U.S. - Indonesia Society - USINDO [Washington D.C.] November 6, 2003 USINDO Open Forum
Summary followed by Q&A Indonesia's Reactions to the War on Terrorism with Sidney Jones, Indonesia Project Director International Crisis Group Jakarta October 28, 2003 [available online Nov. 6] Washington D.C. Sidney Jones did a convincing job of explaining why it is politically incorrect - if not impossible - for Indonesians to condemn Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) these days. The organization listed as a terrorist group by the U.S. and the UN and the subject of a detailed exposé by the International Crisis Group, whose Jakarta office is headed by Jones, is nevertheless exempt from direct criticism in Indonesia for a variety of reasons. While top government leaders such as Coordinating Minister Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Police Chief Da'i Bachtiar will condemn JI to audiences in the United States, they will not repeat those accusations in Indonesia, Jones said at a USINDO meeting on October 28. Most Indonesians are so alienated by U.S. Middle East policy, from its stance on the Israel-Palestine conflict to its war in Iraq, that anything the U.S. condemns, in the eyes of these Indonesians, can't be all bad. Even the moderates, said Sidney Jones, believe that the U.S. has singled out Muslims for repressive action and treats Indonesia in a high-handed way. There's a belief that "Indonesia can't win," she said. Indonesia never gets credit for anything it accomplishes. As a result, anything the U.S. condemns must be defended and anything the U.S. supports must be suspect. This preoccupation with the U.S. is distorting what might otherwise be a more hostile attitude toward JI. For example, the moderate Nahdlatul Ulama, Indonesia's largest Muslim organization, has "good reason to loathe Jemaah Islamiyah," Jones said. The JI is the direct descendant of Darul Islam, the militant fundamentalist organization that fought for an Islamic state during the independence struggle and afterward against the Republic until it was crushed by the Indonesian army in the 1960s. The DI saw the NU "as impure, idolatrous," Jones said, and that attitude is alive and well within the JI. The convicted Bali bomber, Amrozi, had, as one of his first acts upon returning to Indonesia from Malaysia about three years ago, desecrated the grave of an NU kiai (religious leader) who was beloved in that area. The NU was outraged, but "the outrage that everyone senses was not expressed by the leaders of NU." said Jones. Why? The NU fears that the JI might attack them. The NU leader, Hasjim Muzadi, has political ambitions, and it's just not politically possible to take a stand because he would be accused of kowtowing to the U.S. line, Jones said. Another reason for caution is that NU is worried that the JI will attack NU pesantren, the Islamic boarding schools which are the lifeblood of the NU educational system. There are perhaps 30,000 pesantrens in all of Indonesia, the vast majority of which are controlled by the NU, she said. There is some evidence that the JI may target the pesantren system. A cache of documents, captured by the police in Semarang a few months ago, contained a computer printout survey of religious schools in Central Java, including the name of each school, the religious leader, the number of his followers and affiliated organizations, and whether JI had access to it. The chilling news was that JI had the capability of such a sophisticated survey, but the good news was that the survey admitted JI had very little access to these schools. "Very few pesantrens want contact with the JI," she said. Another complication is that "Jemaah Islamiyah" is a generic term meaning "Islamic community. It would be as if the Irish Republican Army called itself the Catholic Church," Jones said. As a consequence, Indonesia is not willing to crack down on JI. This failure to ban the organization may have serious consequences, Jones said. At the moment, senior JI leaders are in detention, but it is not clear that the police can link them to specific acts of violence. They will be more difficult to convict than was Abu Bakar Bashir, JI's leader. Meanwhile, the police are vulnerable. There was a well orchestrated, well financed protest of 20,000 people in Solo, Central Java, after the recent arrests of 15 terror suspects. No senior Indonesian official came to the defense of the police; on the contrary, there seems to be an orchestrated campaign to go after the police, Jones said. "There is a serious problem for moving further on the war on terrorism," Jones said. Meanwhile, the JI remains active. Despite the arrest of some top leaders, there is more and more information on its activities and scope. There is information that there are Indonesian alumni of the Chechen war. An al Qaeda operative arrested in Karachi claimed to have 100 Indonesians there and plans to train Indonesians to fight in Kashmir. So there is evidence that JI is not restricted to Southeast Asia any longer but is operating in South Asia and beyond as well. Furthermore, the recent outbreak of violence in Poso may be linked in some way to JI, Jones said. There is evidence of a special operations unit set up by JI in Poso. This unit may have spun out of control when the JI leaders were detained. Q: What was the Indonesian reaction to President Bush's misstatement about resuming military relations with Indonesia? A: Resuming military to military relations is a non-starter. Indonesia is not of a mind to receive this kind of aid now, and if it were offered it would be refused. Q: Given your description of the attitudes in Indonesia toward the U.S., what can or should the U.S. do at this point? A: At present it is useless to try public diplomacy relating to Muslim issues. It would be better to look at other things: non Islam-related aid programs, educational exchange, institution building... the kind of long-range assistance that USAID produces. Q: It is said that the real war in Islam is between the moderate and radical views within the religion. If so, the moderates in the so-called peripheral states including Indonesia might have a better chance of prevailing over the radicals who are concentrated in the Middle East. Your comment? A: I do think the moderates are prevailing in Indonesia. On a range of social issues, such as the debate whether the provocative dancer Inul should be allowed to perform in public, it's clear the moderates are in control. But on this one issue - U.S. policy - the moderates actually share the views of the radical fringe. Q: How are the police generally viewed, especially as the focus of U.S. aid for police training to combat terrorism? A: The police have been successful in recent investigations of terrorist incidents. They have not been stigmatized for receiving international aid, but they feel very vulnerable nevertheless, particularly as the military are resentful of the police and determined to take back their former role in internal security. There are three bills before parliament at present which might end up in restoring more military power. They are the armed forces bill, the intelligence bill and amendments to the terrorist law passed earlier. Q: Referring to the recent outbreak of violence in Poso [Central Sulawesi], by hit squads dressed in black. Is this reminiscent of earlier communal violence in Ambon [Maluku]? A: The attack you refer to in Ambon was by the Laskar Jihad and Kopassus [armed forces special unit]. In Poso there is no evidence of military involvement. Poso is a fundamentalist Muslim area, a possible fertile ground for pressure to establish Islamic law. There are jihadist elements there. There was possibly a special unit of JI set up there to get a jihad going again. The violence was of a different style, with different people, than in Ambon. Possibly, with some of the top JI leaders now in detention, the local group in Poso got out of control. Q: The Indonesian police chief said at a recent USINDO program that about 10 JI leaders are still at large. Your comment? A: Those ten people are the big fish, members of the central command with the capability of doing serious damage. But if they were all taken into custody JI's capacity would not be reduced. Other units would pop up, perhaps without central control, as may have been the case in Poso. Q: Who will win the 2004 elections? A: I will give you the current wisdom, but the answer changes every two weeks. At the moment Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is thought to have very little chance to become president. His only backing is from the PKB, Gus Dur's party. The strongest candidates are, of course, Megawati from PDI-P and either Akbar Tandjung or Wiranto from Golkar. Akbar has rescheduled the Golkar convention to occur after the parliamentary elections in April. This gives him more time to maneuver, especially if in the meantime the Supreme Court upholds his appeal from a corruption conviction. So the candidates for president might be Megawati and perhaps Akbar Tandjung from Golkar. In a runoff election, there could well be a "anybody-but-Mega" coalition of political parties. This might produce dangerous situations in areas with communal tensions. Q: We haven't heard much lately about the connection between Jemaah Islamiyah and al Qaeda. A: Most Indonesians are skeptical about such links, but the links are there. Hambali is the key person. He received funds from al Qaeda for the Bali bombing. There were ties between the two organizations in Afghanistan, and there were al Qaeda trainers in Poso in 2000 and 2001. It's unfortunate that the U.S. is not allowing the Indonesians to have access to Hambali. (Hambali was captured in Thailand and is in U.S custody at an undisclosed location.) Q: Are there any hopeful developments in Indonesia, or is the news all bad? A: There are many hopeful developments. The stock market is booming, the rupiah is stable, small and medium enterprises are growing, recent polls suggest a big voter turnout for 2004 elections, and parts of decentralization are going well. There are leaders emerging at local levels. -------------------------------------------------------------- Far Eastern Economic Review Issue cover-dated November 13, 2003 [from the Dow Jones Newswires] The 5th Column Why Indonesians Distrust The U.S. By Sidney Jones Indonesians are not happy with the war against terrorism, despite the success of their police in fighting it, primarily because they don't trust the United States government and don't want to be part of a U.S.-led campaign. The distrust of the U.S. is not just a result of the Bush administration's foreign policy in the Middle East, though that is part of it. "The U.S. has demonstrated a double standard in responding to terrorism in the Israel-Palestine conflict," said an October 22 editorial in Kompas, Jakarta's leading newspaper, "and there's no question that it generally associates terror with Islam." But many Indonesians also think that for all the talk about partnership and cooperation in the "war," the U.S. just takes without giving anything back. Its refusal thus far to grant Indonesian police access to detained Jemaah Islamiah leader Riduan Isamuddin, or Hambali, is one example. (During his fleeting visit to Bali, President George W. Bush promised access at some indeterminate future date, but that is not good enough.) There's also the perception that Indonesians can't win -- no matter how many terrorists they arrest, the U.S. is still going to punish them for human-rights violations of the past or find some other excuse for not giving them credit. "In terms of respect for human rights and respect for national sovereignty," the Kompas editorial asked, "isn't the attitude of the U.S. towards Iraq worse than Indonesian policy towards East Timor?" Many Indonesians believe that the U.S. focus on terrorism is pushing everything else off the agenda. Another leading Jakarta newspaper, Koran Tempo, carried an editorial on the eve of Bush's visit, urging Indonesian religious leaders who were going to meet the president to tell him that the country had other pressing needs: "We have a whole warehouse of problems: poverty, corruption, foreign debt, the credibility of our legal system and a difficult transition to democracy. These problems aren't getting enough attention because so much of our energy is being diverted to terrorism, and terrorism in the end is being encouraged by the arrogant attitude of America itself." These strongly negative attitudes toward the U.S. colour how Indonesians in general, and politicians in particular, see Jemaah Islamiah. The home-grown terrorist organization believed responsible for the Bali and Marriott bombings, and perhaps the recent shootings in Poso in central Sulawesi as well, has not been banned, and many members of the political elite remain unwilling to acknowledge its existence. One public reason is that the term jemaah islamiah is a generic term meaning "Islamic community," and that applying it to a terrorist organization is offensive to many Muslims. There is also a concern across the Muslim community that one consequence of banning JI could be an assault on pesantrens, Indonesia's Muslim boarding schools, simply because of the role a tiny handful of these have played in JI recruitment. But another key reason why mainstream Muslim leaders and politicians have difficulty admitting in public that JI is a terrorist organization is because of a widespread view that the U.S. is the real terrorist, and nothing JI has done compares with the devastation that "America and its lackeys" have inflicted on the Muslim world. Many moderates don't condone the indiscriminate killing of civilians, but they explain it, with some sympathy, as the tactic of groups that see themselves as fighting terror, not perpetrating it. Suicide bombs, whether in Tel Aviv or Jakarta, are the weapon of the weak, they say, against an infinitely stronger foe. No amount of U.S. public diplomacy or new assistance is going to change the deep antipathy in Indonesia towards American policies in the Middle East. Stepping up aid for Indonesian education, for example, is a desirable aim in itself, but it will not reduce unease about U.S. motives. Indeed, to the extent that new assistance is linked to the war on terrorism, that unease is likely to grow. What to do? The U.S. should ensure quick access to Hambali and assist Indonesian police as necessary with the gathering of evidence that will allow him to be tried in an Indonesian court. However weak the legal system, the trials of terror suspects thus far have been speedy, fair and transparent, which is more than can be said of the U.S. But Indonesia also needs a few courageous politicians willing to say that whatever people think of the war on terrorism and U.S. policies, there's a serious problem at home that needs more attention -- and the name of that problem is Jemaah Islamiah. Despite the efforts of the police, the public still needs convincing, and Indonesians, not Americans, are the only ones who can make the case. The writer is based in Jakarta as Southeast Asia Director for the International Crisis Group. --[YONSATU - ITB]---------------------------------------------------------- Online archive : <http://yonsatu.mahawarman.net> Moderators : <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Unsubscribe : <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Vacation : <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
