> On Dec 15, 2015, at 9:48 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <[email protected]> > wrote: > > > > On Tue, Dec 15, 2015 at 12:25 PM, Noah Kantrowitz <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On Dec 15, 2015, at 7:17 AM, Michael Wyraz <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > Stephen, > >> Yes, I understand that and didn't actually refer to LE at all in my mail. > > I'm sorry if I missunderstood you with that. > > > >> Basically, IMO only after we first get a "now" that works > > We have a working HTTP-01 spec, implementation and CA. What's missing > > for "a 'now' that works"? > > > >> Personally the optional thing in which I'm much more interested is a > >> simple put-challenge-in-DNS one where the CA pays attention to DNSSEC, > >> since that's the use-case I have and that would provide some better > >> assurance to the certs acquired via acme. I can see that there might > >> also be value for some (other) folks in SRV if it means no need to > >> dynamically change DNS. But, if someone is saying "we must all do > >> these more complex things for security reasons" then they are, in this > >> context, wrong. And my mail was reacting to just such a statement. > > Why not just placing a static public key to DNS that is allowed to sign > > ACME requests for this domain? Simple, no need for dynamic updates (yes, > > it's standardized for years but AFAIK not seen very often in real world > > scenarios). > > Anything that makes deployment _harder_ than the current LE client is a move > in the wrong direction. UX matters, with security more than just about > anything else. Unless you can propose a user flow to go with this change, no > amount of hypothetical correctness is worth having a tool no one will use. > > Harder for whom? > > The current scheme isn't going to work for any geolocation based systems and > is a terrible fit for enterprise.
I think this is a bit of a red herring on a few fronts. You can use http-01 or similar strategies on a widely-replicated system, it is just annoying because you need to push the challenge response file to a bunch of places. If the geo-distributed piece is a CDN, the system is already designed to smash caches effectively so that is handled. Still, that is gross and a lot of work, but fortunately there is already a DNS challenge in the works that will help for some cases. It requires centralized command and control systems to use effectively, but that matches the structure of a lot of these big, distributed setups. The case we haven't covered is where you have a complex distributed setup but want to run the challenge on the edges. I question how many people want to do that but I agree it is non-zero and an http-srv-01 challenge type would help cover that (or fold it in to http-02 as an optional thing). The objection from myself and some others is the suggestion that we mandate DNS changes to use http-01 or tls-sni-01 because of the risk of a rogue HTTP server validating certs unexpectedly. Making that level of interaction with DNS required is a major UX change and will drastically reduce the number of people that will use LE and similar services. --Noah
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