Hi Jonathan:

It is always great to recount anecdotal evidence. However, I fail to see why this should necessarily apply to 6tisch.

The question is what constitutes a proper mechanism for network segregation. This technical topic was discussed in Section 1.2, item #8 of the draft draft-struik-6tisch-security-architectural-considerations-01, where it was suggested that this relates to filtering based on checking the "language of well-formed frames" (see 2nd starred item in 1.2, #8). In fact, some of the language in that section re IE header fields were from Kris Pister (see acknowledgement in Section 3, p. 16).

Once again, may I suggest, as I did in my email of April 24, 2014, 9.47am EDT, to first read that draft and only bring up topics not already dealt with there?

[excerpt email RS as of April 24, 2015, 9.47am EDT]
I did notice lots of emails surrounding 802.15.4 security (or perceptions thereof), but I do not entirely understand the background of these emails.

Since some emails seem to repeat similar discussions in December 2014 (including confusions and misconceptions of 802.15.4 security), I would like to encourage everyone to read the draft draft-struik-6tisch-security-architectural-considerations-01 (posted January 9, 2015). I wrote this draft partially in the hope that we would not have the very repeat of arguments we now seem to witness. So, I highly recommended reading that 3 1/2 months old draft and only bring up topics not already dealt with there.

Best regards,

Rene


On 5/7/2015 6:01 PM, Jonathan Simon wrote:
Once again I will repeat an old story…

We went to a Zigbee demo with our pre-WirelessHART product, which uses MICs to 
authenticate both the equivalent of Beacons (called advertisements in WH) and 
data traffic.

The Zigbee networks fell apart in our presence, while we operated fine.  The 
reason why was that the Zigbee networks did not use MICs, and were interpreting 
some of our data traffic as coordinator realignment frames, causing their nodes 
to change channel.

No protocol owns the airwaves - any protocol that does not anticipate random 
frames arriving that look like valid instructions, and taking at least minimal 
steps to avoid this problem (i.e. authenticating frames with SOME key), is 
poorly designed.


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