I think, we do art, because it should be sufficient and more to satisfy the 'reality' one senses. Otherwise why bother. Boris Shoshensky
---------- Original Message ---------- From: armando baeza <[email protected]> To: [email protected] Cc: armando baeza <[email protected]> Subject: Re: Phenomenology of Signs Date: Sat, 20 Mar 2010 14:12:27 -0700 I feel that a related reality in art is not sufficient to satisfy the reality one senses. In art the, 'subjectively personal' is the only avenue available to us. On Mar 20, 2010, at 1:25 PM, imago Asthetik wrote: >> Cheerskep's "cherishable" >> is as close as one can get to express reality as sense >> > > What leads you to believe this, Mr Baeza? could you explain a > little more? > > > > On Sat, Mar 20, 2010 at 2:51 PM, armando baeza > <[email protected]>wrote: > >> My point is in reference to realistic art making. Cheerskep's >> "sherishable" >> is as close as one can get to express reality as sense , to others. >> A cherishable expression will always be our only alternative in >> art, yet >> as broad as the minds can sense. >> AB >> >> >> On Mar 20, 2010, at 9:42 AM, imago Asthetik wrote: >> >> I suppose my remark was intended to thematize an ambiguity in Mr >> Baeza's >>> use >>> of 'subjective.' For the most part, Mr Baeza seems to use >>> 'subjective' in >>> a >>> sense consonant with 'personal.' However, what is personal need >>> not be >>> contrary to what is objective. My private life is personal, >>> though it >>> could >>> be objectively related to others, and exists in the same manner >>> as tables >>> and chairs. The personal specificity of my love for someone may >>> not be >>> readily communicable to others, but it is nevertheless manifest and >>> objective even if I am unaware of the hows involved in >>> communicating it. >>> >>> Mr Conger's reformulation of the matter in terms of tacit and >>> explicit >>> knowledge (what one used to call, I think, knowing-how and >>> knowing-that), >>> is >>> a subtler way of formulating the point. Naively, I had in mind >>> the idea >>> that one may only grasp a specific sense of an expression (e.g. >>> 'toe the >>> line') which one uses without thereby eliminating the larger >>> field of >>> publicly available and objective connotations and denotations >>> that make >>> the >>> expression 'objective,' semantically rich and evocative. More >>> succintly, >>> Mr >>> Baeza might find the word personal (and Cheerskep's >>> 'cherishable') more >>> appropriate and appealing than 'subjective'. >>> >>> On Sat, Mar 20, 2010 at 11:06 AM, William Conger <w- >>> [email protected] >>>> wrote: >>> >>> The real topic here is tacit and explicit knowledge. A new book >>> from the >>>> Univ. Chicago Press by Harry Collins deals with that subject. >>>> Imago >>>> seems >>>> to be referring to tacit knowledge when he says, "One says more, >>>> means >>>> more,....than one actually knows". >>>> wc >>>> >>>> >>>> ----- Original Message ---- >>>> From: imago Asthetik <[email protected]> >>>> To: [email protected] >>>> Sent: Sat, March 20, 2010 12:58:48 AM >>>> Subject: Re: Phenomenology of Signs >>>> >>>> Is it no the other way around, Mr Baeza? It is not ones >>>> expression that >>>> is >>>> subjective, but ones own understanding of it. One says more, >>>> means more >>>> and >>>> better, than one actually knows. >>>> >>>> On Sat, Mar 20, 2010 at 1:07 AM, armando baeza >>>> <[email protected] >>>> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>> >>>> what is sense, cannot be expressed as sensed, beyond you. >>>>> Ones expression will always be subjective. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Mar 19, 2010, at 2:45 AM, Frances Kelly wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Frances to Cheerskep and interested others... >>>>> >>>>>> Approaching signs as phenomena when studied under the general >>>>>> philosophy and formal science of phenomenology may avoid the >>>>>> thorny problems encountered by thinkers when addressing the issue >>>>>> of an origin or cause and source or limit for signs, which for >>>>>> convenience such frames might be reduced mainly to that of >>>>>> objectivism or relativism or subjectivism. If the conceptual idea >>>>>> of signs should be limited to only the brain and mind of the >>>>>> human being, who likely should also be held as normal and mature >>>>>> and even advanced, then signs would be supplied and supported by >>>>>> only some kind of subjectivism, such as psychologism, mentalism, >>>>>> notionalism, nominalism, perceptualism, or rationalism. The main >>>>>> consequence of accepting this sort of stance and thrust is that >>>>>> it excludes signs from the nonhuman arena. This limit seems >>>>>> problematic and even unnecessary. It is certainly antirealist. In >>>>>> its defence as a special theory, subjectivism might however be >>>>>> usefully applied to a broader realist position within the >>>>>> pragmatist science of phenomenology. The initial thorn to resolve >>>>>> of course is whether the theory of signs as phenomena might be >>>>>> applicable to all forms of phanerisms and as signers, from >>>>>> mechanisms of matter to organisms of life. My primary approach >>>>>> here would be to wrestle with realist phenomenology in order to >>>>>> better understand it, before making any definitive conclusions. >>>>>> (By some accounts the theory of conceptualism is held as a >>>>>> realist tool to bridge the gap between idealist objectivism and >>>>>> antirealist subjectivism, but that issue also must wait in line >>>>>> for address.)
