This is the second proposal we presented at the last 6tisch webex meeting. I am in favor of it but it raised some discussion. I still support it so +1.
regards, Xavi 2015-05-06 12:29 GMT+02:00 Pascal Thubert (pthubert) <[email protected]>: > +1 > > I think it says is all. > > Pascal > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: 6tisch [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Kris Pister > > Sent: mardi 5 mai 2015 23:47 > > To: [email protected] > > Subject: [6tisch] proposed text for minimal security > > > > This is my proposed text for all of section 8. This does not force > anyone to use > > well-known keys, or 32 bit MICs, or send EBs unencrypted. > > It does make it easy to do interop. > > People who want to use pre-configured secret keys, long MICs, encrypted > EBs, > > or no keys at all, are free to do so. > > > > ksjp > > --------------- > > 8. Security > > Minimal assumes the existence of two keys, K1 and K2. EBs MAY be > > authenticated with key K1 using security level 1 (32 bit MIC). > > DATA, ACKNOWLEDGEMENT, and MAC COMMAND frame types SHOULD be > > authenticated with key K2 using security level 1. > > > > For early interoperability, K1 MAY be set to "6TiSCH minimal15". K2 > SHOULD be > > a randomly generated high entropy cryptographic key. > > Key distribution is out of scope. EBs MAY be filtered based on PANID. > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > 6tisch mailing list > > [email protected] > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/6tisch > > _______________________________________________ > 6tisch mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/6tisch >
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