Pascal,
The protection against transmission errors on EBs rely on the CRC in PSDU, 
right?
ThanksQin 


     On Wednesday, May 6, 2015 6:34 PM, Pascal Thubert (pthubert) 
<[email protected]> wrote:
   

 Hum...

But then, if the JN does not know K1, how can it validate the MIC? Do  we have 
another way to protect against transmission errors on EBs? 

Cheers,

Pascal


> -----Original Message-----
> From: 6tisch [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Michael Richardson
> Sent: mercredi 6 mai 2015 04:07
> To: [email protected]
> Subject: Re: [6tisch] Shipping minimal
> 
> 
> Tero Kivinen <[email protected]> wrote:
>    >> But, 6tisch (minimal) is not targetted at that kind of use.
>    >> It's targetted at industrial users that need deterministic work.
> 
>    > I have always wondered for what this 6tisch is meant for, as everybody
>    > seems to have different requirements. Some say, we cannot do
>    > provisoning as nobody touches the devices before they are installed.
>    > This is not true in industrial users, there they can do provisioning
>    > before sending them to factory.
> 
> They *can*, but they don't want to... too much $$$$.
> The contractors who install the devices haven't the skills, and the
> subcontractors, are often not actually trusted.  This is actually in parts of 
> the
> industrial requirements for ROLL (RFC5673) and was in draft-ietf-roll-rpl-
> industrial-applicability-02.. that lead to 6tisch.
> 
>    > There was complains that neighbour toy
>    > store messes up networks for new devices, but for deterministic work
>    > you do not care about the bootstarpping phase, as that is only one
>    > time operation etc.
> 
> Tom Phinney gave two examples from the refining situation.
> The first part was that pieces of the refinery are often sold or leased to
> competitors.  That means that the entire sensor network needs to go through a
> new bootstrap without being disassembled, and needs to do this in the midst of
> another network.
> 
> The toy store could well have two or three networks.
> 1) the control network for the building/mall.
> 2) the control network for the toy store itself.
> 3) the actual junk actually being sold in the toy store.
> 
>    > All of this of course makes discusissons about issues hard, as
>    > everybody is talking about different things.
> 
> True.
> 
>    >> Minimal is further targetted at well... interop.
> 
>    > If it is only for interop, there is no point of publishing it as RFC
>    > at all. If so then I do not care whether there is well-known key put
>    > in to the internet-draft.
> 
> I don't know if it will have a life beyond the interop.
> 
>    >> Let me put it differently: Bluetooth didn't specify a default key, and 
>didn't
>    >> do enrollment for headsets sanely, and now the "K1" *and* "K2" keys are
> "0000"
>    >> We can't keep people from doing stupid things.
> 
>    > Yes. On the other hand for most headsets you need to put them in
>    > pairing mode before they initiate setup and I think they exchange some
>    > kind of random keys during that phase that is then used later...
> 
> I see your point.
> 
>    > No we dont.
> 
>    > The K1 can be completely random, and the joining node does not need to
>    > know it.
> 
>    > I repeat:
> 
>    > The K1 can be completely random and the joining node does not
>    > need to know it.
> 
>    > Only device who really needs to know the K1 is the device sending out
>    > EBs, as he needs it to be able to calculate the MIC...
> 
> So, really, we don't need to use K1 on the EBs at all, is your point.
> Therefore there is no point in having EBs authenticated at all....
> 
>    >> If K1 has to be provisioned, then K2 will get set at the same time,
>    >> and K1 and K2 will get set to "0000".
> 
>    > The K1 and K2 can both be generated by running KMP during the joining
>    > process. The K1 will protect the EBs and every coordinator sending EBs
>    > in the network should use the same key to provide data integrity for
>    > EBs. If EBs are not used at all after the initial bootstrap phase
>    > (which some people seem to say will happen), then this K1 protection
>    > does not provide anything.
> 
> Agreed... which is why Kris argues for using it for something else.
> 
>    > On the other hand on some networks I can see some real uses for EBs
>    > also after the initial bootstrap, but those uses will require the EBs
>    > to integrity protected for those devices who are already part of
>    > network.
> 
> Good... I'd like to hear more.
> 
> --
> ]              Never tell me the odds!                | ipv6 mesh networks [
> ]  Michael Richardson, Sandelman Software Works        | network architect  [
> ]    [email protected]  http://www.sandelman.ca/       |  ruby on rails    [
> 
> 
> 
> --
> Michael Richardson <[email protected]>, Sandelman Software Works  -=
> IPv6 IoT consulting =-
> 
> 

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