Facts of biological knowledge of ontogenic development of a personae is may be unreasoned opinion for you, but obvious for me. You want examples I will give you: You and I and billions more. As educator you have to know that potency of learner depends on genetics and acquired life experiences. I think you have to rethink mindfully my statement without any bias . "Judgment - quality/ability is born and learned." Boris Shoshensky To: [email protected] Subject: Re: Reading Kivy: Chapter Two - Wittgenstein and Weitz Date: Fri, 9 Oct 2009 09:31:29 -0700 (PDT)
Why do you think that your summative pronouncements constitute anything beyond unreasoned opinion? What is the evidence, what are the arguments, where are the examples to support your statements? wc ________________________________ From: Boris Shoshensky <[email protected]> To: [email protected] Cc: [email protected]; [email protected] Sent: Friday, October 9, 2009 10:33:21 AM Subject: Re: Reading Kivy: Chapter Two - Wittgenstein and Weitz Judgment quality/ability is born and learned. Boris Shoshensky ---------- Original Message ---------- From: armando baeza <[email protected]> To: [email protected] Cc: armando baeza <[email protected]> Subject: Re: Reading Kivy: Chapter Two - Wittgenstein and Weitz Date: Fri, 9 Oct 2009 08:05:43 -0700 Humans are unique by nature, judgement is learned. mando On Oct 9, 2009, at 6:40 AM, Boris Shoshensky wrote: > How we know uniqueness without Aesthetic judgment? > Boris Shoshensky > > ---------- Original Message ---------- > From: armando baeza <[email protected]> > To: [email protected] > Cc: armando baeza <[email protected]> > Subject: Re: Reading Kivy: Chapter Two - Wittgenstein and Weitz > Date: Thu, 8 Oct 2009 22:10:50 -0700 > > Aesthetic judgement aside, art is always one of a kind (unique). > mando > > On Oct 8, 2009, at 7:23 AM, William Conger wrote: > >> Miller is much better here. He is more interesting and smarter >> because he raises questions from the content instead of attaching >> his (usually pejorative) judgments up front. >> >> I've always liked Weitz because he seemed to explain Wittgenstein >> (in terms of art) better than others. But I need to agree that >> just because "a family resemblance" cannot be pinned down to an >> explicit common feature or concept does not mean that the concept >> has already been fully examined or defined. We can't sidestep the >> issue by saying there are open and closed concepts. We can't be >> sure that a concept is closed but we are always right when we say a >> concept is open. I agree that nothing (in art) has been fully >> explicated. I turn again to a master of such thinking among >> artists, E. Delacroix: "That which has been done has not yet been >> done enough". >> >> So why not just admit that the art concept is always open? Why not >> admit that the "family resemblance" is always an evolving one -- >> like nature, remoter genes are reduced to near zero, if not zero, >> and newer ones seem all new -- or as with metamorphosis, a real >> change occurs. One can imagine a cluster of "closed concepts" >> within an ever expanding "open concept". >> >> Follow nature. Here's another quote from Renoir: "Take your >> theories (of art) to Nature and she knocks them all flat". >> wc >> >> >> >> >> ________________________________ >> From: Chris Miller <[email protected]> >> To: [email protected] >> Sent: Thursday, October 8, 2009 8:55:40 AM >> Subject: Reading Kivy: Chapter Two - Wittgenstein and Weitz >> >> "A concept is open if its conditions of application are emendable and >> corrigable; i.e. if a situation or case can be imagined or secured >> which would >> call for some sort of decision on our part to extend the use of the >> concept to >> cover this, or to close the concept and invent a new one to deal >> with the new >> case and its new property. If necessary and sufficient conditions >> for the >> application of a concept can be stated, the concept is a closed one" >> >> (Morris Weitz - following Wittgenstein's "Philosophical >> Investigations") >> >> ""Art" is an open concept . New conditions (cases) have constantly >> arisen and >> will undoubtedly arise; new art forms, new movements will emerge, >> which will >> demand decisions on the part of those interested, usually >> professional critics, as to whether the concept should be extended >> or not" >> (Morris Weitz) >> >> "The primary task of aesthetics is not to seek a theory but to >> elucidate the >> concept of art. Specifically, it is to describe the conditions >> under which we >> employ the concept correctly. Definitions, reconstruction, >> patterns of >> analysis >> are out of place here since they distort and add nothing to our >> understanding >> of art" (Morris Weitz) >> >> .......... >> . >> ....... >> ........ >> >> Kivy first notes that Weitz has not clarified whether his claim is >> epistemic >> (what we know) or ontological (what really is) I.e, "it might well >> be that we >> tell whether something is a work of art by noting family >> resemblances (the >> epistemic claim) even though, in fact, what makes it a work of art >> is some >> (unknown) property common to all artworks (the ontological claim)" >> >> Kivy suggest that Weitz has acknowledged this oversight, but In >> either case, >> the Wittgensteinian student of aesthetics will be "looking for the >> elusive >> common property" - "noting family resemblances to paradigm cases" to >> continually modify the cluster concept being assembled. >> >> And then Kivy, with no further explanation, suggests "my advice to >> the >> Wittgensteinian, then, would be the same as to the traditional >> theorists: give >> resemblance a rest. My theme is differences" >> >> Perhaps realizing that this advice is a bit irrelevant, Kivy then >> launches >> into a sharper attack -- noting that "The Wittgensteinian move in the >> philosophy of art was never a popular one, and at the present it is >> not a >> going concern" >> >> Unfortunately, as with his dismissal of Schopenhauer, Kivy seems to >> once again >> accept that the popular reception of a philosophy as the final >> word on its >> value. >> >> But to apply the coup de grace, he finally adds "There is a >> simpler, less >> philosophically expansive reason why I reject the Wittgensteinian >> model for >> art. It is simply that the only argument for its being a proper >> model is a >> bad argument" >> >> And that "bad argument" is that any traditional definition
