For me, naturalism and realism have the same meaning. We have limited knowledge of it and always will, but always trying to learn more regardless. Boris Shoshensky
---------- Original Message ---------- From: "Frances Kelly" <[email protected]> To: <[email protected]> Subject: RE: Thought always precedes speech Date: Tue, 16 Mar 2010 22:05:55 -0400 Frances to Boris and others... It is tempting for me to tentatively retain "realism" or some brand of realism like "idealist realism" or "realist pragmatism" as the label for any key support philosophy, but the door is always ajar and ready to accept suggested alternates. The term "dialectic naturalism" is unknown to me, but let me search it out. Incidentally, assigning any notion of "theism" to a key support philosophy would be unacceptable to me, although the loose religiosity of Peirce is admitted, as is the roots of realism in catholic antiquity, but this background in my opinion did not affect his scholarship. Peirce by all accounts was clearly a mathematician and logician and scientist of the highest order. He simply wanted to blend evolution theory and creation theory in general philosophic ways that were nonreligious and panentheistic or neutrally moral, with the goal of respecting intellectual economy and authority. Boris wrote... How about dialectic naturalism. I think it includes idealism and materialism as "general" realistic accounts of the world. Frances wrote to Saul... If it may be correct that naturalist pragmatism or idealist realism now fail as "general" accounts of the world, then the search likely continues for some other alternate theory, but just exactly what that might be remains unclear to me; however all suggestions are welcome. Saul wrote to Frances... Theistic evolutionism - very 19th century pragmatic inductive rationalism- your trapped in words- you call it realist- and by that you are held to 19th century concepts - this is what becomes of them disciple Frances wrote to Saul... > The antirealist alternative to globally account for what may > be felt or sensed or known by humans as being in the world is > some kind of subjective mentalism, like notionalism or nominalism > or rationalism, which is unacceptable to realists. > The common sense hypothesis of external existence is a good > guess, derived from individual observations of inner feelings > about the seeming haze given of phenomenal stuff, which > subjective observations are then put to objective expressions, so > that other normal experts who are similarly inclined will by a > consensus of their agreed opinion tentatively determine what is > real and true. Since the individual observer is unreliable, it > falls to the community of observers to control conformity by > analyzing their expressed propositions. What collective thinkers > have found to date is that mathematics and logics, and > synechastics or the evolving phenomenal categories, are ideal > objective things that exist independent of human feelings or > knowings, and that furthermore the laws of nature and the laws of > science are also found to be objective phenomenal constructs. > These expert findings of course would be conditionally contingent > and provisionally probable. Under the philosophy of realist > pragmatism this is a situation of objective relativism, where the > human is brought into an indirect relation with the objective > phenomena they subjectively feel might exist, and not into a > relation with their own inner psyche about the haze of seeming > phenomenal stuff that is given uncontrolled to them. The > mathematics and logics and laws of nature or science found to > exist by humans are not arbitrary inventions. The agents of this > design are the dispositional tendencies of stuff to evolve in the > best direction possible, which is generally fated towards a good > end goal. > Saul wrote to Frances... > As revealed or hypothesized by human beings - whomergent > world se knowledge of the world is emergent - consequently > man-made laws are merely propositions and cannot be held to be > true - in other words they are either merely symbolic or mythic > or in some cases delusional. > Frances wrote to Saul... > My understanding of realist pragmatism on this issue of what > continues or exists in the world before signs is that phenomena > does, and as categorically structured with monadic qualities > and dyadic facts and triadic laws.
