some more psychedelic works by William Fields http://alarmpress.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2007/11/williamfields1.jpg http://www.orangehillart.com/images/HERMETICRAPSODIE.JPG http://www.orangehillart.com/images/UNKNOWNYOGI.JPG http://www.communityartscafe.com/arielsm.jpg
On 3/12/12 5:34 PM, William Conlin wrote: > W. Conger writes: > > "I need to be instructed as to why Dennett's view excludes the > "aesthetic" experience since it is not raw experience -- or feeling > -- as such that is aesthetic but experience and feeling imagined or > located in some metaphorical construct that for various cultural and > evolutionary reasons is called aesthetic." > > My original concern is less about Dennett's position than > about my own trouble with categorizing experiences. As far as I know > there is no way to show how various peak experiences are > physiologically different. (unless you know of some?!) > > This is not to say that cheerskep is wrong about knowing > personally the difference between various peak experiences. I'm only > saying that an outsider could never measure your reactions and say: > you're experiencing bliss type a based on symptoms x, y and z. > > [email protected] says: > "I can say I've never been aware of confusing a palatal experience > with a sexual experience. Similarly, when I've had an "aesthetic > experience", I've been convinced this feeling was a genus distinctly > different from sexual or palatal." > > The evolutionary reasons for sexual or palatal experiences > becoming so powerful is clear to me. But why would we have a similar > experience when viewing art or listening to music? > > I think there are two reasons: > One: our brains are rigged for identifying familiar patterns and > finding meaning, we often Identify with that which we find most familiar. > > Two: as we enter into an artistic event/experience we put away other > concerns and find ways to appreciate the moment, this removal of > stressful concerns and presence in the moment allows us transcend into > a more pleasurable state of appreciation. > > This brings up a big question that is one of the reasons I > joined the forum: > > Do I determine the quality of my experience by allowing myself > to be in the moment, or does the work have to be powerful enough to > pull me into a peak experience without my consent. > > How do we gauge the quality of art when we base it on our own > ephemeral experiences? > > enjoying the dialogue! > -WWC > > > > > > > I just want to clarify a few issues about Dennett. > > > [email protected] > "I certainly don't claim there's no connection, but I'm with the guy > in the hospital who, shown a scan of a pulsing neural plexus in his > brain and told, "That's your pain", answers, "Like hell that stuff is > my pain." " > > Dennett is a non-dualist as far as brainstuff and mindstuff > are concerned. I don't think he would say "this is your pain" he might > go as far to say that "this is a picture of your neural plexus when > you describe what you call pain." > > [email protected] > "The trouble is that he seems to pass over the empathy issue too > slickly." > > You are correct, Dennett avoids the issues of empathy his > descriptions of affect are centered on the individual experience. > "Consciousness Explained" avoids it completely as far as I know (O > regret that I have not had time to finish it). I think the reasons for > this are that it is hard to measure empathy empirically and the focus > of Dennett's book is to present an argument using thought experiments > that are backed up by empirically verifiable data. I have not read > /The Intentional Stance /but now I'm curious! > > > > On 3/12/12 4:06 PM, [email protected] wrote: >> William Walker Conlin writes: >> >> "I must admit that it concerns me to see discussion of a so-called >> "aesthetic experience". How can this experience be differentiated from other >> descriptions of bliss or relief?" >> >> I touched on this in my earlier posting to Artsy6. I claim palatal >> experiences seem to me to be of a different genus from aural experiences. The >> "bliss" of an orgasm seems to me generically different from the "bliss" I >> feel >> from Beethoven's Ninth. >> >> This is not to insist I'm convinced there is a total difference in kind >> between aesthetic blisses and other blisses not usually thought of as >> aesthetic. In track and field, for example, consider this scenario. My very >> good >> friend, whom I believe to be the best of the twelve runners in the mile >> race, is >> tripped by another runner at the end of the first lap (of the four-lap >> race). He tumbles onto the track. By the time he gets up, he's a good thirty >> yards behind everyone else. But he starts chasing them. At the end of the >> third lap, he at last catches the eleventh-place runner. As they all race >> across the final back stretch, my friend is visibly moving up, passing one >> runner >> after another. As they make the final turn and head into the home stretch, >> he is in fourth place, with only about a hundred yards to go. But he >> displays a tremendous kick, he sprints, he catches the third guy, he catches >> the >> second, and finally, five yards from the end, he catches and passes the >> leader, he wins, and then tumbles to the track again, this time in >> exhaustion - >> and happiness. >> >> I've seen such a race, and I'm not sure how much the bliss, for me as a >> spectator, is different from certain memorable endings I've been exposed to >> in >> theater and at the movies. >> >> Yes, I'm aware that Ducasse and others would claim the experience from the >> story-element in a theater (and by extension, at a sporting event) is always >> vicarious and never aesthetic. I don't readily accept that dismissal. I can >> imagine Ducasse (a very good man, but perhaps not in aesthetics) similarly >> dismissing the blazingly triumphant and tumultuously satisfying endings of >> some terrific symphonies and operas because they are in some way what he >> called "vicarious". Playwrights, screenwriters, novelists have spent long >> hours >> shaping and reshaping their work. All those works occasion an experience in >> the audience. Ducasse would claim they're all "vicarious". And yet some >> occasion a.e.'s and some don't. One of my favorite tv series is I SURVIVED >> (Not >> "I SURVIVED...AND BEYOND.) I regularly writhe with the victims. But I seldom >> confuse that experience with an aesthetic one. (Though sometimes I'm given >> pause by a victim's ability to summon up extremely effective details and >> shapes to their narratives.) >> >> Conlin goes on to write: >> >> "There is nothing about an experience that has an ontic quality of >> "artness"." >> >> I would never suggest my EXPERIENCE has "artness". Indeed, I'd never even >> ascribe that alleged quality to any object or event that occasioned my a.e. >> Conger is right in denying that quality is a mind-independent entity. >> Over the years on this forum, I've said that no object or event has an >> absolute >> ontic status as "art", so the search for a "definition of art" is folly. >> But I can still ask, "What is going on when I have an a.e.? Why does that >> object or event occasion it?" >> >> Conlin: >> >> "It's a slippery slope, to say that this experience is somehow different >> from other experiences of strong emotion. If we get caught up in descriptions >> of experiences and emotions we will end up trying to define consciousness." >> >> Agreed, it's a slippery slope. But slippery slopes also go upward. It's >> we who do the slipping, not the slope. >> >> As for Dennett, I'll simply say his position is different from mine, and >> I'll characterize mine only by saying it's closer to that of Chalmers et al. >> (Though I differ from him too.) I can't rid my mind of the conviction that >> consciousness is a fundamentally different sort of entity from any material >> thing. I certainly don't claim there's no connection, but I'm with the guy in >> the hospital who, shown a scan of a pulsing neural plexus in his brain and >> told, "That's your pain", answers, "Like hell that stuff is my pain."
