William: Quite possibly I don't understand what you mean by belief. A belief
we hold we may believe is untrue. A belief you hold may be that
consciousness is not material. You challenge me to prove that your possibly
untrue belief is untrue.
It's too circuitous for me. If it helps, you can win. I would say it's a
mug's game. Your rules for what you believe are idiosyncratic and beyond my
knowing that I understand them (or not).
Geoff C
From: William Conger <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Reply-To: [email protected]
To: [email protected]
Subject: RE: Materiality
Date: Sun, 30 Nov 2008 19:14:18 -0800 (PST)
I don't think you understand what I'm saying when I say belief. I am
saying that consciousness is actually a belief in the thoughts, etc., it
apparently consists of. It does not require that we regard those beliefs as
true. But even that's a still conscious act, a belief. We can believe that
we hold untrue thoughts. We can believe that we hold true thoughts. Both
rely on belief.
If we can agree for a moment that only material existence, including
consciousness, is actual and identifiable, what is lost? If mind or sould
is immaterial, how can be be gained or lost (to consciousness)?
WC
--- On Sun, 11/30/08, GEOFF CREALOCK <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> From: GEOFF CREALOCK <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: RE: Materiality
> To: [email protected]
> Date: Sunday, November 30, 2008, 8:38 PM
> If, for you, belief is proof, then we don't agree on
> basic
> assumptions/axioms and then you'd be right. End of
> discussion. (I respect
> that you believe but that doesn't equal proof to me - I
> wouldn't believe
> it.)
> Geoff C
>
>
> >From: William Conger <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> >Reply-To: [email protected]
> >To: [email protected]
> >Subject: RE: Materiality
> >Date: Sun, 30 Nov 2008 13:48:24 -0800 (PST)
> >
> >What's true of noxious stimulation is true of any
> stimulation, since neural
> >activity is common to both. Absent all neural activity
> and thus absent
> >consciousness and even life. It's counterintuitive
> to recognize that all
> >thought is brain activity and all brain activity is
> material but that's how
> >it is, insofar as anyone can demonstrate.
> >
> >We are saying the same thing when we say mind, brain,
> spirit, soul. I'd
> >prefer it be otherwise but I can't find anything to
> truly justify it,
> >excep-t, of course, belief. And that's where I
> always end up, admitting
> >that belief underlies all thought.
> >WC
> >
> >
> >--- On Sun, 11/30/08, GEOFF CREALOCK
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> > > From: GEOFF CREALOCK
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > > Subject: RE: Materiality
> > > To: [email protected]
> > > Date: Sunday, November 30, 2008, 1:11 PM
> > > I guess it depends on one's definition. I
> agree that it
> > > is difficult to
> > > prove that something doesn't ... exist/have
> > > materiality. It would also be a
> > > challenge to you to do more than nfer that
> consciousness
> > > has
> > > materiality/exists. My responding to noxious
> stimulation
> > > would prove that I
> > > have sense receptors and my brain responds by
> trying to
> > > move my physical
> > > self from the area of annoyance. That
> wouldn't
> > > demonstrate the materiality
> > > of consciousness to me.
> > > Geoff C
> > >
> > >
> > > >From: William Conger
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > > >Reply-To: [email protected]
> > > >To: [email protected]
> > > >Subject: RE: Lehrer and Whitman
> > > >Date: Sun, 30 Nov 2008 09:59:11 -0800 (PST)
> > > >
> > > >So how do you demonstrate the immateriality
> of
> > > consciousness? How do you
> > > >demonstrate the immateriality of anything at
> all?
> > > >WC
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >--- On Sun, 11/30/08, GEOFF CREALOCK
> > > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > From: GEOFF CREALOCK
> > > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > > > > Subject: RE: Lehrer and Whitman
> > > > > To: [email protected]
> > > > > Date: Sunday, November 30, 2008, 8:49
> AM
> > > > > Cheerskep: For one who emphasizes
> (sometimes on
> > > and on) the
> > > > > role of the mind
> > > > > in deciphering meaning from, at least,
> words, one
> > > would
> > > > > have thought that
> > > > > you would have thought that you would
> find
> > > Lehrer's
> > > > > reference to Stevens'
> > > > > line about "august
> imagination" at
> > > least somewhat
> > > > > sympathetic to your
> > > > > perceptions.
> > > > > Do you mean to deny the
> 'immateriality"
> > > of
> > > > > consciousness?
> > > > > Geoff C
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > >From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > > > > >Reply-To:
> [email protected]
> > > > > >To: [email protected]
> > > > > >Subject: Lehrer and Whitman
> > > > > >Date: Sat, 29 Nov 2008 17:14:43 EST
> > > > > >
> > > > > >I'm afraid I truly began to
> object to
> > > Jonah Lehrer
> > > > > and to his book "Proust
> > > > > >Was a Neuroscientist" even
> before I got
> > > to a word
> > > > > Lehrer wrote. A mind that
> > > > > >would choose this quote from
> Wallace Stevens
> > > to be the
> > > > > first line of his
> > > > > >book
> > > > > >is
> > > > > >not a mind for me:
> > > > > >
> > > > > >"Reality is a product of the
> most august
> > > > > imagination."
> > > > > >
