Frances to Boris and others... 
   The intriguing issue of whether signs should be limited only
to normal human signers was rejected by Peirce and the early
pragmatists who sided with him. To this day however many realists
and pragmatists would expand the human limit of signs, but only
to include all biotic organisms. My tentative feeling is that
signs in their making and taking should be extended to include
all phanerisms, from mechanisms of matter to organisms of life.
What suggests to me that this stance might be on the correct
track is that mechanistic machines from neutrinos to computers to
neurons can engage signs albeit only as crude signals, and that
microscopic organisms can be consciously aware of their own being
in that they will not eat their own body parts when driven by the
signals of hunger. Not all phanerisms of course would engage all
kinds of signs, from icons and indexes to symbols, but would
engage only those signs in the main that they are say capable of.
It is admitted however that only normal humans can engage signs
as symbols, and to include those symbols of linguistic languages.
It is likely a philosophic mistake to claim that all abnormal
humans and all nonhuman phanerisms can engage symbols of any
kind. 
   In any event, the determination of limits for signs must
likely fall with the relative grounds that signs are found to lay
in with their objects, and then this dyad to lay in with their
effects. In other words, it is probably the sign situation as an
act of semiosis that sets the signs and signers. Furthermore, it
is the referred semiosic object that determines the main kind a
sign will be in any given situation; so that for example many
translated lingual signs can stand for one and the same object. 

Boris partly wrote in effect... 
   [posted Peirce text] "By a Sign, I mean anything that is, on
the one hand, in some way determined by an object and, on the
other hand, which determines some awareness, and this in such
manner that the awareness is thus determined by that object." I
think this Peircean passage is one of the more successful
definitions. I have fished out things that make sense to me, even
through heavy pondering of Peirce. The only thing I wish Peirce
would stress more often is that signs should apply only to
humans. 

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