IF all of you would read my old paper back by Susanne K. Langer, 'Feeling and Form' on the aesthetic experience as presented by Clive Bell. One would conclude, it's not in the object itself but in our like mindedness in our personal experience to it's related forms of all sensed things. At least, I am convinced of that, and why I work to relate my forms in the creation of what I do ,from my own being, and trust that others will feel it too. Mando
--- [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > Derek asks: > > "How do you know these 'a.e.'s' are (just?) > sensations?" > > This was in response to my saying: > > "An a.e. is a sensation, a personal experience as > undeniable as a jolt of > fear, tactile pleasure, my experience with vanilla > ice cream, or with the > color-sensation occasioned by encountering a > material object like an apple." > > In other words, during an "aesthetic experience" the > "experience" I am > pointing at is what takes place in the aware mind; > it is the conscious feeling > within occasioned by the observation/contemplation > of certain objects and events. > > A key word in my description of my notion of a.e. is > 'undeniable'. A > sensation is undeniably taking place. When it > occurs, it is, of course, undeniable > only to the person doing the experiencing, but to > him it is certainly that. > > The word 'experience' is certainly used in other > ways. Sometimes we use it > with no reference to what one is aware of. "He > experienced a blow to the head > that put him in a coma for four months." The notion > behind this use of > 'experience' is different from the "awareness" > notion of experience in, "He experienced > great pain during and after the accident." > > I concede there may be bodily changes -- an increase > in heart rate -- > occasioned by the observation, and it's a nice > question what causal connection there > may be between the mental and the cardiac event. > (William James suggested we > don't run because we are afraid -- we are afraid > because we run.) > > Derek asks further: > "And even if these 'a.e's' were just 'sensations' > would they exist > independently of consciousness? (So might they not > also depend on the 'out > there' somehow?)" > > No. In my view, conscious experience and, say, the > concurrent neural activity > are different entities. If I am experiencing pain, > and a doctor shows me, on > some sort of electronic scope, a pulsing nerve in my > brain, and he says, > "That's your pain," I would demur. > > If Derek takes nerves in the brain to be "out > there", then yes, I believe > consciousness is somehow "dependent" on them, but > not in a way that is pertinent > to anything I've said about a.e.'s. > > If by "out there" he means in the external, > mind-independent world (where by > 'mind' I mean the combination of consciousness and > any correlative neural > role), and he's asking if my conscious experience > can exist outside my head the > way, say, the Plymouth Rock exists outside my head, > then again my answer is no. > My consciousness cannot exist outside my > consciousness. > > Derek goes on: > "Speaking personally I am not aware of anything > equivalent to a 'tactile > pleasure' when I look at a Goya painting or listen > to Mozart for example. Indeed > it is nothing like stroking a cat, for example." > > It almost always gives me humbling pause when I see > what I've written fails > to "communicate" serviceably. When I wrote, "An a.e. > is a sensation, a personal > experience as undeniable as a jolt of fear, tactile > pleasure, my experience > with vanilla ice cream, or" a visual sense datum > like red, I did not mean an > a.e. tastes like vanilla ice cream. I meant that > just as fear, ecstasy, > exultancy in victory, tastes, smells, and tactile > pleasures and pains are undeniable > moments of consciousness, so is an a.e. > > A logician might put it this way: An aesthetic > experience and a tactile > experience are alike in that they are both distinct > classes of consciousness; but > the two classes have different members characterized > by different attributes. > > I like the comparison of a jolt of fear with an > a.e., because they both are > emotional experiences within, occasioned by > observing something "out there". In > that way they are alike. But they are unlike in the > attributes of the > specific experiences. We'd also agree sudden fright > is different from the sudden > elation afforded by a joke we find funny, but they > are alike in that both are > feelings occasioned by an observation. > > Two caveats: When I say "I mean", what I have in > mind is, "Here is the notion > I am trying to convey." This notion of "to mean" > stipulates an intention to > communicate as essential to a person's trying "to > mean". Thus we can reasonably > say people mean, but words don't. Words do not > intend ever -- only the > wordsmith does. > > I talk about the aesthetic experience a good deal in > this posting, but I do > it with the limited understanding betrayed by anyone > who finds himself confined > to defining by ostension -- i.e. by pointing. E.g. > "the special, peculiar, > cherishable experience when we contemplate, say, > Mozart, Shakespeare, Van Gogh, > Pavarotti, Allegra Kent, et al at their best are > instances of what I call an > 'aesthetic experience'." > > > > > ************** > Gas prices getting you down? Search AOL Autos for > fuel-efficient used cars.
