Thomas Watteyne writes:
> I believe Tero refers to the idea developed
> in https://tools.ietf.org/html/
> draft-struik-6tisch-security-considerations-01#section-1.1 in which
> a JN hears an authenticated EB, tries to authenticate it, which
> fails as it does not have the key, but still reads the payload of
> the packet (sent in the clear, since the EB is not encrypted).
> [personally, I'm not a fan of this approach]
Yes. But this idea is actually part of 802.15.4. It was already
described in 802.15.4-2011 section 5.1.2.1.2 "Active and passive
channel scan".
If a protected beacon frame is received, i.e., the Security
Enabled field is set to one, the device shall attempt to
unsecure the beacon frame using the unsecuring process
described in 7.2.3.
The security-related elements of the PAN descriptor
corresponding to the beacon, as defined in Table 17, shall be
set to the corresponding parameters returned by the unsecuring
process. The SecurityStatus element of the PAN descriptor
shall be set to SUCCESS if the status from the unsecuring
process is SUCCESS and set to one of the other status codes
indicating an error in the security processing otherwise.
The information from the unsecured frame shall be recorded in
the PAN descriptor even if the status from the unsecuring
process indicated an error
> Qin correctly points out that the CRC will provide (weak) protection
> against transmission errors.
This is assumed to be acceptable for non-secured traffic. The MIC is
not mandatory and I have not really seen people saying that we need to
make MIC mandatory to provide protection against transmission errors
in any other places that when protecting EBs with well-known keys...
--
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