I wrote: > Also: My name and address differentiate me from anyone else in the world. > Would you call them my "essence"?
Saul then advanced his description of his notion of 'essence' from "the essence of something being the minimal > > conditions that allow us to distinguish it from another thing" to > "the essence of something being the minimal > conditions that allow us to distinguish it from another thing (of a > different kind or order)." But Saul also wrote: > > If that combination is the most significant difference we might identify > then I would say yes This is troublesome because the whole game of coming up with this stipulative definition of 'essence' now rides on a person's notion of "significant". I see a circle trembling on the horizon: > - though I do not think there is any essential > difference between one human and another - though there may be between the > quality of their life - this is why I chose a phenomenal rather than a > linguistic criteria - i.e. the essence of something being the minimal > conditions that allow us to distinguish it from another thing (of a > different kind or order) - An "essential difference" is needed to make something an essence. And how do we determine if something is "essential"? We see if it is "significant". And how do we determine if something is "significant"? Well, it's significant if it means something is of a "different kind or order". And how do we determine that? Well, it's of a different kind or order if it makes for a different essence. Oy.
