Where is the experience? At the sensing level (which I believe is no-epistemic), between sensing and perceiving, after perceiving? Is it the result of a gestalt module in the brain? Is it a cognitive event? Is this cogniive event always conscious? If it is, then, there is a cognitive deficit b experiencing the experienceb since we do not perceive all what we sense.
Cortical color is sensed in the brain; how do we translate that into words? Reading William last post, English philosopher Edmond Wright came to my mind. He wrote: b the public word does not capture all the private sensation. (b&) What is implicit for each cannot all be explicit for both.b I couldnbt agree more. So, this is why we must deposit our trust in the Other. And since I am quoting Wright, allow me to get back to the difference we seem to have Geoff and myself about the famous phantom limb. b The phenomenon of stereoscopic space, which is itself a cortically produced feature, is what allows the development of a judgement of external space, but the same applies in that external space and phenomenal space have no qualitative resemblance.b Luc William wrote: > Most philosophers say that whatever the aesthetic > "experience" is, it cannot be fully explicated > because to do that is to describe it in terms separate from > the experience. Experience is a flow, a continuum, always > mixed with a variety of feelings and memories in addition to > the moment at hand. How is it possible to isolate "an > experience" except in vague summary? Thus I think the > aesthetic experience, a faulty term, is ineffable. In fact, > I suspect we could say the same about any sort of experience > whatsoever. We need to use a language to reconstruct the > presumed experience and that has its own experiental or even > aesthetic evocative and therefore constructive aspects. In > short, the word we use to describe our experience is also an > experience and thus has its own defining impact. /
