openly, as a friend, that we can't play these games, and we aren't going to play them. We demand that if you can't stop the bombing, you at least halt it for a time." > > > > (Rambouillet, France, was the location of talks involving Milosevic, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), and French and U.S. mediators. -Trans.) > > > > Chirac said that he had come to Moscow not only to speak about Kosovo. He reminded me that I was moving Russia toward the future and returning it to the community of nations. But Milosevic was a man from the past, the bad past. > > > > I listened attentively to Chirac. The conversation was taking an unexpected turn. Chirac gave me to understand that among the NATO allies, there was an American worldview and a French worldview. The U.S. vision was simple-world leadership by the United States-but France didn't agree with that. The French didn't want a one-dimensional conception of a unipolar world to prevail, but the fact was that the Americans had the means to conduct such policy. > > > > Chirac went on to outline briefly how the situation in Europe had changed over the past year because of the change in governments. Everything had begun in Spain; then Blair had appeared; then Schroder. All of them unexpectedly supported the tough American line, perhaps for internal domestic political considerations. But France advocated another route: the idea of a multipolar world. Even the French battalion in Kosovo had been given an exclusively humanitarian mission, Chirac explained. At least, so I understood him. > > > > As our conversation ended, Chirac unexpectedly announced that I had to make up my mind whether I was for or against Milosevic. Russia had only two paths, Chirac more or less told me: to remain on the sidelines and become marginal or to enter the modern world under my leadership. Russia had to affirm universal democratic principles. > > > > I agreed with that. But how could I affirm these democratic principles as bombs exploded over Kosovo? > > > > "That's what I'm asking you to do. I'm asking you not to jeopardize democracy in Russia," I said to Chirac. > > > > Chernomyrdin met with Milosevic a total of five times, four of them alone, in tête-à-têtes Sometimes the conversations would last nine hours without any break. Chernomyrdin told me that at the most frustrating moments of the negotiations, he would ask Milosevic bluntly: "Do you really think you can win this war?"> > > > > Milosevic would a> nswer No, but that he wouldn't lose it either. No one had been able to vanquish the Yugoslavs for 400 years. "Let them just try now," he said. "Let them just try to stick their noses in here! A ground operation will definitely fail.> "> > > > > Milosevic had his own reasons for being so sure that NATO's ground operation would fail. He believed that the Yugoslav army was prepared to fight, and that the Yugoslav people were prepared to unite around Milosevic. At times Milosevic even asked Chernomyrdin to conduct the negotiations in such a way that the ground operation would start faster. > > > > But within about a month Milosevic's position changed. He no longer wanted an escalation of the conflict. He asked to stop the war. > "> But nevertheless I cannot be defeated!" he said to Chernomyrdin. > > > > Russia could not look on indifferently as people were killed and as the civilian population suffered. Chernomyrdin pushed Milosevic toward negotiations, even though Milosevic was advancing unacceptable conditions. For example, Milosevic demanded that the troops of Russia, Ukraine, India, and other countries rather than NATO troops be brought into Kosovo. > > > > A draft proposal to have Yugoslavia enter into the union of Russia and Belarus also played a role here. Our Duma was actively discussing the idea, although it was absolutely politicized, aggressive, and unrealistic. Nevertheless, I allowed this notion of Yugoslav's entry into our union to be used during the negotiations, in order to distract Milosevic. > > > > In fact, Chernomyrdin's main purpose was to try to press Milosevic to conduct peace talks with the West. Chernomyrdin pushed hard, letting Milosevic know that he could expect no military support and that his political support was already exhausted. > > > > Meanwhile, Chernomyrdin managed to get an agreement from the Americans to transfer the political mechanism for the settlement of the crisis into the hands of the UN. This took NATO out of the political aspect of the talks. Milosevic could not capitulate either to Russia or to NATO. Chernomyrdin flew to the United States twice and held talks with Clinton for two hours and with Vice President Al Gore for four hours. The eight points which Chernomyrdin had worked out with Milosevic ended up in the UN resolution, although in altered form. Formulated as a resolution of the UN Security Council, the surrender ceased to be humiliating. > > > > Milosevic asked for time to coordinate the document with the Veche (the Yugoslav parliament) and the military. As a result, the agreement was ratified without a single amendment. > > > > Chernomyrdin did everything he could. The war was stopped. And all of this happened even though Milosevic behaved utterly without principle. In his relations with Russia, he had wagered on an explosion of popular dissatisfaction with my foreign policy. He anticipated a split in Russian society and hoped to push Russia into a political and military confrontation with the West. These things never happened. > > > > On May 28, while he was visiting Belgrade, the Yugoslavs told Chernomyrdin that they accepted the general principles of a Kosovo settlement proposed by the Group of Eight. > > > > On June 1-2 Chernomyrdin, Ahtisaari, and Strobe Talbott met in Bonn and agreed that there would be two international presences in Kosovo: Russia and NATO. > > > > On June 2-3 Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari held negotiations with Milosevic in Belgrade. The Yugoslav authorities accepted the plan for a peace settleme nt passed in Bonn. The Chernomyrdin-Ahtisaari plan consisted of ten points. The most important were those which NATO had demanded before the bombing: the return of all refugees, the deployment of international deterrent forces, the withdrawal of Serb army and police units, and the settlement of Kosovo's status on the basis of the Rambouillet agreement. > > > > Essentially, Milosevic was forced to return to square one. He got less than what he had been offered during the Rambouillet talks. With the help of the war, he had achieved only one goal: At the price of des> truction and complete international isolation, he had removed all his domestic opponents and enemies from the political stage. I think he is one of the most cynical politicians I have ever dealt with. > > > > The Kosovo conflict demonstrated the worst political tendencies and double standards of modern Europe. It was claimed, for example, that human rights were more important than the rights of a single state. But when you violate the rights of a state, you automatically and egregiously violate the rights of' its citizens, including their right to se-curity. Thousands of Yugoslav citizens suffered in the war. Can you weigh the rights of the Kosovo Serbs against the rights of the Kosovo Albanians? Yes, the Albanians suffered brutal repression under Milose-vic and were forced to flee the territory. Now the same thing is hap-pening with the Serbs. The difference is only that in the first instance it was the Yugoslav army doing the repressing and now it is the KLA. That gives you some idea of how effective the military operation was. > > > > One more thing: On the night of June 4, I had to decide whether to let the Russian military land its paratroopers at the Pristina Airport in Kosovo. All the documents had already been signed. An agreement stipulated that the peacekeeping forces would simultaneously take up their assigned positions. Was it necessary? * > > > > I hesitated for a long time. It seemed too dangerous to send our men in early. Furthermore, why were we demonstrating military boldness and waving our fists after the fight was over? Still, I decided that Russia must make a crowning gesture, even if it had no military significance. It was not a question of specific diplomatic victories or defeats; it was a question of whether we had won the main point. Russia had not permitted itself to be defeated in the moral sense. It had not let itself be split. It had not been dragged into the war. This last gesture was a sign of our moral victory in the face of the enormous NATO military, all of Europe, and the whole world. I gave the order: GO. > > > > * Russian troops arrived unexpectedly ahead of NATO forces and took over the Pristina airport, which NATO troops had planned to use as their initiative headquarters. - Trans. > > > > > > > EOM > > NOTICE - This message and any attached files may contain information that is confidential and/or subject of legal privilege intended only for use by the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient or the person responsible for delivering the message to the intended recipient, be advised that you have received this message in error and that any dissemination, copying or use of this message or attachment is strictly forbidden, as is the disclosure of the information therein. 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