Correct. So I just need to make sure that the various
MUST/SHALL/SHOULD/etc decisions continue to support our policy needs.
I suspect that a diversity of trust anchor sets and a diversity of trust
purposes will be increasing in the authentication process when people start
making operational use of security instead of using it as theater. The
standards just need to acknowledge and support this.
R Horn
|---------+---------------------------->
| | Sam Hartman |
| | <[EMAIL PROTECTED]|
| | t.edu> |
| | |
| | 02/07/2007 11:53 |
| | AM |
| | |
|---------+---------------------------->
>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|
|
| To: Robert Horn/MOPOO/[EMAIL PROTECTED]
|
| cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
|
| Subject: Re: [Syslog] AD Review for draft-ietf-syslog-transport-tls
|
>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
It sounds like trust anchor selection (what security people talk about
when the rest of the world talks about set of root CAs) is actually
very important to you. It's just that you don't actually consider the
traditional root CAs part of your trust anchor set; you have a much
smaller trust anchor set.
--Sam
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