I do art to tickle the essence , of it's reality,in me.
mando
On Mar 20, 2010, at 4:46 PM, Boris Shoshensky wrote:
I think, we do art, because it should be sufficient and more to
satisfy the
'reality' one senses. Otherwise why bother.
Boris Shoshensky
---------- Original Message ----------
From: armando baeza <[email protected]>
To: [email protected]
Cc: armando baeza <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: Phenomenology of Signs
Date: Sat, 20 Mar 2010 14:12:27 -0700
I feel that a related reality in art is not sufficient to satisfy
the reality one senses.
In art the, 'subjectively personal' is the only avenue available to
us.
On Mar 20, 2010, at 1:25 PM, imago Asthetik wrote:
Cheerskep's "cherishable"
is as close as one can get to express reality as sense
What leads you to believe this, Mr Baeza? could you explain a
little more?
On Sat, Mar 20, 2010 at 2:51 PM, armando baeza
<[email protected]>wrote:
My point is in reference to realistic art making. Cheerskep's
"sherishable"
is as close as one can get to express reality as sense , to others.
A cherishable expression will always be our only alternative in
art, yet
as broad as the minds can sense.
AB
On Mar 20, 2010, at 9:42 AM, imago Asthetik wrote:
I suppose my remark was intended to thematize an ambiguity in Mr
Baeza's
use
of 'subjective.' For the most part, Mr Baeza seems to use
'subjective' in
a
sense consonant with 'personal.' However, what is personal need
not be
contrary to what is objective. My private life is personal,
though it
could
be objectively related to others, and exists in the same manner
as tables
and chairs. The personal specificity of my love for someone may
not be
readily communicable to others, but it is nevertheless manifest and
objective even if I am unaware of the hows involved in
communicating it.
Mr Conger's reformulation of the matter in terms of tacit and
explicit
knowledge (what one used to call, I think, knowing-how and
knowing-that),
is
a subtler way of formulating the point. Naively, I had in mind
the idea
that one may only grasp a specific sense of an expression (e.g.
'toe the
line') which one uses without thereby eliminating the larger
field of
publicly available and objective connotations and denotations
that make
the
expression 'objective,' semantically rich and evocative. More
succintly,
Mr
Baeza might find the word personal (and Cheerskep's
'cherishable') more
appropriate and appealing than 'subjective'.
On Sat, Mar 20, 2010 at 11:06 AM, William Conger <w-
[email protected]
wrote:
The real topic here is tacit and explicit knowledge. A new book
from the
Univ. Chicago Press by Harry Collins deals with that subject.
Imago
seems
to be referring to tacit knowledge when he says, "One says more,
means
more,....than one actually knows".
wc
----- Original Message ----
From: imago Asthetik <[email protected]>
To: [email protected]
Sent: Sat, March 20, 2010 12:58:48 AM
Subject: Re: Phenomenology of Signs
Is it no the other way around, Mr Baeza? It is not ones
expression that
is
subjective, but ones own understanding of it. One says more,
means more
and
better, than one actually knows.
On Sat, Mar 20, 2010 at 1:07 AM, armando baeza
<[email protected]
wrote:
what is sense, cannot be expressed as sensed, beyond you.
Ones expression will always be subjective.
On Mar 19, 2010, at 2:45 AM, Frances Kelly wrote:
Frances to Cheerskep and interested others...
Approaching signs as phenomena when studied under the general
philosophy and formal science of phenomenology may avoid the
thorny problems encountered by thinkers when addressing the
issue
of an origin or cause and source or limit for signs, which for
convenience such frames might be reduced mainly to that of
objectivism or relativism or subjectivism. If the conceptual
idea
of signs should be limited to only the brain and mind of the
human being, who likely should also be held as normal and mature
and even advanced, then signs would be supplied and supported by
only some kind of subjectivism, such as psychologism, mentalism,
notionalism, nominalism, perceptualism, or rationalism. The main
consequence of accepting this sort of stance and thrust is that
it excludes signs from the nonhuman arena. This limit seems
problematic and even unnecessary. It is certainly
antirealist. In
its defence as a special theory, subjectivism might however be
usefully applied to a broader realist position within the
pragmatist science of phenomenology. The initial thorn to
resolve
of course is whether the theory of signs as phenomena might be
applicable to all forms of phanerisms and as signers, from
mechanisms of matter to organisms of life. My primary approach
here would be to wrestle with realist phenomenology in order to
better understand it, before making any definitive conclusions.
(By some accounts the theory of conceptualism is held as a
realist tool to bridge the gap between idealist objectivism and
antirealist subjectivism, but that issue also must wait in line
for address.)
