I think Micheal and I are in basic agreement on all points. I like his paragraphs below. This idea even holds with evolution. If ugly is merely that which we unconsciously reject because our physiologial makeups are threatened by it. Even metaphors of the ugly would evoke a masked physiological response. But in fact, such threats are not inherently ugly, or lacking radiance or that permeating essence I'm trying to describe, either right now, or when I am at work in my studio.
WC --- Michael Brady <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Is there beauty "in Nature" (out there, objective, > in the world, > etc.)? If so, is there also ugly? > > And if there is ugly in nature, what things are ugly > ... in Nature? > Creepy crawling things? Slimy things? Dull dun brown > stuff? Why would > those things (or whatever one might nominate as > ugly)--why would those > things be ugly? > > As far as I can discern, there are no ugly colors. > Nor are there any > ugly beasts, or plants, or landscapes, or textures. > Can something be > ugly in smell? or sound? or touch? or taste? Is > ugly, and > concomitantly beauty, only a property of vision? > > Can there be beauty without ugly? Isn't that like > light (luminance), > which is only perceived by comparison with dark? > > > > Beauty is a property of things perceived by humans, > who can judge and > evaluate abstractly. And since beauty is considered > to be a > culmination or perfection of specific qualities or > characteristics, > there is also ugly, the deficiency of those > qualities. But these > qualities are socially valued. Remember: there are > no ugly things "in > Nature." > > Artworks embody, make concrete in one way or > another, these qualities > of beauty and thus isolate them, as it were, from > the demands of > utility, so that beauty, grace, radiance, quiddity > even, can be > contemplated. That's what Aristotle means by > catharsis and vicarious > violence. > > Because artworks *do not need to be denotatively > truthful*--because > WoA's are fictions, because they do not have to have > a utilitarian > purpose, because they are free creations--the maker > can concentrate on > the accidental qualities of appearances, in order to > manipulate the > degree to which beauty or formal wholeness or > another property can > exhibit itself. > > Art moralizes nature. The artist takes the material > qualities of > things and forms and arranges them in such a way to > produce an order > to these qualities. Canons and rules and guidelines > and other > prescriptions are the socializing of the raw, > unordered, un-beauty and > un-ugly of nature, the making of preferences for and > against ways of > perceiving these qualities. Art is a social > endeavor, and by being > social, it subjects its materials (the stuff of > Nature) to the mores > of the group, of the society. Art moralizes nature, > imposing > preferences on colors and shapes and forms that, in > the wild, occur > for other reasons and purposes. > > And Nature, which precedes art, is indifferent to > these moral rules of > Art. From time to time, Nature rebuffs art, Nature > supersedes art, > Nature is superabundantly more than art, defeating > the rules of art: > There are no binding canons of portrayal in Nature. > Ultimately, Nature > demoralizes art--i.e., Nature de-moralizes art. > > Art moralizes Nature. > Nature demoralizes Art. > > > | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | > Michael Brady > [EMAIL PROTECTED]
