Frances to William... According to the tenets of idealist realism, the normative normal norm is what ought to be, regardless of what humans may think of it when seeking goals. To help thinkers attain knowledge about such norms, realist pragmatism further posits the normative sciences of aesthetics and ethics and logics as systematic methods to aid thinkers in trying to get at the normal goals they seek. There are many real goals set by persons or peoples and even as actual ideals that nonetheless are agreed proved by even greater collective communities to defy common sense and to be evil or wicked, thus these bad goals are not normal, because they fail to be what ought to be as good for persons or peoples. The determination of the normal however is tentative and thus probable. It is therefore the search for the norm that is important, and not its actual attainment, which absolute finality is impossible for humans in any event. It is sufficient to satisfy the principles of idealist realism if thinkers merely believe in this likelihood. The norm of an object is what ought to be in the foreseeable future by optimistic seekers. The norm of an object is not what works according to a plan. The value of an object on the other hand is indeed what works in satisfaction of a need, aside from any aesthetical or ethical or logical concerns, but not the norm of an object. The normative normal norm is what any group of reasonably intelligent persons might eventually agree to if enough relevant knowledge becomes evident in the long run through researched inquiry. The norm of what ought to be thus can be ideal or real and perfect or imperfect and ethereal or corporeal, but it must eventually seem to be good. The application of normality as a condition to say unfortunate humans who are disadvantaged or handicapped in some physical or psychical way may often be held as being culturally insensitive or politically incorrect, but these abnormalities still violate the norm of what ought to be for humans as currently known, regardless of what we may think of the normal otherwise. The realization of the norm however does not mean that humans cannot help other humans, whether they are normal or abnormal. The application of normality and the accommodation of abnormality are clearly evident at present in many samples of architecture. Even if a norm were found to be metaphysically or ontologically ideal, this does not necessarily make the norm or the ideal imaginary or fictive. The normal object of eternal infinity and its sensible property of continuity for example can demonstrate this, and because continuity can be sensed, then infinity and its continuity are real and are thus made concrete in experience, which object and property can be proven as an actual fact by the axiomatic geometry of exact mathematics. The normal normative norm in architecture therefore is what ought to be found by expert groups as being good.
William wrote... There is not an excess of issues, but an excess of faultiness in your thesis, in my view and as I explained it in clear language. My critique is that you are equating normal and perfect by your own logic. If normal is what ought to be, then it is not yet present and real but is instead an imagined ideal; if the perfect is also ideal, then it, too, is only imagined and not real. Thus according to your view, the normal and the perfect are the same ideal. As far as I know the normal is simply what works according to plan, a pragmatic condition. Depending on the item being measured for its normal condition of working there are different ways to find the norm. It is not the optimal good working or bad working, just somewhere in-between.
