I'm fine with Dennett's Intentional Stance which is essentially a pragmatic explanation of consciousness if we leave it at the level of a popular mechanics explanation of reality : We figure out the intentions of others based on what we would intend for ourselves in their predicaments, much like we figure out the "intentions" of machines by examining their functionality. The trouble is that he seems to pass over the empathy issue too slickly. Our projections of Intentional Stance to the outer world are enabled by empathy, or a make-believe metaphorical play by which we pretend to be the other. This is not simply old-fashioned spiritualism nicely replaced by science but it appears to be science itself as defined by the recent discovery of "mirror neurons" in humans and some other animals. Mirror neurons, real physical things, are what enable us to "feel what another feels" or even to anticipate and vicariously experience what others do and even to make-believe that consciousness in objects as when one says, for example, "I feel like that rock" or "I am uplifted as if in flight".
In some ways mirror neurons actually reinforce Dennett's mechanistic Intentional Stance since they are the tangible site for his otherwise speculative argument. But they also incorporate what he seems to deny, the metaphorical or make-believe dimensions of consciousness and the need to attribute -- and create? -- our own sense of being and continual relocation of our 'center of gravity' (whatever that is) to everything we experience. However, I need to be instructed as to why Dennett's view excludes the "aesthetic" experience since it is not raw experience -- or feeling -- as such that is aesthetic but experience and feeling imagined or located in some metaphorical construct that for various cultural and evolutionary reasons is called aesthetic. Wouldn't that be a an example of Intentional Stance? wc ----- Original Message ---- From: William Conlin <[email protected]> To: [email protected] Cc: joseph berg <[email protected]> Sent: Mon, March 12, 2012 6:57:10 AM Subject: Re: Psychedelic art Hi all, I must admit that it concerns me to see discussion of a so-called "aesthetic experience". How can this experience be differentiated from other descriptions of bliss or relief? There is nothing about an experience that has an ontic quality of "artness". Such an experience is an internal process having more to do with consciousness than with the art-experience responsible for it (or is the person experiencing it responsible?). It's a slippery slope, to say that this experience is somehow different from other experiences of strong emotion. If we get caught up in descriptions of experiences and emotions we will end up trying to define consciousness. Don't get me wrong I'd love to discuss consciousness but I have a feeling that it may belong in another forum. Dan Dennett discusses some of these issues at length. Is anyone is familiar with "Conciousness Explained" or his article "On the Absence of Phenomenology"? Dennett says something I find comforting that "there really are no phenomenologists," that is, "no uncontroversial experts on the nature of the things that swim in the stream of consciousness." Is it possible to discuss aesthetics without reference to phenoms of a conscious experience? Curious to see anyone's reaction to this (good or bad) -William Walker Conlin On 3/12/12 4:39 AM, joseph berg wrote: > On Sun, Mar 11, 2012 at 5:57 AM,<[email protected]> wrote: > >> I agree with William about the "subjectivity" of art. There is no absolute, >> mind-independent, ontic "quality" of "artness" up in Plato's heaven. Even >> those who have been sufficiently involved in a genre to be called >> "sophisticated" can disagree in their response to works in that genre. The >> variety of >> sensibility can be startling. It's astonishing how many highly literate >> people profess disgust at Shakespeare. >> >> For me, the most interesting inquiry in aesthetics continues to be focused >> on what I'll call the "aesthetic experience". I know even that phrase will >> be disputed and rejected by some. But I'm fairly firm about saying I know >> it >> when I feel it. I'm convinced there are those who all their lives read >> poetry, visit visual-art museums, listen to music, but who fail in one or >> more of >> the genres ever to have an "aesthetic experience". One can encounter a >> bemused blankness when trying to convey what an "a.e." is like. It is >> roughly >> comparable to trying to convey the feeling of an orgasm in sex to those >> who've >> never had one. I've known warm people who have willingly indulged in sexual >> play all their lives (It's friendly! It's "nice"!) but who persuasively >> report they have never reached orgasm. >> > Do you feel that an a.e. is supposed to be cathartic, i.e., provide a kind > of purge? > >> Luckily for me I've had what I call a.e.'s in a variety of genres - and for >> me the question of exactly what is going on and why in each is an abiding >> question. I grant that the best moments in Mozart... > > I'd be curious to know what you consider to be "the best moments in Mozart"?
