Frances to Cheerskep and William and others...
To warrant the very being of types as real signs tends to attract support from idealist realism and its naturalist pragmatism. Any acceptance of realism over antirealism as an objective global account of the whole wide world however seemingly requires the placing of mentalist theories like notionalism and nominalism and rationalism into philosophy as only special theories. In this way, the origin of things like normal kinds and typical classes can be best properly appreciated as being applicable to both matter and mind. The ontic realm of the world and its objective classes can then be justly explained by methodically and systemically searching the cosmic realm of the world and its classes. This philosophic position was firmly posited by pragmatists over a century ago to get realism right, but it still seems viable. The metaphysics of ideal continuent stuff in the ontos is found to prepare for the evolving physics of real existent stuff in the cosmos, but it is the evolving psychics of ideareal present stuff in the epistemos that controls the conformity of the cosmos to the ontos. The least of the epistemos is a law of habit and conduct which assures stuff that its facts as culled from its quales are growing in the best likely direction. In the eventuality that the psychics of the epistemos evolves into the normal human mind, then the collected group of persons will agree subjectively on kinds and classes and types by conforming to objective things given uncontrolled to sense, because all of psyche is culled in mind from the prior experience of phenomena stored in its memory. If mind classes stuff, which it seemingly must to exist, then matter classes stuff, which it also seemingly must to exist, because mind after all is of cerebral matter, therefore matter in acting to classify stuff in effect is quasi effete mind. The mind cannot classify mental stuff that exists independent of material stuff that can also classify stuff. The least of stuff in the cosmos that can classify stuff as a group might for example be the particles of atoms or the elements of maths. This realist stance seems reasonable, because the stuff of both matter and mind after all are fully phenomenal. The pragmatist proof for this claim is found in the fact that the determination of mind is dependent on a relation with the determination of matter, yet matter can exist and with classes independent of mind or sense or life. The basis of typical classes in mind is hence found in matter. This realist contention is further supported by the pragmatist mathematical logic of relativity. This is why all forms of mentalism fail as global theories in their attempt to account for the norms and classes and types of stuff. If typical objects like art or man are classed in mind subjectively, it is because matter allows it objectively. Some typical abstract objects like mystified figurations or deluded illusions or imagined fictions of course will be mainly mental constructs, but their causal basis is phenomenal nonetheless. The task for thinkers is then to determine whether the main thrust of a typical object is phantomical or physical or psychical. Furthermore, the only way that any norm or class or type can be made real in mind is if some property its object has can be sensed. If some mere stuff is initially given uncontrolled to sense, then it is real in mind, so that the reality of even factuality and actuality is a phenomenal mental construct. If the phenomenal fact that otherwise exists independent of phenomenal mind is not sensed, then the fact is simply not real. This realist approach allows not only for a concrete actuality that is substantially manifested, but also for an abstract possibility that is essentially attributed, and a discrete agreeability that is reliantly exemplified in the presence of mind. For a class of stuff to thus be real as a fact, the mind must clearly be in relational ground with sense, but sense then must be in a relational ground with matter. The ground or relation is where signs logically stand for objects to some effect for a signer. The type is itself a formal sign of law or an immediate semantic legisign that lays in a fundamental iconic ground of familiar identical similarity. The initial classification of stuff in mind is thus only by way of signs acting as types, of which signs however are a degenerate form of the logical phenomenal categories. The only way mind can sense stuff is with signs, but it is a degraded version of stuff, because mind must interpret stuff or infer the meaning of signs. The mind therefore can never know for certain what exactly or precisely the stuff of sense might really be. The only way mind can be assured that its sense of real stuff is a true fact is to call upon other members of its group to confirm what seems sensed and signed. Typical objects like art or medicine or science for example may be found mainly as either possible or lawful and even socially institutional, rather than mainly as actual, but to hold that these typical objects as normal classes are only mental constructs of mind is to overstate the point, because this stance must wrongly hold that mind is epiphenomenal and not phenomenal. For mind to determine the real status of an existent object as being a typical class, and then to determine the main kind of type the class is, requires a semiotic assay of the tones and tokens and types related to the object. This systemic structure of terns goes to the phenomenal categories. The tonal qualities are the formal iconic properties that all the token facts as particular objects might share in common, and which fall under the normal umbrella of the governing type. The typical laws of grounds will then relate the tokens to their tones, so that the tone given uncontrolled to sense is driven to conform to the specific token, which task of assurance is taken by the type. In regard to the phenomenal existence of the tone or token or type, if there is no signer related to feel them or no organism related to sense them or no human related to know them, then the issue of classes is pointless and meaningless and useless. The mind then is brought into a relative relation with the objective object of subjective sense, and not with its own sense of the object, because it is the object after all that is classed as normal and typical. -----Original Message----- Sent: Thursday, April 17, 2008 8:19 PM Frances to Cheerskep and others... Your remarks about signing and calling and naming objects from a notional and nominal stance is mainly understood and appreciated, but my agreement extends only to the degree that such subjectivity is held as a special approach to particular issues turning on psychologism, and in no way is posited or construed as a global approach to all signs and minds. Within that limited frame, my reflection on the stance as explicated by you has been rewarding. Having said that piece, your posts have led me to search for more detailed information on any "ontic existence" that current studies in ontology may reveal. My goals of course are to compare this information with the realist ontology of Peircean pragmatism and philosophy, and to assess whether these ontologies might be a useful study, especially in regard to aesthetic and artistic issues, such as the existent reality of created fantasies and invented fictions and imaginary figures and deluded illusions and phantom afflictions. Any comments or suggested sources and books on the field will be most welcome. Cheerskep partly wrote in effect... I argue that "art" and "artness" is a mythical ontic category or quality, like notions of miracles, destiny, luck, holiness, genius, and more. People sincerely entertain those notions, and when they use those words they sincerely believe they "refer to" or "denote" and "name" a non-mental entity, a "real thing" out there, the way they believe that 'the Plymouth Rock' and 'the
