What is realistic art making? Boris Shoshensky ---------- Original Message ---------- From: armando baeza <[email protected]> To: [email protected] Cc: armando baeza <[email protected]> Subject: Re: Phenomenology of Signs Date: Sat, 20 Mar 2010 11:51:18 -0700
My point is in reference to realistic art making. Cheerskep's "sherishable" is as close as one can get to express reality as sense , to others. A cherishable expression will always be our only alternative in art, yet as broad as the minds can sense. AB On Mar 20, 2010, at 9:42 AM, imago Asthetik wrote: > I suppose my remark was intended to thematize an ambiguity in Mr > Baeza's use > of 'subjective.' For the most part, Mr Baeza seems to use > 'subjective' in a > sense consonant with 'personal.' However, what is personal need > not be > contrary to what is objective. My private life is personal, though > it could > be objectively related to others, and exists in the same manner as > tables > and chairs. The personal specificity of my love for someone may > not be > readily communicable to others, but it is nevertheless manifest and > objective even if I am unaware of the hows involved in > communicating it. > > Mr Conger's reformulation of the matter in terms of tacit and explicit > knowledge (what one used to call, I think, knowing-how and knowing- > that), is > a subtler way of formulating the point. Naively, I had in mind the > idea > that one may only grasp a specific sense of an expression (e.g. > 'toe the > line') which one uses without thereby eliminating the larger field of > publicly available and objective connotations and denotations that > make the > expression 'objective,' semantically rich and evocative. More > succintly, Mr > Baeza might find the word personal (and Cheerskep's 'cherishable') > more > appropriate and appealing than 'subjective'. > > On Sat, Mar 20, 2010 at 11:06 AM, William Conger <w- > [email protected]>wrote: > >> The real topic here is tacit and explicit knowledge. A new book >> from the >> Univ. Chicago Press by Harry Collins deals with that subject. >> Imago seems >> to be referring to tacit knowledge when he says, "One says more, >> means >> more,....than one actually knows". >> wc >> >> >> ----- Original Message ---- >> From: imago Asthetik <[email protected]> >> To: [email protected] >> Sent: Sat, March 20, 2010 12:58:48 AM >> Subject: Re: Phenomenology of Signs >> >> Is it no the other way around, Mr Baeza? It is not ones >> expression that is >> subjective, but ones own understanding of it. One says more, >> means more >> and >> better, than one actually knows. >> >> On Sat, Mar 20, 2010 at 1:07 AM, armando baeza <[email protected] >>> wrote: >> >>> what is sense, cannot be expressed as sensed, beyond you. >>> Ones expression will always be subjective. >>> >>> >>> On Mar 19, 2010, at 2:45 AM, Frances Kelly wrote: >>> >>> Frances to Cheerskep and interested others... >>>> Approaching signs as phenomena when studied under the general >>>> philosophy and formal science of phenomenology may avoid the >>>> thorny problems encountered by thinkers when addressing the issue >>>> of an origin or cause and source or limit for signs, which for >>>> convenience such frames might be reduced mainly to that of >>>> objectivism or relativism or subjectivism. If the conceptual idea >>>> of signs should be limited to only the brain and mind of the >>>> human being, who likely should also be held as normal and mature >>>> and even advanced, then signs would be supplied and supported by >>>> only some kind of subjectivism, such as psychologism, mentalism, >>>> notionalism, nominalism, perceptualism, or rationalism. The main >>>> consequence of accepting this sort of stance and thrust is that >>>> it excludes signs from the nonhuman arena. This limit seems >>>> problematic and even unnecessary. It is certainly antirealist. In >>>> its defence as a special theory, subjectivism might however be >>>> usefully applied to a broader realist position within the >>>> pragmatist science of phenomenology. The initial thorn to resolve >>>> of course is whether the theory of signs as phenomena might be >>>> applicable to all forms of phanerisms and as signers, from >>>> mechanisms of matter to organisms of life. My primary approach >>>> here would be to wrestle with realist phenomenology in order to >>>> better understand it, before making any definitive conclusions. >>>> (By some accounts the theory of conceptualism is held as a >>>> realist tool to bridge the gap between idealist objectivism and >>>> antirealist subjectivism, but that issue also must wait in line >>>> for address.)
