I guess I'm not sure that Ranciere's point is so obvious, really.  I mean,
Greenberg thought there was a connection (subtract everything that's
inessential to the medium, etc).  And his criticism is rather compelling.  So
I take it that this is in fact a rather unobvious point.

But maybe that's just me.  Care to explain why you think it's obvious?

AP

>>> "Derek Allan" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> 03/28/08 8:55 PM >>>
Alexei

I'm not sure I follow all this but if, as you say, it reduces to 'Simply
put, technical elements do not exhaust the aesthetic concerns', it seems a
long way around to establish something fairly obvious, doesn't it?

Derek.


-----Original Message-----
From: Alexei Procyshyn [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Saturday, 29 March 2008 2:30 AM
To: [email protected]
Subject: The Fate of The Image

Hopefully, all those who are interested in participating in the online
reading
of _Le destin de l'image_/_The future of the Image_, have managed to get
their
hands on a copy.   As I've mentioned before, I'm working from the French
Edition, which will present a few problems (pagination, and translation).
I'll quote everythign in the original, and then offer a quick translation;
where my translations wildly diverge from the english edition, perhaps folks
could flag this, and we could figure out f I'm just translating badly, or if
there's a point in the english verions that's wonky.  I'll cite both the
French edition's pagination, and the section + paragraph number in order to
ensure that we're all roughly on the same page.

So, here goes my opening salvo.  In what follows, I'll take up the first
subsection of the first Chapter (Fr. pp. 9-11, "The fate [or, i guess
according to the english version, Future] of the image" to "From one regime
of
Imaging to another").

Anyway, in these three sections Ranciere attempts to characterize the notion
of 'image' in a manner that neither falls into the contemporary 'traps' of
representationality-cum-resemblance nor reduces the notion of 'image' to a
technical, material, mode of presentation.  An image, to pull out a
distinction that's very much alive, -- at least for me, since I'm more
familiar with German philosophy -- is not to be characterized as either
Vorstellung (i.e. as a form of [re]presentation which can be subsumed by our
conceptual, linguistic capactities -- think of Kant here: intuitions are
subsumed by concepts in the form of propositional judgments; intuitions are
roughly Vorstellungen) or Darstellung (i.e. a concrete, material
presentation
of content which is not subsumable by concepts).  In fact, Ranciere will
claim
that the image is precisely that which skirts, or plays within this 'ecart'
(gap, unbridgeable break or canyon) between the "sayable" ( i.e.
representable
in french, 'dicible,' perhaps awkwardly translated as 'articulable') and the
"visible" (in French, "visible," perhaps translated as 'seeable').  The
sayable and the visible, the representational and the presentational, thus
become two of the four coordinates needed to situate Ranciere's discussion.

So, what is the other pair?  It would seem to be nothing less than the
relationship between art and non-art.  That is, between two modes of
presentation, which are sayable or visible.  But this axis remains implicit
in
his discussion at this point and it may be better simply to bear it in mind,
until it becomes thematic.  For now, let's concentrate on how Ranciere
teases
out his notion of image, which is neither strictly sayable nor strictly
visible, and how this conception stands in sharp contrast to our typical
conceptions of the image.

Ranciere begins his discussion by noting two bad approaches to the notion of
the image: "il n'y a plus de realite mais seulement des images ou, a
l'inverse, qu'il n'y a desormais plus des images mais seulement une realite
se
representant incessement a elle-meme" [there is no longer a reality, but
only
images, or, conversely, that there no longer are images, but only a reality,
which incessentently represents itself to itself] (Fr p. 9; 1st section, 2
para).  although his formulation sounds so simplistic to be utterly wrong,
Ranciere's claim characterizes two approaches which I'm sure e're all
familiar
with. (1) captures folks like Beaudrillard and the various appropriations of
Lacanian Pyschoanalysis (e.g. the former's theory of Simulacra, and
'representation overtaking the real,' etc. and the latter's claim that 'The
Real' is a noumenon-like posit subtending the symbolic functions of
subjectivity -- there is no Real, only the empirically valid presentations
of
things, which can be accounted for through the psychological mechanisms of
an
absolute or transcendental subject); (2) captures folks like Goodman, who
take
images to be some kind of epistemological index Images create the world,
since
it is through them that we express our understanding of it.  Moreover,
whereas
(1) falls within the Vorstellung-camp of the image (with the further
stipulation that reality is noumenal, non-existent and unknowable, and hence
all we have are represenations), what is sayable," (2) falls within the
Darstellung-camp: reality is made through images, which refer to other
things,
or express universal properties, etc.

Ranciere's quick demonstration that (1) implies (2) and (2) implies (1) is
thus a reductio ad absurdum of the two prevalent schools of thought, which
stem from -- indeed are embodied by -- Kantian philosophy.   (1) there are
only images, and no reality (2) there is only reality and no images.  (think
of this as a reformulation of Kant's dictum, "Transcendentally ideal,
empirically real").

But what accounts for this stance? how is noumenon to be separated form
phenomenon?  Or, to reformulate, how is the artistic image to be separated
from the mundane image, the commercial image, how is the Film to be
separated
from the Gameshow?  If we are to show that this Kantian stance is false, we
need to identify a difference, something that shows the image, whatever it
might be, to be the other of reality.  But what is the status of this notion
of "Other"?

The typical, and useless, answer is to say that what differentiates the
(artistic) image from reality is its mode of production.  The former has a
self-contained essence, something that is unique to its mode of production,
something valuable in-itself.  Again, this characterization might seem
facile,
but notice that it bears a rather strong likeness to Greenberg's claims
concerning the essence of painting.  Ranciere illustrates the
meaninglessness
of such a characterization by appeal to the difference between film and
television.  There's nothing essentially different between the technical
means
of producing a game show and the technical means of producing a film.  As
Ranciere puts it, "Il se fait passer pour plus qu'une tautolgie en
identifiant, par le jeu rhetorique des propositions independent telescopees,
les propriete des universaux avec les caracteristiques d'un dispositif
technique. Mais les proprietes techniques d'un tube cathodique sont une
chose,
les proprietes estetiques des images que nous voyons sure l'ecran en sont
une
autre" [He exchanges this tautology for something something more valuable by
identifying, through a rhetorical play of telescoped and independent
propositions, universal properties with the characteristics of technical
device] (Fr. p 10, 1st section, 4th para.  NB: there's a very nice allusion
to
monetary exchange in the French: propriete also means something like
household
estate, and ownership; disposotif can also be applied to coin-money; so by
buying the tautology, you're exchanging the homeland of truth, we might say,
for the technical/mechanical coin of appearances).

So, in this first section of a few pages, we've seen that the Kantian
paradigm
is, as it were, on trial, and that neither isolated attitude towards the
image
(i.e. either there's only images, or there's no images) gets us anywhere.
We've also seen that a n emphasis on the technical proprieties of a medium
will not generate an essence either.  Simply put, technical elements do not
exhaust the aesthetic concerns.

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