Great. So that means if the NSA builds their embedded AGI successfully it's going to have a huge upper hand at world domination.
Too many things to worry about :( John From: Nanograte Knowledge Technologies via AGI [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Monday, March 2, 2015 7:23 PM To: AGI Subject: RE: [agi] Couple thoughts @John, Yes, the message may have come from you, but it did not only go to the recipient(s). There are layers of networked and/or "lone ranger" middlemen hardware and software, which intercept and decode and promote. The technologies for doing so for email and internet is already 15 years old. National-security laws strictly govern the public release of all encryption algorithms. Such technologies are layered over networked architectures as watchdogs, harvesters and messengers. In another role, they could also become assassins and saboteurs. These days, they simply get the data straight from social-networked cloud platforms, as we have seen in the news. Big data = centralized accessibility. Out of sight in the cloud = out of mind and personal control. Voila! Agent software are snooping, even locally-resident, content-driven objects. If needs be, they would record your keystrokes on your computer even before you encrypt. No commercial issues there then. Apparently, such technologies for touch screens read your fingerprints from the bottom of the screen and translate what you're saying, event hat you chose to delete and retype. The full record of every session. Even your editing profile. Bam! Bam! Try saying: "It wazn't me!" They'll have you type on a keyboard and match your typing profile (behavior) to the database and match your fingerprints and geo-location to the record you just produced in front of legal witnesses. patterns in everything then. "The Typer profile is ready Sir!" Agent-software types are invisible and only detectable via super-smart means. They are adaptive in that they could morph or relay messages via other types of networked layers specifically designed for them: eg, swarm. So, even if you catch the little bastard, his package is safe. It's a waste of time to even try. No secured work ethics, transmission or message encryption would ever be able to stop them for long. >From what I've read, the rule is quite clear: No decryption key handed to government = no government security release permission granted. Serious jail time, and perhaps even worse, for offenders. _____ From: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> To: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> Subject: RE: [agi] Couple thoughts Date: Tue, 3 Mar 2015 01:58:15 +0200 @Mike There is something unhackable, but we'll need to build it first. > Date: Mon, 2 Mar 2015 14:22:08 -0800 > Subject: Re: [agi] Couple thoughts > From: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > To: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > > I get the feeling there is nothing left unhackable. Even a > typewriter, they can plant a effing video recorder somewhere and film > you typing. It used to be you made fun of the guy with tin foil on > his head to "block transmissions." > > On 3/2/15, John Rose via AGI <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > wrote: > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: Matt Mahoney via AGI [mailto:[email protected]] > >> > >> Peers need to know when two messages are from the same source. If a peer > >> earns a reputation for being a reliable source of information (like Google > >> or > >> your bank), then malicious peers will try to spoof messages from them. To > >> prevent this, peers sign their messages using a mutually agreed secret > >> key > >> chosen at random. After an initial exchange (using e.g. Diffie-Hellman), > >> I > >> send you a message and a signature like SHA256(message + key). You > >> receive > >> the message, compute the signature, and compare it to the signature that > >> I > >> sent you. Since nobody else knows the key, and the hash is not invertible, > >> you > >> know the message must have come from me. > >> > > > > > > Well, that's the same as using HTTPS or another application layer protocol > > over TLS/SSL with certificates signed by a certificate authority no? Though > > in your communications protocol you control the signing and encryption > > algorithm and everyone need not get a CA signed cert I suppose. > > > > John > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------- > > AGI > > Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now > > RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/11943661-d9279dae > > Modify Your Subscription: > > https://www.listbox.com/member/? <https://www.listbox.com/member/?&;> & > > Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com > > > > > ------------------------------------------- > AGI > Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now > RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/26941503-0abb15dc > Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/? <https://www.listbox.com/member/?&;> & > Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com AGI | <https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now> Archives <https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/26941503-0abb15dc> | <https://www.listbox.com/member/?&;> Modify Your Subscription <http://www.listbox.com> AGI | <https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now> Archives <https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/248029-82d9122f> | <https://www.listbox.com/member/?&;> Modify Your Subscription <http://www.listbox.com> ------------------------------------------- AGI Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/21088071-f452e424 Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=21088071&id_secret=21088071-58d57657 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
