On Tue, Dec 15, 2015 at 2:41 PM, Noah Kantrowitz <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > On Dec 15, 2015, at 9:48 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <[email protected]> > wrote: > > > > > > > > On Tue, Dec 15, 2015 at 12:25 PM, Noah Kantrowitz <[email protected]> > wrote: > > > > > On Dec 15, 2015, at 7:17 AM, Michael Wyraz <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > > Stephen, > > >> Yes, I understand that and didn't actually refer to LE at all in my > mail. > > > I'm sorry if I missunderstood you with that. > > > > > >> Basically, IMO only after we first get a "now" that works > > > We have a working HTTP-01 spec, implementation and CA. What's missing > > > for "a 'now' that works"? > > > > > >> Personally the optional thing in which I'm much more interested is a > > >> simple put-challenge-in-DNS one where the CA pays attention to DNSSEC, > > >> since that's the use-case I have and that would provide some better > > >> assurance to the certs acquired via acme. I can see that there might > > >> also be value for some (other) folks in SRV if it means no need to > > >> dynamically change DNS. But, if someone is saying "we must all do > > >> these more complex things for security reasons" then they are, in this > > >> context, wrong. And my mail was reacting to just such a statement. > > > Why not just placing a static public key to DNS that is allowed to sign > > > ACME requests for this domain? Simple, no need for dynamic updates > (yes, > > > it's standardized for years but AFAIK not seen very often in real world > > > scenarios). > > > > Anything that makes deployment _harder_ than the current LE client is a > move in the wrong direction. UX matters, with security more than just about > anything else. Unless you can propose a user flow to go with this change, > no amount of hypothetical correctness is worth having a tool no one will > use. > > > > Harder for whom? > > > > The current scheme isn't going to work for any geolocation based systems > and is a terrible fit for enterprise. > > I think this is a bit of a red herring on a few fronts. You can use > http-01 or similar strategies on a widely-replicated system, it is just > annoying because you need to push the challenge response file to a bunch of > places. If the geo-distributed piece is a CDN, the system is already > designed to smash caches effectively so that is handled. Still, that is > gross and a lot of work, but fortunately there is already a DNS challenge > in the works that will help for some cases. > And is likely to be challenged by the IPR holder. Keys in the DNS has prior art. It is also rather simpler to implement.
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