On Tue, Jul 24, 2012 at 6:19 PM, Piaget Modeler <[email protected]>wrote:
> In my view, there is behavioral expectation verification... > > My theory is this: > > We form expectations (predictions) constantly, and then correlate the > expectations with observation. We regulate behavior > based on this simple process. Where predictions are successful, we > reinforce behaviors, and where predictions fail, we correct the behaviors. > Piaget Modeler, As I pointed out, a predicted event can be tied to any kind of theory so even if an event that has been predicted is observed it can be used to "verify" all kinds of nonsense. You might try to limit the relationship between the prediction and the theory but the only way to do this effectively is to say that the observation of some easy-to-observe event -A- verifies the prediction that easy-to-observe event -A-would occur. This is a triviality and even this is confined only to those observations which are easy to observe. You really need to tie more imaginative theories in with a variety of kinds of observable events if you want to use observations as a basis for AGI. But once you do this it will inevitably lead to the false verification of poor theories like the person who finds that a weakly associated prediction "proves" some crackpot conjecture that he is peddling. This is one reason why AGI programs have yet to achieve minimal sustainable mentation. The fact that you are talking about some separation of the sentences that the agi program would make from the verification of the truth of the sentences does show that there are some old fashioned flaws in your theory (it was good enough for Tarski and it is good enough for me) and this flaw could be used to let some light in, but the meandering of the stream of thought about how this might work shows that you are almost totally unprepared for dealing with the issue that I am talking about. Since easy to observe events are too scarce to use as a tool of verification that means that we have to use more elaborate methods to "verify" theories about the world. If an AGI program is not carefully designed it will tend to act like a crackpot who thinks that overly-simple tests can verify his insipid theories. But since AGI programs have yet to attain a minimal level of mentation an AGI program that was not designed well would not only end up pursuing crackpot theories, but also theories that were meaningless. That is one reason why current AGI programs do not even show that they are capable of sustained weak intelligent thought. So if a supposed verification is found for some targeted subject, other theories about the target subject should also be tried to cross examine the supposed validity of the theory and the relativity of the tests and observations used in the verification process. These theories will be relatively complicated and the observation methods that are used to try to verify or disqualify the theory will also be relatively complicated. (They will not be based only on simple observation events like the appearance of a pixel set or something like that.) So we can try, for example, developing opposing theories tied to an observation event which might prove that conjectured theory was wrong just to make sure that the theory can withstand some opposition. So if an AGI program thinks that it has made an observation that verifies one of its theories it should then try to develop methods to prove the theory wrong as well. It should also try to modify the theory in some way to see if the modification can be proven or not and to see if it can be falsified as well. As our (hypothetical) AGI programs are better able to use components that have proven useful and withstood cross-testing they can then start to use these more viable components in more controlled testing procedures. Jim Bromer On Tue, Jul 24, 2012 at 6:19 PM, Piaget Modeler <[email protected]>wrote: > > In my view, there is behavioral expectation verification, then there is > linguistic utterance verification. > These are two distinct processes. > > My theory is this: > > We form expectations (predictions) constantly, and then correlate the > expectations with observation. We regulate behavior > based on this simple process. Where predictions are successful, we > reinforce behaviors, and where predictions fail, we correct > the behaviors. > > Regarding language, we perceive and store utterances, we may ascribe > properties to the utterances such as certainty, > origin, etc. We don't necessarily have to prove all utterances as true or > false, rather we store them initially as opinion and register > them as a known belief of some entity (the source of the utterance). It > would be up to a reasoner process to actually determine > to some degree of certainty whether the utterances are factual (true or > false), counterfactual, hypothesis, or simply opinion. > > For my purposes, and from my perspective, determining the truth of > utterances is less important than recording that they were made. > > ~PM > > > ------------------------------ > Date: Tue, 24 Jul 2012 17:12:08 -0400 > Subject: Re: [agi] Prediction is not a reliable method of verification > From: [email protected] > To: [email protected] > > You believe it because > 1. You read that it would work when you were younger and more gullible. > 2. You don't know of anything that will work. > > Basically, you are in the wilderness and don't know it. > > There is no such thing as a good verification method. They all work some > of the time, but the problem is that there is no way for an actual AGI > program to know when they are working and when they aren't working. If > there was then we would all be able to show some neat AGI programs that > worked up until a point. The result is that we have to rely on evidentiary > methods which are tied to some kind of general modelling (an intrinsic > modelling) that is geared to the one task of collecting evidence, cross > validating it, cross-examining it and so on to make our evidentiary > verification methods intrinsically stronger. > > The idea that you would mention reinforcement in this context really > reveals the surprising naivety of dealing with the problem. For example, > how do you confirm or disconfirm what I am saying? Is it possible that > much of what I just said is right but a little of it is wrong? Suppose > that most of what I am saying is right but there are a few details that are > wrong. Does that mean that reinforcement will encourage me to continue and > that my theory about this will be strengthened? No it does not. Even if > there is only a little thing wrong with my theory it could potentially ruin > the greater theory if it is reinforced. Now suppose that you might want to > encourage me to continue just so that you might examine my theory in > greater detail. Wouldn't that act as a kind of reinforcement? The problem > is that you would be effectively reinforcing my theory even while you > disparaged it (or at least were sceptical of part of it.) The idea that a > simplistic and self-contradictory behaviorist model could be effectively > used in the development of higher intelligence is not sound. The > behaviorists claimed that reinforcement was based on pure observation but > of course it was a philosophical construct that was developed before their > births or when they were young enough to allow them to accept the theory as > a sound basis for their musings. The great thing about the mind is that we > are capable of discernment; we do not have to dogmatically react to > some little reinforcement as if it verified the greater elaboration of a > theory. We can discern that someone might be interested in one of our > theories without necessarily ascribing to it. Similarly we can discern > that someone might not react well to the presentation of one of our > theories without having to wallow in their inability to comprehend as an > absolute negative reinforcement of our own theories. For example, > discernment allows me to dismiss the criticism of a blatant bigot because I > do not need to look very far to find what is motivating him. Its right > there near the surface. Bigotry is such a primitive form of reasoning you > really have to wonder what makes people think that they can get any > traction out of it. At the same time, discernment also allows me to > reconsider the bigot's intellectual reasoning just to make sure that there > is nothing of value in it that I might have missed. > > To believe that the jailer's fascism is what is responsible for making the > mind work is really beyond the pale. > > Jim Bromer > > > > On Tue, Jul 24, 2012 at 4:10 PM, Piaget Modeler <[email protected] > > wrote: > > > I believe the opposite. I believe prediction IS the essence of > verification, > of correlation. Prediction based regulation (intrinsic reinforcement or > correction) is practical. > > If not, how else would you verify? > > -------------------------------- > *AGI* | Archives <https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now> > <https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/19999924-5cfde295> | > Modify <https://www.listbox.com/member/?&;> Your Subscription > <http://www.listbox.com> > > *AGI* | Archives <https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now> > <https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/10561250-164650b2> | > Modify<https://www.listbox.com/member/?&;>Your Subscription > <http://www.listbox.com> > ------------------------------------------- AGI Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/21088071-c97d2393 Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=21088071&id_secret=21088071-2484a968 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
