+1.
Qin
On Wednesday, May 6, 2015 9:40 PM, Tom Phinney <[email protected]> wrote:
Let's put this to bed (i.e., reach a conclusion for this aspect).
Saying less is very much in the spirit of "minimal".
+1
===
On 2015.05.05 14:46, Kris Pister wrote:
> This is my proposed text for all of section 8. This does not force
> anyone to
> use well-known keys, or 32 bit MICs, or send EBs unencrypted.
> It does make it easy to do interop.
> People who want to use pre-configured secret keys, long MICs,
> encrypted EBs,
> or no keys at all, are free to do so.
>
> ksjp
> ---------------
> 8. Security
> Minimal assumes the existence of two keys, K1 and K2. EBs MAY be
> authenticated with key K1 using security level 1 (32 bit MIC).
> DATA, ACKNOWLEDGEMENT, and MAC COMMAND frame types SHOULD be
> authenticated with key K2 using security level 1.
>
> For early interoperability, K1 MAY be set to "6TiSCH minimal15". K2
> SHOULD
> be a randomly generated high entropy cryptographic key.
> Key distribution is out of scope. EBs MAY be filtered based on PANID.
>
>
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>
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