Jim, Karl Popper used the concept as part of his model of scientific discovery > in the 1930s, but his principles, which were based on logical positivism, > have become more dubious because logical certainty has become a more > dubious principle of knowledge.
Just for the record: Popper was disagreeing with positivists, not agreeing. (This mistake is widespread, much to Popper's annoyance.) Positivism is verificationist: their idea of science was that only verifiable assertions should be considered meaningful. Popper's idea was similar, but directly opposed: only falsifiable theories should be considered meaningful. Popper's ideas won out, but honestly I think it has become a blind fixation; although non-falsifiable theories are often bad science, it isn't "fundamental" (some things are verifiable, some things are falsifiable, some things are both, some things are neither... it effects how feasible it is to know an answer, sure, but it doesn't bear on how *meaningful* the questions are.) --Abram On Tue, Jun 19, 2012 at 7:40 AM, Jim Bromer <[email protected]> wrote: > The original idea behind the use of "prediction" in AI was that the > prediction could be compared against the actuality and that comparison > could be used to test the theory that produced the prediction. (Some > author popularized that model for AI but it was proposed by academic > researchers before he did so. Karl Popper used the concept as part of his > model of scientific discovery in the 1930s, but his principles, which were > based on logical positivism, have become more dubious because logical > certainty has become a more dubious principle of knowledge. And, oh, by the > way, Popper did not believe that AI was possible.) So, continuing with the > march of the use of "prediction" in AI, AI people could see that our > expectations were like "predictions" and so it did seem that the human > mind did indeed use a method of prediction. Of course the principle that a > prediction could be compared against an actuality in order to evaluate the > accuracy of a theory only works in narrow AI, and as narrow AI failed to > produce simple AGI that part of the cherished notion of "prediction" has > been gradually eroded. > > This group uses the term prediction to simply refer to something that is > "known" and as such it is a concept which is pretty shallow since > its verification as a mental product is thereby based on the experience > that when we know something we act as if we were confident that it would > happen. The problem with such concepts like "knowing" or "prediction" is > that they -do not- confirm the efficacy of theories that an AGI program > might produce, except in those circumstances which would be considered > narrow AI by this group. > > Let me repeat that. > The problem with such concepts like "knowing" or "prediction" is that they > -DO NOT- confirm the effaciacy of theories that an AGI program might > produce, except in those circumstances which would be considered narrow > AI by this group. > > So sure, when someone points out that the human mind uses "expectation" > and expectation is a little like "prediction" I do agree. But here the > word prediction is just being used to describe "knowing something." There > is no principle of confirmation or disconfirmation of the use of > "prediction" that can be used to produce AGI, except for special cases. > After years and years of the repetition of the word in these types of > discussions there is still no AGI so that should give you a hint about how > good an idea it was. > > If the use of prediction as a confirming method can only be used in a > limited set of circumstances then its power in these discussions has been > so diminished that it should not be used as if it were a magical concept. > Without some efficacy the word should not be used as a special technical > term. The word should be used in the way it is usually used. > > As I implied, Popper originally used the word the concept in a logical > model of scientific theory. If a theory could be used to predict a > confirming or disconfirming observable event then the theory could be > disconfirmed by the failure of the event to occur. (If the event occurred > it still might be caused by a coincidence.) > > It is coming back to me. (Or else my creative memory is kicking in.) > The author who popularized the theory of confirmation through prediction > had a model of probability and confirmation by prediction. That model is > inherently contradictory. > > It amazes me that you guys don't get this. > > Jim Bromer > *AGI* | Archives <https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now> > <https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/7190161-766c6f07> | > Modify<https://www.listbox.com/member/?&;>Your Subscription > <http://www.listbox.com> > -- Abram Demski http://lo-tho.blogspot.com/ ------------------------------------------- AGI Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/21088071-c97d2393 Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=21088071&id_secret=21088071-2484a968 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
