On Tue, Dec 15, 2015 at 4:17 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On Tue, Dec 15, 2015 at 2:41 PM, Noah Kantrowitz <[email protected]> > wrote: >> >> >> > On Dec 15, 2015, at 9:48 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker >> > <[email protected]> wrote: >> > >> > >> > >> > On Tue, Dec 15, 2015 at 12:25 PM, Noah Kantrowitz <[email protected]> >> > wrote: >> > >> > > On Dec 15, 2015, at 7:17 AM, Michael Wyraz <[email protected]> wrote: >> > > >> > > Stephen, >> > >> Yes, I understand that and didn't actually refer to LE at all in my >> > >> mail. >> > > I'm sorry if I missunderstood you with that. >> > > >> > >> Basically, IMO only after we first get a "now" that works >> > > We have a working HTTP-01 spec, implementation and CA. What's missing >> > > for "a 'now' that works"? >> > > >> > >> Personally the optional thing in which I'm much more interested is a >> > >> simple put-challenge-in-DNS one where the CA pays attention to >> > >> DNSSEC, >> > >> since that's the use-case I have and that would provide some better >> > >> assurance to the certs acquired via acme. I can see that there might >> > >> also be value for some (other) folks in SRV if it means no need to >> > >> dynamically change DNS. But, if someone is saying "we must all do >> > >> these more complex things for security reasons" then they are, in >> > >> this >> > >> context, wrong. And my mail was reacting to just such a statement. >> > > Why not just placing a static public key to DNS that is allowed to >> > > sign >> > > ACME requests for this domain? Simple, no need for dynamic updates >> > > (yes, >> > > it's standardized for years but AFAIK not seen very often in real >> > > world >> > > scenarios). >> > >> > Anything that makes deployment _harder_ than the current LE client is a >> > move in the wrong direction. UX matters, with security more than just about >> > anything else. Unless you can propose a user flow to go with this change, >> > no >> > amount of hypothetical correctness is worth having a tool no one will use. >> > >> > Harder for whom? >> > >> > The current scheme isn't going to work for any geolocation based systems >> > and is a terrible fit for enterprise. >> >> I think this is a bit of a red herring on a few fronts. You can use >> http-01 or similar strategies on a widely-replicated system, it is just >> annoying because you need to push the challenge response file to a bunch of >> places. If the geo-distributed piece is a CDN, the system is already >> designed to smash caches effectively so that is handled. Still, that is >> gross and a lot of work, but fortunately there is already a DNS challenge in >> the works that will help for some cases. > > > And is likely to be challenged by the IPR holder.
You've mentioned IPR a couple of times. If you have knowledge of IPR in this space, disclosures would be very helpful. Same goes for anyone else here. Thanks, --Richard > > Keys in the DNS has prior art. It is also rather simpler to implement. > > > _______________________________________________ > Acme mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/acme > _______________________________________________ Acme mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/acme
