William writes:
" I don't think of myself as an artist, as the tone of your remark suggests a
degree of "wannabe" to my demeanor. I am an artist."
Consider the lines:
"I don't think of myself as a virtuous man; I AM a virtuous man."
" I don't think of myself as a man born with good luck; I AM a man born with
good luck."
" I don't think of myself as a beautiful woman; I AM a beautiful woman."
" I don't think of myself as a man cursed; I AM a man cursed."
" I don't think of Jane as a sinner; she IS a sinner."
" I don't think of that victory as a miracle; it IS a miracle."
"I don't think of that as holy ground; it IS holy ground."
" I don't think of Bush as an evil man; he IS an evil man."
"I don't think of myself as a genius; I AM a genius."
We often see a comparable form in other lines:
"I don't just CALL that a miracle. It IS a miracle.
I don't just CONSIDER this holy ground; it IS holy ground."
I realize many listers hate to hear such cold and "artless" terms as
'ontological'. But when they see and use a distinction between merely CALLING
something an XXX and its "BEING" XXX, they are into ontology.
If people, like me, do not believe that the entities good luck, holiness,
curses, sins, miracles, goodness, or even evil "exist" except as mental
notions,
ideas, then they believe every 'am' and 'is' above is a symptom of a delusion.
Rephrased: It's a delusion to believe that there exist outside-the-mind,
"ontological" categories for each of these -- such that if only we could
examine the contents of each category we could learn if a person is in fact
cursed,
or an event a miracle, or an object holy. Or an object "art".
Presumably William believes about 'artist' as he does about 'art'.
"I don't think of that as a work of art; it IS a work of art."
"I don't think of myself as an artist; I AM an artist."
I wrote William:
"You have never -- and I suspect will never -- describe what you have in mind
in terms that will enable us to see why you think the category you call 'art'
"exists", and how you distinguish between objects you'd say ARE "art" and
those you'd say "are not art". Anyone who thinks of himself as an artist -- and
likes to argue on a forum about "philosophy of art" -- should make an effort to
achieve a respectable degree of clarity about this. And then, having put that
delusion behind him, get on to the more interesting questions of
"aesthetics".
So when I imply William thinks of himself as an "artist", my aim is not to
suggest he is a mere wannabe. I know he is much honored and respected for his
work, and has hundreds of paintings all over three continents.
I'll come at this another way. I asked William to describe what he has in
mind when he claims something "is" 'art', using terms that will enable us to
see
why he thinks there even "exists" a category or status he calls 'art', and how
he distinguishes between objects he'd say ARE "art" and those he'd say "are
not art".
I asked this because I assume William would be content to say that to "be" an
"artist" a person must create "works of art". I assume this because of his
attempt to convey here what he has in mind with that term 'art':
"Art in the personal declarative form does not exist
outside of experiencing it.
Art is a form of belief. To say something is art is to
acknowledge its aesthetic impact, subjectively.
The belief makes it so; if you believe it's art then
so it is."
Here's how I interpret his notion.
(As a preface I observe that William's notion of "art" entails the familiar
"for him" qualification. What may "be art for Jones" may "not be art for
Smith".)
A work either has an "aesthetic impact" on a given individual or it does not.
Others, agreeing with William, might say the work either occasions an
"aesthetic experience" in them or it does not. I certainly accept the spirit of
William's posting: The best works by the likes of Mozart and Shakespeare and
Van
Gogh do occasion an aesthetic experience in me.
All I have said is that I have an "experience". I've made no assertions about
the generic scope of what I have called "aesthetic experience". The feelings
derived from a work by Mozart and one by Van Gogh are not identical. And yet
they seem allied in a way they are not allied with, say, a physical pain, or a
fear, or itching. They even seem -- to me -- allied to the experiences derived
from certain "real life" moments -- a beautiful sunset, an unfolding "drama"
in the news, or even on a playing field or an Olympics venue. Exactly what I
have been urging this forum to do is to focus on those feelings that we are
inclined to call "aesthetic experiences". Why do we have them? Is there indeed
some common factor that obtains on all occasions when we feel an a.e.? What is
going on?
But notice: I try not to get circular. I do not hypostatize an ontic category
to "explain" or classify the feeling. I say neither, "They yield a.e.'s
because they are art!" or "They are art because they yield an a.e.!"
I maintain that such ontic categories -- of objects, or "qualities", or
"properties" -- are as mythical as the categories of sin, luck, miracles, etc.
The
only categories involved are notional. To say, "I CALL a work art if it
occasions an a.e.," is defensible if it concedes the word 'art' there is used
as an
honorific, like "Hooray!" To say that anything IS art is always a muddled
assertion. If a work occasions an a.e., all this "proves" is that the work
occasions an a.e.. It does not prove that it must belong to some mind-external
"category", "ART".
**************
Get fantasy football with free live scoring. Sign up for
FanHouse Fantasy Football today.
(http://www.fanhouse.com/fantasyaffair?ncid=aolspr00050000000020)
