I agree with Piaget's remark.

I am going to conduct an experiment.  I want to see if I can get you to
solve a problem for me.  So I am going to keep track of our conversation by
keeping notes on particular issues related to this experiment.  It is
unlikely that you would be able to solve a particular problem that is of
interest to me, so I am going to be looking for an unexpected solution to
some related problem that I will pick up somewhat serendipitously from our
conversation.  The best way to get you to cooperate with me on this is to
get you talk about the thing you are interested in. However, the solutions
to the problems of your projects probably will not be the solutions to the
problems of my projects, so I have to find a way to get you talk about
something that is common to both of our projects.
So I have gotten you to describe some ways that your program can apply
imagination to problem solving.  Your seem to acknowledge that integration
is a part of the process, but you haven't acknowledged that complexity is a
problem.  So now, in order to get you to continue discussing this I have to
back off from talking about complexity and emphasize the problems of
'verifying' and integrating internal projections.  I will review your
message in response to my question of how your program will use
imagination, and I will copy that response into my notes.  Now that I have
reviewed some of your previous messages I see that you mentioned Piaget's
comments on coordination before.  Coordination seems to be very similar to
conceptual integration.  I also found that you had told me that Michalski
had a fast inferencing method so that must be important to you for some
reason.

So, to repeat myself for clarity.  I am going to run a
subjective experiment for a couple of weeks. The goal is to get you to
solve a problem for me and I want to be able to note how I personally
integrate subject related serendipity into my knowledge structures
concerning the subject. It is unlikely that you would be able to solve a
problem that I specified in advance so I am going to look for an unexpected
serendipitous solution to some problem that I haven't yet
completely identified.  In order to get you to participate in this
experiment I need to encourage you to talk about your project using terms
that are relevant to both of us.  Since I will be keeping notes I have
started by reviewing and collecting some of the comments you made in this
thread.  I can then use this knowledge to get you to continue talking about
things that interest you.  I noted that you have not acknowledged that
complexity is a problem so I will back off that particular problem and try
to shift to integration (coordination) issues that seem challenging for an
automated AGI program to use effectively.  Now that I have explained this
'experiment' to you I will stop talking about it and get back to the
subject.


On the list of mental coordination methods, internal simulation methods and
inferencing you did not specifically mention conditional branching so there
is a chance that you (or Piaget) left that off the list. I would say that
is a pretty important concept! On the other hand, running different methods
to use in a comparison with perceived events seems to imply a conditional
branching.


Anyway, the next question I have for you concerns 'verification' and
integration (coordination).  Without strong verification, coordination is
essentially going to tie weak inferences together. If you accept that this
could be a problem then how would your program use the products of
coordination reliably?

Jim Bromer


On Tue, Dec 4, 2012 at 11:45 PM, Piaget Modeler
<[email protected]>wrote:

>  "The central idea is that knowledge proceeds neither solely from the
> experience of  objects nor from
>
> an innate programming performed in the subject, but from successive
> constructions, the result of
>
> constant development of new structures.”   ~ Jean Piaget****
>
>
> So I think we knit together these insights, piecemeal, until they recur
> and strengthen, and become
>
> more predictable and forceful in our minds.  Then they integrate and form
> a larger structure, and
>
> eventually they become a subsystem, integrating with other subsystems,
> until they finally integrate
>
> with the totality.
>
>
> Or at least that's how I interpreted it in "The Development of Thought" by
> J.Piaget.
>
>
> Cheers.
>
>
> ~PM.
>
>
> ------------------------------
> Date: Tue, 4 Dec 2012 23:12:06 -0500
>
> Subject: Re: [agi] Internal Representation
> From: [email protected]
> To: [email protected]
>
> Well, I would look at Ryszard Michalski's work on dynamically interlaced
> hierarchies if it was convenient for me to do so. Nothing about this is
> mentioned on his home page and the first reference I looked at did not seem
> like a breakthrough paper.
>
> I want to finish something that I was thinking about.
>
> We (or a machine) would be able to build strong knowledge if the knowledge
> that was gained could be used to reliably predict, explain or produce a
> specific outcome.  But often, the outcomes are weak or unreliable
> indicators of much of value.  So instead we are left with a lot of weakly
> related situation-action-reaction insights that are inexplicably
> conditional and variant.
>
> This is a lot like serendipitous learning.  If I try to learn something, I
> probably won't be able to figure out what I wanted to figure out (unless it
> is something that other people had already figured out and it was within my
> field of knowledge).  But I would probably learn something new
> serendipitously.  Now can we patch a lot of weak unexpected insights
> together?  Yes, but in order to build something reliable out of a lot of
> weak structural pieces they have to be integrated pretty thoroughly. The
> integration does not have to perfect but the matrix of these things have to
> be strong enough to serve as a foundation for greater insights.
>
> Jim Bromer
>
> On Tue, Dec 4, 2012 at 9:31 PM, Piaget Modeler 
> <[email protected]>wrote:
>
>
> I would agree that you also need mult-strategy reasoning in addition
> to correlations.
>
> Look at Rysard Michalski's work on dynamically interlaced hierarchies.
> He has a fast and efficient mechanism for inference.  He inspired me.
>
> Cheers,
>
> ~PM.
>
>
> ------------------------------
> Date: Tue, 4 Dec 2012 18:36:20 -0500
>
> Subject: Re: [agi] Internal Representation
> From: [email protected]
> To: [email protected]
>
> I discovered something about logic that I never knew before.  It is
> something that I have thought about for 40 years, but I never stopped to
> explore the application.  Now, shouldn't this new insight give me greater
> understanding?  Well, yeah, but it doesn't work that way.  I have a new
> insight but I haven't got any use for it.  So now I have to try to find
> some practical use for it.  Well even though I don't have any use for it, I
> might pick up some street creds by telling other people about it right?
> Well no, not really.  It is really a turn-the-crank kind of thing and the
> fact that I thought about it for so long without ever once examining its
> application is kind of embarrassing.  So now, before I can talk about it I
> have to search for some way to use the idea effectively.  If I found some
> utility for it then I could pick up some credit for it, but until then it
> is just going to make my work with logic more complicated.
>
> The insight was a turn-the-crank kind of insight so it represented the
> application of a familiar idea onto another familiar idea in a way that was
> very familiar to me.  The only thing I did different was to actually see
> how it worked in a few examples.  When I did that I realized that the
> effects were not exactly what I expected.  However, logic is an artificial
> field which is well formed so that other logic-based ideas, like something
> from mathematics, can sometimes be easily integrated into it.  In real
> world examples of ideative projection, the analysis of turn-the-crank
> imagination cannot easily be achieved just by using other (integrated or
> related) methods of internal ideative projection.  And as I just explained,
> simple correlation methods are not an easy substitute for insightful
> methods.
>
> Jim Bromer
>
>
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