Mike,

I suggest you go to *their* list and enlighten them on what they haven't 
thought through as well as you have... maybe they will show more interest than 
you get here.

Personally, although I agree that the authors you refer to (Lakoff, Johnson, 
etc) -- and many others directly in the field of Cognitive Linguistics as well 
as related fields -- are extremely useful for insights applicable to AGI 
research.  Most of my own reading these days is in that area.

Your own take on it seems bizarrely focused on one subpart of one sense 
modality, as if you skimmed a few articles and fixated on the word "image" 
which you could bend to your own preconceived ideas about the mind, which seem 
rather dubious.  When Lakoff pats you on the head and refers you to source 
material, predictably you ignore the referenced work's substance and take the 
whole interaction as some sort of vindication.... Schemes (and image schemes) 
are much more abstract than you ever acknowledge... An IS for, say, COMPULSION, 
is not some kind of neural line drawing of arrows and balls...

But AI has never really been about copying The brain (at any level of 
abstraction).  It is astonishing and unbelievably cool that evolution, which 
produced a complex set of task-specific information processing mechanisms to 
solve survival problems, was then able to repurpose these to achieve 
(relatively) general purpose abstract cognition.   But... To AGI folks, it 
would be equally astonishing if the result turned out to be the ONLY way 
intelligence can be built, or even the BEST way to build it using radically 
different technological substrates.  

It does seem to me that the resulting hodgepodge -- biological inspiration 
combined with intuitions about abstract reasoning -- is rather unconvincing 
without either firm theoretical foundations or clear incremental experimental 
progress... but that doesn't doom such efforts, it just makes the success of 
any particular effort rather unlikely.

Your criticisms miss the mark here because you presume a requirement that AGI 
must operate the same way as your beliefs about how human minds operate, and 
your resulting anthropocentric view produces rather irrelevant comments about 
how AGI development MUST proceed.  Evolution may have (roughly) started with 
generality and added sophistication and eventually "intelligence" to that, but 
it's not the only possibly way to proceed.

It would be very interesting to see an AGI effort taking explicit direction 
from cognitive linguistics (especially fom a developmental perspective) and 
related areas of study focusing on concepts, schemas, and metaphorical mappings 
-- again especially from a perspective of "non-traditional" computational 
models... If I were to get anywhere in my own efforts, it would follow such a 
path.  But it is far easier said than done.  I don't know what that 
computational model should be (yet, haha), and neither as far as I know does 
anybody else including Lakoff and his colleagues.  Their computational models 
of abstracted neural function are just as arbitrary and unconvincing as the 
mechanisms chosen by AGI researchers, and although they are better motivated 
for the purpose of a cognitive psychology research agenda, whether such 
parochial methods are best for AGI is much less clear, especially while the 
results are still so underwhelming.

While I am rambling, I personally think that the vast pre-general-intelligence 
neural heritage provides a very rich many-dimensional sensorimotor environment 
on which abstract cognition rests.  Thinking in terms, for example, of vision 
as a sort of movie camera is not the best way to think about it... Hardwired 
neural circuitry to separate form from movement, figure from ground, and 
objects from a spatial field (including slots for tracking those objects)... 
Spatial maps of various kinds; various spatial coordinate systems, etc, etc --- 
THOSE are what should properly be thought of as the outputs of sense 
modalities, and those are the things that schemas are built from, are the 
genesis of abstraction.  These color our thinking and communication so much 
that from a purely practical standpoint I don't see how a "young" AGI could get 
much from reading human text, or communicate anything except the simplest 
technical material, without replicating a lot of that architectural detail.  
But that's just me...

Derek Zahn



From: [email protected]
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: [agi] Image schemas control all forms of action [Lakoff replies]
Date: Tue, 24 Jul 2012 10:10:22 +0100





The idea of mapping schemas onto each other is v. fundamental to the 
general image schema approach to cognition and action of cog. embodied 
sci.  This is esp. evident in the whole idea of metaphors wh. is of extreme 
(and IMO somewhat excessive) importance to the field. Computers as we have much 
discussed aren’t yet capable of holistic mapping – though I think a way round 
can be found for robots.
 
The other aspect of schemas that is vital is that they are fluid,loose 
outlines – and not just outlines of objects, but of actions and potential 
courses of actions – and therefore a fundamental contradiction and challenge to 
the idea of algorithmic, precisely first-to-last-step preplanned courses of 
action. *However* I doubt that anyone in the field has really thought this 
through – or they wouldn’t be so attracted to computational instantiations.. I 
welcome comments from all here.
 
 


 

From: Jim Bromer 
Sent: Tuesday, July 24, 2012 2:43 AM
To: AGI 

Subject: Re: [agi] Image schemas control all forms of action [Lakoff 
replies]
 

Mike said:
My impression is that these attempts are always misguided ... – for they do 
IMO “betray” or certainly distort the guiding image schema inspiration – and 
the 
idea of mapping schemas onto each other. (I’d like to discuss this with 
him/them 
– and may use your reply as an opportunity).

 
Do you mean that the idea of mapping schema onto each other is a distortion 
of "the guiding image schema inspiration," or do you mean that the idea of 
mapping schema onto each other is a part of the inspiration?  Because the 
"mapping" of schema onto each other is a mapping of a computational idea onto a 
hypothesis about the biological process of mind, whereas the guiding 
inspiration 
of using image is more of a process derived from physical neural biology.
Jim Bromer

On Mon, Jul 23, 2012 at 7:13 PM, Mike Tintner <[email protected]> wrote:


  
  
  
  Ben,
   
  Did you read it in the proper order, so to speak (hard to do from the 
  layout)?  i.e. starting with *my* post and his reply?
   
  I don’t think there’s any doubt that he is replying to, and confirming my 
  position – wh. is a general point about how the brain works, and how image 
  schemas inform and control many different kinds of action, incl. cognition 
and 
  representation.
   
  It’s true that at almost every point,  Lakoff and his many 
  followers/colleagues seek to find computational instantiations of their 
  ideas.
   
  My impression is that these attempts are always misguided – and invite 
  the kind of response you have made, – for they do IMO “betray” or certainly 
  distort the guiding image schema inspiration – and the idea of mapping 
schemas 
  onto each other. (I’d like to discuss this with him/them – and may use your 
  reply as an opportunity).
   
  But I don’t think there can be any doubt that Lakoff & co do see 
  image schemas as central as I have outlined (and don’t see them as 
  mathematical) – and that while they may seek to be computational, their 
  primary loyalty is to the biological and science.
  
  
   
  
  From: Ben Goertzel 
  Sent: Monday, July 23, 2012 11:54 PM
  To: AGI 
  Cc: AGI 
  
  Subject: Re: [agi] Image schemas control all forms of action 
  [Lakoff replies]
   
  
  Mike,
   
  Lakoff's reply to you is not about "image schema" but rather about 
  "process schema" , specifically naranyan's x-schema
  

  naranyan's x-schema are "a 
  graph-based, token-passing formalism based on stochastic Petri 
  nets"
  

  
http://www1.icsi.berkeley.edu/~snarayan/CFN-NCPW04.pdf 

  

  These x-schema are an abstract mathematical formalism, and not 
  intrinsically "imagistic"
  

  Naranyan uses x-schema as a bridge btw language, action, perception 
  and reasoning -- much as opencog uses its atomspace model in this role 
  
  

  Ben G
  

  -- 
  Ben Goertzel  
  http://goertzel.org

  ### Sent from my mobile; plz forgive any typos or excessive concision 
  ...
  
On 24 Jul, 2012, at 5:17 AM, "Mike Tintner" <[email protected]> wrote:


  
  
    
    
    
     
    
    
     
    
    From: George Lakoff 
    Sent: Monday, July 23, 2012 10:11 PM
    To: Mike Tintner 
    Subject: Re: [Cogling-L] The scope of image 
    schemas
     
    Narayanan's 
    X-schemas (or process schemas) characterize all events and actions and 
    actually control physical actions. So you're right about that. We are now 
    working on entity schemas, but we're not there yet. 
     
    George


    On Sun, Jul 22, 2012 at 11:34 AM, Mike Tintner <[email protected]> 
wrote:

    Lakoff:The idea behind image metaphors is simple. Images 
      are structured by image
schemas. A given image has multiple image 
      schemas linked via neural binding
to form a composite image schema ? or 
      more than one. Metaphors map one
image to another by mapping the source 
      image schemas to the identical image
schemas in the 
      target

George,

Your exposition was v. useful. Can you/should 
      you not extend the scope of image schemas? They structure presumably 
      under

*Images* : both

*Verbal Images* 
      &
*Graphic/Photographic/Sensory Images*.

and not just word 
      images but :

*Words/Language/Concepts" - period; *all words* are 
      structured by image schemas, no?

And from that one can one go on to 
      argue - no? -  that they structure

*Moves/Movement* - period - 
      that, for example, our reaching for a cup is structured by a 
      schema.

After all, language is used principally to structure 
      actions: "Hand me that cup" - "Go to the other room". It makes sense that 
      image schemas should structure not just verbally-mediated action, but all 
      action, however mediated. The same mirror neurons that respond to 
      (image-schema-structured) verbal accounts of action, also respond when 
      just watching direct sensory images of agents executing those 
      actions.

Concepts/schemas arguably structure all the actions of 
      living creatures.

Comments?

P.S. Personally, I think it's 
      helpful to think of image schemas as "[loose] outlines" - esp. in 
      connection with actions. Comments?

     
    
    
      
      
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