Holy cow! I even like what Frances said, especially her remarks re metaphor...and that means I like the rest of her comment too because it leads up to the metaphor conclusion. Or, I've been destabilized by Miller's brilliant comment re painting. WC
--- On Thu, 9/25/08, Frances Kelly <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > From: Frances Kelly <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Subject: RE: Metaphors and Categories > To: [email protected] > Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Date: Thursday, September 25, 2008, 1:17 AM > Frances to Michael and Geoff... > (1) You may wish to read some realist writings by > angloamerican > pragmatists from Peirce to Morris and Sebeok on the matter > of > categoric classes and semiotic signs. The classes as > applied to > signs, like the informative lingual grammar of verbal > words, deal > therein at least with many kinds of represented vehicles > and > referred objects and interpreted effects. These writings on > phenomenal categories also deal with semiotic issues > turning on > objectivism and relativism and subjectivism, to include the > role > that mental visions and notions and nominations play in > that of > classes and signs. In regard to signs in particular, the > specific > writings relevant to this discussion are those on > "types" of > words in minds roughly as immediate or intermediate or > mediate, > and those on the "vehicles" of words as formally > similar or > causally contagious or conventionally arbitrary, and those > on the > referred "objects" of words as possible or actual > or agreeable, > and on the logical "effects" of words as abstract > or concrete or > discrete. Semiotics also posits a distinction between the > general > "tones" and special member "tokens" and > universal class "types" > of all signs. The writings that tend to define > "factuality" as a > material construct and "meaning" as a contextual > construct and > "reality" as a mental construct is also germane. > Lastly, the > pragmatist idea of logical "degeneracy" in regard > to signs and > senses and minds and thoughts are uniquely revealing. The > categories therefore are indeed analogous surrogate signs > to > senses in minds, because the categories cannot be accessed > generatively or directly. As with all things felt or known > by > humans in the world, they are phenomena that can only seem > to be > what they likely really are. All that normal humans can do > is > make a good guess at the truth of signs, and hope they are > empirically right, but then optimistically that is what > humans > usually do so well. > (2) In regard to the category of "art" as a > typical class, the > key issues to debate here in this forum is whether that > group of > all objects called artworks is found to be of objective > matter or > rather is made in the subjective mind. If some classes are > agreed > found to be objective aside from mind, then it may be found > that > "art" is one of them. The task then is to warrant > and justify > such a claim. On the other hand, if all categorical classes > of > generality are agreed found to be subjective constructs > made only > inside the mind, then it must be held that "art" > is one of them. > These issues appear as yet to remain unresolved. > (3) By the way, in pragmatist semiotics > "metaphors" along with > "metonyms" and "models" are analogous > iconic signs of formal > similarity, whether the signs are nonlingual or lingual and > then > nonverbal or verbal. Anything found or held or deemed or > called a > "metaphor" is therefore simply a kind of mimetic > sign that > resembles an object. Icons under pragmatism are furthermore > logically senseless in that they alone cannot be truly > verified, > but can be if they are further made into at least an > abstract > symbol. > > Geoff partly wrote... > Could we agree that some words are or refer to > "categories"? We > might call "categories" "metaphors" (or > not). In either case, we > might > agree that some words refer to members of > "categories". Example: > "art" is a "category" and possibly a > metaphor. Perhaps we could > agree to disagree regarding whether a category is a > metaphor, but > agree that names/categories are abstractions intended to > facilitate communication. > > Michael partly wrote... > In any event, your assertion above means that a metaphor is > no > different from a sign. But as I use the term, a metaphor is > a > significantly different kind of verbal device. A sign > points to > the thing, it's the name that points to the substance. > But a > metaphor asks the reader to compare two dissimilar things > and > imagine that some quality of B can be found in A, either in > some > explicit way or in some indirect, i.e., > "metaphorical," way. > > William partly wrote... > Whatever stands for something else can be a metaphor of it > because it evokes the thing without being it by other > means.
