Sam I struggle to think what a security system would look like when the protocol is purely simplex, apart from a MAC to give integrity with some shared secret transmitted totally out of band.
Are there any examples of simplex security elsewhere in the IETF? Tom Petch ----- Original Message ----- From: "Sam Hartman" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Thursday, January 05, 2006 11:12 PM Subject: [Syslog] Charter comments from IESG Review > > > Hi. The IESg reviewed the proposed syslog charter at today's telechat > and decided that it requires revision. The main concern seems to be > the lack of a mandatory to implement security mechanism. I indicated > this might be the case in the Vancouver meeting. > > so, you definitely need to have some sort of mandatory to implement > security mechanism. I'm not quite sure what needs to be said about > this in the charter. > But the working group will need to: > > 1) Identify a threat model for syslog > > > 2) Define mechanisms to address these threats. > > So, questions for the threat model include things like whether > confidentiality is important or whether integrity of mesages is > sufficient. > > Depending on the threat model here are some possible solutions: > > 1) Require some transport like syslog over TLS|DTLS be implemented. > > 2) Require that all senders implement signatures stored in structured > data as an option. > > I don't think you need to commit to one of these options now. > However, you do need to reflect the security issues in the charter. > > --Sam > > > _______________________________________________ > Syslog mailing list > Syslog@lists.ietf.org > https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/syslog _______________________________________________ Syslog mailing list Syslog@lists.ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/syslog
