"You don’t know my qualia on red ... We may never know that your green is my red." Great, seems like we've reached agreement on something. When we communicate with words like "red," we're really communicating about the frequency of light. I would argue that we are not communicating our qualia to each other. If we could communicate qualia, we would not have this issue of being unable to know whether your green is my red. Qualia are personal and incommunicable *by definition,* and it's good to have that specific word and not pollute it with broader meanings.
In the mouse example, I was assuming that I had fully modeled the electro-mechanical phenomena in *this specific* mouse. I still don't think that would give me its qualia. I would be happy to refer to a machine with an incommunicable first-person subjective experience stream as "conscious." But you've admitted that you're not trying to talk about incommunicable first-person subjective experiences, you're trying to talk about communication. I'm not concerned with whether the "consciousness" is mechanical or biological, natural or artificial; I'm concerned with whether it's actually "consciousness." ------------------------------------------ Artificial General Intelligence List: AGI Permalink: https://agi.topicbox.com/groups/agi/T41ac13a64c3d48db-M123187415d84d17b03b08bf7 Delivery options: https://agi.topicbox.com/groups/agi/subscription
