On 1/18/13 8:40 AM, Anne van Kesteren wrote:
On Tue, Jan 15, 2013 at 2:44 PM, Markus Ernst <derer...@gmx.ch> wrote:
The allow-seamless mechanism is to be triggered at the side of the embedded
resource, which would also be the one affected by possible security risks
(if I get this right). The developer of this resource will have to be aware
of these risks, and avoid to expose critical stuff in pages that allow
seamless embedding.
So, would it be possible to generally treat resources that allow seamless
embedding as same-origin from the security POV?
No. And "AllowSameOrigin" would not work either. Because of scripting
one resource granting such access means exposing the entire origin to
attacks.
I'm not sure why.
It sounded to me like the proposal was that if a resource is flagged as
AllowSameOrigin and loaded in an iframe then the origin it gets is an
alias for the origin of the ownerDocument of the iframe (basically the
way data: or srcdoc work). That seems like it wouldn't expose too
much... except for niggling issues around code that uses location.href
to determine origins. :(
-Boris
